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Prosecution Without Representation
DOUGLAS L. COLBERT†
INTRODUCTION
Justice Souter: “I want to know whether your position is that an
individual may be brought by a police officer before a magistrate,
charged with no crime, required to post bail, and if he doesn’t post
bail, be held for three weeks without charge. . . . I’m asking
1
whether it would be constitutional without appointing counsel.”
Texas Solicitor General: “It would be—not be a violation of the
2
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”

Nearly a half-century since Gideon v. Wainwright3 and
its progeny guaranteed counsel to every poor person
charged with a felony or misdemeanor crime, a critical
question remained unanswered. After a criminal
prosecution begins, what is the precise moment when a
state must guarantee that an accused receives a lawyer’s incourt representation? While counsel’s early entry is crucial
to gain freedom, start an investigation, and guard against
† Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. A.B. 1968, SUNY at
Buffalo, J.D. 1972 Rutgers (Newark) Law School. I offer my sincere thanks to
Michael Pinard for offering his thoughtful comments and give special
recognition to Cindy Feathers for her excellent suggestions and ideas
throughout the writing of this Article. I am particularly appreciative of the
Maryland law students who participated in the survey and contributed to this
Article. They include Cherakana Feliciano, Tiffany Joly, Chris Madeio, Sally
McMillan, Tiffany Martinez, Eric Masick, Dennis Robinson, Cara Shepley,
Mariel Shutinya, Julia Solyar, and Brittany White. Special recognition goes to
Margot Kniffen for her dedication to the very end of this project, as well as to
Shana Ginsberg and Sameer Vadera for their valuable input.
1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29-30, Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554
U.S. 191 (2008) (No. 07-440).
2. Id. at 30 (Tex. Solicitor Gen. Gregory S. Coleman).
3. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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coerced pleas, the Supreme Court had never made clear if
Gideon mandates representation when lower-income
defendants initially appear before a judicial officer for a
determination of bail or pretrial release. In light of the lack
of a definitive holding by the Court, a checkered pattern
exists across the nation where states conduct bail hearings
without a defense counsel’s presence and indigent
defendants often do not gain the benefit of a lawyer’s
representation for many days, weeks, and even months
thereafter.
Recently, the Supreme Court made significant progress
toward declaring explicitly that Gideon’s guarantee includes
representation once a prosecution begins and an accused
appears before a judicial officer for a determination of bail.4
The Court ruled that an accused’s right to counsel attached
at the first appearance hearing and that states cannot
unreasonably delay assigning a lawyer to an indigent
defendant.5 The holding came in the case of Walter
Rothgery, who spent weeks in jail due to an error in
computer records, combined with the lack of timely
appointment of counsel until six months after his bail
hearing.6 As a result, Rothgery lost his home and
opportunity for employment.7 Rothgery’s use of civil rights
§ 1983 action8 led to a decision that illuminated the
Supreme Court’s current thinking about representation at
initial bail hearings.9 The Justices’ responses during oral
4. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 195-97.
7. Id. at 208; see infra p. 350.
8. “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress
. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). The § 1983 civil rights statute was originally
included as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, to provide a remedy against
racially motivated violence by white supremacist groups, such as the Ku Klux
Klan. See Linda E. Fisher, Anatomy of An Affirmative Duty to Protect: 42 U.S.C.
Section 1986, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 461, 471-74 (1999).
9. See generally Rothgery, 554 U.S. 191. This Article highlights the
importance of the bail determination at the defendant’s first judicial
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argument suggest that the narrow issue decided in Rothgery
v. Gillespie County could indicate that the Court is ready to
consider closing this fundamental post-Gideon gap—states
declining to guarantee a lawyer to represent an indigent
incarcerated defendant at the initial bail hearing and for
significant periods thereafter. When the Supreme Court
again considers this question, the criminal law and human
rights bar must stand ready to provide amicus support to
ensure that the Court understands the plight of
unrepresented state criminal defendants, and that the
outcome of the next key case promotes a just system by
strengthening the protection of individuals accused of
crimes.
A. Gideon v. Wainwright
Within the legal culture, few decisions are more revered
than the 1963 ruling in Gideon v. Wainwright, which
established an accused poor person’s guaranteed right to a
lawyer when charged with a felony.10 This landmark case
was decided at a moment in history when substantial
numbers of people supported human rights protests against
a system of racial segregation and class bias against the
poor.11 The case addressed the longstanding denial of

appearance. It recognizes the lack of uniformity among the fifty states regarding
the “label” used to characterize the initial judicial proceeding where a judge or
magistrate decides whether a defendant should be detained, released on bail or
other conditions, or released on his or her recognizance. For these reasons, this
Article uses “bail hearing” to emphasize what occurred at Rothgery’s, and other
defendants, first appearance. In Rothgery, the Supreme Court explained that,
“Texas law has no formal label for this initial appearance before a magistrate,
which is sometimes called the ‘article 15.17 hearing’; it combines the Fourth
Amendment’s required probable-cause determination with the setting of bail,
and is the point at which the arrestee is formally apprised of the accusation
against him.” Id. at 195 (citations omitted).
10. 372 U.S. 335, 344-45.
11. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding the
constitutionality of a Louisiana law that segregated train passengers on the
basis of their race). Many states applied Plessy’s “separate but equal” doctrine to
the public arena to maintain American-style “racial apartheid” for almost six
decades until 1954 when the Supreme Court ruled racial segregation
unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The postBrown civil rights struggle to gain citizenship and freedom rights for AfricanAmericans eventually led to a national March against Poverty in Washington,
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counsel violations embedded in a criminal justice system
that disproportionately impacted the rights of minority and
indigent defendants. The unanimous opinion declared that
a lawyer’s role is essential for guaranteeing fairness and
protecting the liberty of a poor person accused of
committing a crime.12 Reversing a 175-year-old practice, the
Court in Gideon recognized that “[t]he right of one charged
with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and
essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.”13
During the next decade, the Supreme Court extended
indigent
defendants’
guarantee
of
counsel
to
misdemeanors14 and to certain pretrial proceedings
considered to be “critical”15 stages of state criminal
proceedings. Beginning in 1974, however, the momentum
toward guaranteeing poor people access to counsel before
trial came to a sudden halt when the Court ruled in
Gerstein v. Pugh that indigent defendants were not entitled

D.C., during the summer of 1963. TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR
THE KING YEARS 1963-65, at 102-03, 131-34 (1998).

OF

FIRE: AMERICA

IN

12. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
13. Id.
14. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972) (holding that the right
to a trial lawyer includes counsel at a pretrial proceeding). “Counsel is needed so
that the accused may know precisely what he is doing, so that he is fully aware
of the prospect of going to jail or prison, and so that he is treated fairly by the
prosecution.” Id.
15. The standard focuses on the importance of the rights of an accused that
are at risk without counsel’s presence, such as pretrial liberty and the privilege
against self-incrimination, rather than on the ultimate outcome of the
infrequent trial. The Rothgery Court explained that “what makes a stage critical
is what shows the need for counsel’s presence.” Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554
U.S. 191, 212 (2008). The Court referred to “critical stages as proceedings
between an individual and agents of the State (whether ‘formal or informal, in
court or out,’) that amount to ‘trial-like confrontations,’ at which counsel would
help the accused ‘in coping with legal problems or . . . meeting his adversary.”
Id. at 212 n.16 (citations omitted); see also Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1,
9-11 (1970) (mandating counsel at the critical stage of a felony preliminary
hearing); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223-27 (1967) (post-indictment
lineup is a critical stage triggering right to counsel); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368
U.S. 52, 53-55 (1961) (arraignment on indictment is a critical stage). For an
argument that bail is a critical stage, see Douglas L. Colbert, Thirty-Five Years
After Gideon: The Illusory Right to Counsel on Bail Proceedings, 1998 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1, 35-37 [hereinafter Colbert, Illusory Right to Counsel].
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to representation for the initial probable cause
determination.16
Following Gerstein, many states’ practices denied
indigent defendants assigned counsel at the defendant’s
initial bail hearing to protect liberty and to commence
preparing a defense. Look inside most state and local
criminal courtrooms today and you are likely to find
defendants appearing alone and without a lawyer when first
facing a judicial officer,17 whether present in court or via
video broadcast.18 States’ pretrial jails are filled with
detainees who have no lawyer to advocate for their pretrial
freedom19 and who often wait in jail for days, weeks, and
sometimes even months following arrest before obtaining incourt representation.20 In contrast, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure guarantee counsel at an indigent
defendant’s bail hearing.21
16. 420 U.S. 103, 122-23 (1975).
17. See infra Part II.A.2 showing only ten states’ criminal procedure laws and
practices uniformly guarantee counsel at a defendant’s initial appearance
proceeding; see also app. tbl.I.
18. Commentators describe the “tremendous benefits” of video conferencing
to the state by reducing prisoners’ transportation costs, enhancing courtroom
security, and increasing judicial efficiency when judges can hear more cases in a
shorter time period. See, e.g., Anne Brown Poulin, Criminal Justice and Videoconferencing Technology: The Remote Defendant, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1089, 1100,
1098-1103 (2004). Professor Poulin recognizes that “the use of videoconferencing for bail hearing may have a negative impact on the defendant.” Id. at 1148.
Since the defendant is a primary source of information at a bail hearing, the
use of videoconferencing may impede the court's ability to assess the defendant's
credibility, and prevent the defendant from participating through questioning of
family or witnesses who can provide assurance at the bail stage. Id. at 1147-48.
Should counsel be present, the defendant cannot confer directly when facing
questions from the court or preparing what to say. Id.
19. The Bureau of Justice Statistics indicates that nationally, there were
477,500 incarcerated defendants awaiting trial in the states’ local jails between
2008 and 2009. See TODD D. MINTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2009—STATISTICAL TABLES 16 tbl.12 (June
2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim09st.pdf; infra
Part II.A.3 (describing delays before assigned counsel’s in-court representation
in states that do not guarantee counsel at the initial appearance).
20. See infra Part II.A.3.
21. Since 1966, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(a) guarantees counsel
to an indigent defendant “at every stage of the proceeding from initial
appearance through appeal.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(a).
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B. Rothgery’s Challenge: An Overview
The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Rothgery v.
Gillespie County22 represented a rare opportunity to address
a vital question: Is a poor person entitled to immediate
representation when first appearing at a bail hearing before
a judicial officer? The criminal prosecution of Walter
Rothgery dramatically illustrates why the answer is “yes.”
Rothgery was denied a courtroom advocate after being
arrested and wrongfully charged for being an ex-felon in
possession of a loaded gun.23 The fifty-two-year-old former
West Point cadet was never previously convicted of any
crime.24 The only blemish on his prior record was a 1996
felony drug arrest that was dismissed after he completed a
court diversion program.25 However, the computerized
criminal background check erroneously suggested that the
earlier arrest had resulted in a felony conviction.26 Rothgery
needed a lawyer’s assistance to show that an error occurred
but he lacked funds to hire one, and no court-appointed
attorney appeared when he faced the magistrate.27
Like most states,28 Texas did not guarantee counsel for
indigent defendants at their initial bail hearing.
Consequently, it was predictable that when Rothgery asked
a Texas magistrate to appoint a free attorney, the judicial
officer denied the request—using similar reasoning as the
judge in Gideon when he rejected Clarence Earl Gideon’s
plea for a lawyer nearly forty-five years earlier.29 The Texas
22. 554 U.S. 191 (2008).
23. Id. at 194-95.
24. See id. at 195.
25. Id. at 195 n.1.
26. Id. at 195.
27. Id. at 196.
28. See infra Part II.A.3.b.
29. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 337 (1963). “Mr. Gideon, I am
sorry, but I cannot appoint Counsel to represent you in this case. Under the
laws of the State of Florida, the only time the Court can appoint Counsel to
represent a Defendant is when that person is charged with a capital offense. I
am sorry, but I will have to deny your request to appoint Counsel to defend you
in this case[,]” replied the trial judge to Mr. Gideon’s application for counsel in
1961. Id. During oral argument before the Supreme Court, Florida’s Assistant
Attorney General explained the judge’s ruling that justified requiring Mr.
Gideon to defend himself without a defense lawyer:
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magistrate told Rothgery that eventually he could have an
assigned lawyer, but he would remain in jail without bail
until counsel was assigned and appeared.30 Rothgery opted
to represent himself. The Texas magistrate ordered $5,000
bail and the defendant’s return to his jail cell.31
Rothgery was more fortunate than many other
unrepresented
defendants.
Instead
of
remaining
incarcerated while the prosecution deliberated for ninety
days about whether to charge him with a felony,32 Rothgery
regained his liberty after his wife posted bail for him. Once
released, Rothgery persisted in making “several oral and
written requests for appointed counsel.”33 His efforts failed.
Rothgery remained without an attorney for six months until
indictment, when he was re-arrested and learned his bail
increased to $15,000.34 Unable to afford the amount,
Now, on its face, that [ruling] appears to be a misstatement of the law
because Florida does follow Betts versus Brady and in Florida a man is
entitled to counsel if he can show, if he is indigent and also he is
ignorant, illiterate or incompetent in some way. Since our brief has
been printed, I have received a letter from the trial judge who handled
this case. I asked him what happened at arraignment because I just
couldn’t believe that a judge would make this statement at the trial
without examining the man and finding out whether he really was
incompetent or unable to handle his own defense. And Judge McCurry
wrote back and said . . . “After talking with this defendant, it was my
opinion that he had both the mental capacity and the experience in the
courtroom at previous trials to adequately conduct his defense. This
was later borne out at the trial, as you can determine from examination
of the record in this case.”
Transcript of Oral Argument at 31-32, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (No. 155) (Fla. Ass’t Att’y Gen. Bruce R. Jacob).
30. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 196.
31. Id.
32. In felony cases, Texas law gives a prosecutor ninety days to be ready for
trial or the defendant must be released from jail. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 17.151 (West 2009). For an accused released on recognizance or bond and
awaiting trial, Texas prosecutors may present a felony charge to a grand jury
within “three years from the date of the commission of the offense.” Id. art.
12.01.
33. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 196; Interview with M. Patrick Maguire, Walter
Rothgery’s assigned Trial Attorney, in Balt., Md. (Nov. 11, 2008) [hereinafter
Maguire Interview].
34. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 196. Upon indictment, Texas criminal procedure
calls for an automatic review of the previous bail. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
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Rothgery again asked the presiding judicial officer to assign
counsel.35 This time, the judge agreed, but Rothgery
remained in custody for the next three weeks, waiting for
his lawyer’s appointment and appearance.36
Once Rothgery’s assigned counsel, M. Patrick Maguire,
entered the case, the advocate acted “promptly.”37 First, he
succeeded in persuading the prosecutor to consent to a bail
reduction, allowing Rothgery to regain his freedom.38
Thereafter, the attorney confirmed that his client had told
the arresting officer the truth about not having a prior
felony conviction. More than nine months following arrest,
Rothgery’s prosecutor dismissed the indictment.39
Rothgery then took an unusual step. Not satisfied that
the dismissal provided an adequate remedy, he pursued
justice through a civil action. With the able assistance of the
Texas Fair Defense Project, Rothgery sued the County.40 In
art. 17.09 (West 2009). According to Rothgery’s appellate counsel, William
Christian, a Texas judge granted the prosecutor’s request to raise Rothgery’s
bail. Shortly thereafter, he was arrested on the indictment. Telephone Interview
with William Christian, Walter Rothgery’s Appellate Counsel (Nov. 5, 2008).
Rothgery’s assigned trial lawyer, M. Patrick Maguire, indicated that a
prosecuting attorney made an ex parte application for a bail increase after
considering the potential danger of Rothgery’s gun possession. Maguire
Interview, supra note 33.
35. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 196.
36. Id. The presiding judge at Rothgery’s arraignment provided a form
request for counsel, which Rothgery claimed he submitted, but then learned
that it was misplaced. Maguire Interview, supra note 33. He filed a second
application four days later. Id. When assigned counsel Maguire received notice
of his appointment, he was engaged in a trial that prevented him from seeing
Rothgery until three weeks after Rothgery’s felony arraignment. See infra Part
I.B.
37. The Supreme Court opinion gave the impression that counsel corrected
the wrongful arrest and gained Rothgery’s release from jail soon after his
assignment, rather than three weeks later. The Court stated, “Rothgery was
finally assigned a lawyer, who promptly obtained a bail reduction (so Rothgery
could get out of jail) . . . . Counsel relayed . . . information to the district
attorney, who in turn filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, which was
granted.” Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 196-97; see also infra notes 91-93 and
accompanying text.
38. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 196-97.
39. Id. at 197.
40. Telephone Interview with Andrea Marsh, Esq., Texas Fair Defense
Project (Nov. 12, 2008) [hereinafter Marsh Interview].
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his § 1983 civil rights claim, Rothgery did not contend that
he had a constitutional right to counsel when he first
appeared before the Texas magistrate.41 Instead, Rothgery
argued that he was denied a constitutional right to obtain
counsel’s future assistance when County officials refused to
assign him a lawyer at his initial bail hearing and during
the six months he remained free on bond.42
During the Supreme Court oral argument, most
Justices indicated an interest in deciding the broad issue of
whether an indigent’s right to counsel included immediate
representation, particularly for the jailed defendant.43
Ultimately, the Court did not directly address the question
and reached consensus on Rothgery’s narrower position.
The 8-1 majority agreed that, when a police officer files a
criminal charge and a defendant appears before a judicial
officer, an adversarial criminal prosecution has commenced
and triggered the attachment of counsel.44 Once the
magistrate informed him of the charge, Rothgery’s right to
counsel “attached” and it was not necessary that a
prosecutor was aware of or participated in initiating the
prosecution. At a minimum, indigent defendants like
Rothgery were entitled to know their appointed lawyer’s
identity during a “reasonable” period following the first bail
hearing and the county could not delay counsel’s
appointment indefinitely.45
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court
considered Texas out of step with forty-three other states
that assigned counsel before, at, or following the initial bail

41. See infra Part I.C.
42. Complaint ¶¶ 23-32, Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 413 F. Supp. 2d 806
(W.D. Tex. 2006) (No. A-04-CA-456LY) [hereinafter Civil Rights Complaint]; see
also infra Part I.C.
43. See infra Part I.E.
44. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 191, 213.
45. Id. at 212. Following the Supreme Court’s ruling, the Fifth Circuit
remanded Rothgery’s suit to the trial court where the presiding judge’s
instructions to the jury will address the issue of reasonableness of the county’s
delay in assigning counsel. See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 537 F.3d 716, 716
(5th Cir. 2008) (“Under the circumstances, we think it advisable to vacate the
district court’s judgment and to remand for further proceedings that, from the
beginning, are consistent with the Court’s opinion.”).
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hearing.46 It left for another day the determination of what
is a “reasonable” delay following the filing of criminal
charges before a state must ensure representation for an
incarcerated and a released defendant.
Though Rothgery’s specific holding of when the right to
counsel attaches affirmed prior right to counsel rulings, its
“critical stage”47 analysis goes further and makes clear that
counsel must be provided at any proceeding that addresses
important rights of the defendant or involves a quasiadversarial confrontation with the state, such as Rothgery’s
first appearance before the magistrate. Initial bail
proceedings meet these tests, and guaranteeing counsel
would provide tremendous benefits for the criminal justice
system. Appointing counsel at a bail proceeding would
result in pretrial release for many indigent defendants
currently languishing in jail and produce a more
streamlined and just system. Counsel’s entry permits
immediate investigation, preparation of a defense, and
evaluation of the charge. It also provides a trial alternative
to defendants inclined to accept prosecutors’ “let’s make a
deal” plea offer to regain freedom. Counsel’s representation
also lessens the risk that an unrepresented defendant will
utter an inculpatory statement while speaking for himself
that a prosecutor subsequently uses at trial.48 In short,
counsel’s presence enhances the fairness and efficiency of
state criminal proceedings. Had Texas assigned a lawyer to
a released defendant like Rothgery, he likely would have
gained a speedy dismissal of the gun charge and been
spared the loss of liberty and economic losses flowing from
his pending weapons charge.
46. Brief for The Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 13, Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191 (2008) (No.
07-440) [hereinafter NACDL Brief].
47. See generally Colbert, Illusory Right to Counsel, supra note 15. This
Article focuses on the long delays indigent defendants face before obtaining an
assigned counsel’s assistance in court. The issue of bail as a critical stage, not
argued in Rothgery, is deserving of careful analysis of the Court’s clarification
and will be the subject of future scholarship. For a pre-Rothgery constitutional
discussion, see id.
48. See State v. Fenner, 846 A.2d 1020, 1034-35 (Md. 2004) (ruling admissible
the prosecutor’s use of an unrepresented defendant’s inculpatory statement at a
bail hearing that the defendant offered to mitigate the charge and to reduce the
bail amount).

2011] PROSECUTION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION

343

Though Rothgery took an important step,49 it deferred
answering two crucial questions. First, are states
constitutionally required to provide for counsel’s
representation and advocacy at the initial bail hearing? And
second, how long may states “reasonably” delay a lawyer’s
assistance to an incarcerated and released defendant
awaiting trial?
When these issues reach the Court in a subsequent
case, the Justices should consider the impact of denying
representation at the bail determination, and examine how
long indigent defendants have been waiting, following the
setting of bail, before gaining the benefit of an appointed
lawyer’s in-court representation. In Rothgery, this
information was not made available. This Article seeks to
fill the glaring gap by presenting a national survey of states’
current practices in lower criminal court proceedings.50
Examining the reality in each state presents a picture of the
often non-existent assigned counsel when lower-income
defendants enter the system and first appear before a
judicial officer. Most members of the bar and public may be
surprised to learn how many people are not represented by
a lawyer and that many wait five, ten, twenty, thirty days,
or longer before appointed counsel is present in court. The
49. See The Supreme Court 2007 Term: Leading Cases, 122 HARV. L. REV.
276, 306, 312 (2008) (“Rothgery will protect a subset of defendants—those
charged and released on bail—who currently do not have their right to counsel
activated when the prosecutor is unaware of their charges.”). The Rothgery
Court identified seven states—Alabama, Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Texas, and Virginia—that did not assign counsel “at, or [shortly]
after” the initial appearance. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 204-05
(2008). Additionally, Michigan, Mississippi, and New Hampshire do not provide
counsel at the initial appearance and delay counsel’s in-court appearance. See
app. tbl.II. In local courts in forty states, counsel is not present at the first
appearance but enters the proceedings at varying time periods ranging from as
few as two to seventy days. See app. tbls.II-IV.
50. See infra Part II. Federal court procedures are considerably different than
state procedures; since 1966, an accused is guaranteed counsel “at every stage of
the proceeding from initial appearance through appeal.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(a).
Supreme Court Justices’ limited experience with state court proceedings has led
some commentators to call for greater diversity to the Court’s composition. See,
e.g., Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Who the Supreme Court Needs Now, ROOT (May 1, 2009,
10:19 AM), http://www.theroot.com/views/who-supreme-court-needs-now?page
=0,1. During oral argument in Rothgery, several Supreme Court Justices
indicated they were not aware of state court practices of delaying assigning
counsel to indigent defendants. See infra Part II.E.2.
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Court, too, will have the opportunity to revisit its previous
assumption that most people charged with a felony have
access to counsel at the bail stage.51
This Article is also a call to action. The legal community
should take an active role as amici as it did in Rothgery,
where the Supreme Court acknowledged the criminal
justice and national bar’s significant contribution regarding
state practices in assigning counsel to indigent defendants.52
When the next post-Gideon issue reaches the Court,
defenders should likewise describe the reality and
infrequency of counsel standing with an assigned client at
the initial bail hearing, as well as how long indigent
defendants
must
wait
before
obtaining
in-court
representation. They should explain the critical difference a
lawyer’s immediate appearance makes in protecting an
accused’s liberty and limiting the state’s expense of
maintaining a growing pretrial jail population. Revealing
this rarely told story will assist the Court in choosing
between two starkly divergent, post-Gideon paths. The first
path brings Gideon full circle by guaranteeing
representation at an initial bail hearing for “any person
haled into court.”53 The second path justifies appointed
counsel’s delayed arrival until a “reasonable” period after
arrest. Because pretrial detention is considered a “carefully
limited exception”54 to the presumption of liberty before
trial, the amicus community should inform the Court about
the high stakes that await an accused, particularly
defendants who cannot afford bail and remain in jail.
Part I of this Article analyzes the Supreme Court ruling
in Rothgery v. Gillespie County. It recounts Rothgery’s life
51. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 180-81 (1991) (“The Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attaches at the first formal proceeding against an
accused, and in most States, at least with respect to serious offenses, free counsel
is made available at that time and ordinarily requested.”) (emphasis added).
Defendant McNeil had been represented by a public defender at his initial bail
appearance. Id. at 173; see also infra pp. 372-73, 383.
52. See infra Part IV.C.
53. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
54. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). In upholding a
congressional preventive detention law, Chief Justice Rehnquist indicated that
an accused’s pretrial release before trial is the usual practice. “In our society
liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully
limited exception.” Id.
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and experience in the Texas criminal justice system. After
reviewing the lower federal court rulings, Part I examines
the Supreme Court’s 8-1 ruling and focuses on the
attorneys’ oral argument with Justices who admitted their
lack of familiarity with state court practices and
demonstrated a sympathetic view toward unrepresented
detainees. While suggesting that Rothgery moved in the
right direction by reaffirming that the right to counsel
attaches at the initial appearance, Part I concludes that
states and localities will continue to refrain from providing
legal representation until the Justices explicitly declare
that Gideon’s principles apply to initial bail proceedings.
Part II presents the results of a national survey that
reveals assigned counsel’s widespread absence at the bail
stage and frequent delay before representing an accused in
court. Contrary to the popular belief that indigent
defendants are constitutionally entitled to a lawyer when
their liberty is at stake, only ten states guarantee
representation at the initial assessment of bail at an initial
appearance. In comparison, an equal number of states deny
counsel at initial bail proceedings uniformly throughout the
state, while the remaining thirty states assign appointed
counsel in select counties only. While these results show a
clear deficiency in failing to guarantee an accused’s early
access to counsel, Part II highlights a gradual trend toward
more states extending counsel’s advocacy to the initial bail
hearing.55
Part III examines Rothgery’s civil rights remedy for
extending a municipality’s responsibility to guarantee
counsel’s assignment after a criminal prosecution
commences.
Part IV discusses the mission that the bar, the criminal
justice system, and the human rights communities must
undertake: educating courts about right to counsel practices
at the bail stage of a criminal prosecution. Amicus
intervention by interested national and local organizations,
as well as by influential parties such as the Solicitor
General of the United States, will play an important role in
the Court’s deliberation and ruling in the next key case.

55. See also app. tbls.I-IV.
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I. THE WRONGFUL PROSECUTION OF WALTER ALLEN
ROTHGERY
A.

Background

Arrested for illegal possession of a handgun,56 Walter
Rothgery suffered the ultimate frustration of knowing he
was innocent, but could not establish his non-culpability
without counsel. Unfortunately for Rothgery, Gillespie
County, Texas, did not provide an accused indigent with
legal representation at his first appearance, a
“magistration”57 proceeding. Had one been assigned, his
lawyer’s phone calls to California authorities would have
produced the documentation to save Gillespie County from
prosecuting an innocent man based on an unfounded
accusation and incurring the cost of defending his
subsequent civil rights lawsuit. Counsel’s advocacy would
have exonerated Rothgery and spared him the adverse
consequences that accompanied his prosecution.
In the absence of an assigned lawyer, Gillespie County’s
wheels of justice moved at a deliberate pace. Six months
after arrest, a prosecutor presented Rothgery’s gun
possession case to a grand jury.58 The jurors knew nothing
about the computer glitch that made it appear that he had a
prior felony conviction, and they indicted him.
Only after Rothgery was rearrested and arraigned on
the indictment did the County authorize assignment of
counsel.59 Even then, Rothgery encountered a series of foulups that delayed meeting his appointed lawyer until after
he had remained in jail for three more weeks because he
could not afford bail.60 Justice Scalia aptly captured
Rothgery’s nightmarish ordeal two decades ago. Rothgery
was the “law-abiding citizen wrongfully arrested” on a
56. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 195 (2008).
57. Id.; see also Kirk v. State, 199 S.W.3d 467, 476 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006)
(explaining that Texas procedure refers to the defendant’s initial appearance as
an article 15.17 hearing, where a magistrate determines the issues of probable
cause and bail, and informs the accused of the charge). Practicing lawyers refer
to the initial appearance as a “magistration.” Maguire Interview, supra note 33.
58. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 196.
59. Id. at 196-97.
60. Id. at 196.
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serious felony charge, who unjustly lost his freedom while
being “compelled to await the grace of a Dickensian
bureaucratic machine” moving excruciatingly slowly before
it produced an assigned lawyer.61
Rothgery’s situation may seem unusual, but the
experience of being arrested, charged, and brought before a
judicial officer for the determination of bail without counsel
is a regular feature of most states’ pretrial justice systems.
Indeed, local courts’ judicial proceedings often proceed
without providing a defense lawyer at the first bail
hearing.62 These localities and states take the position that
money spent for assigned counsel at the initial bail hearing
is a “luxury” and not essential to legitimize a prosecution.63
They reject Gideon’s view that attorneys are “necessities”64
at the first bail hearing for ensuring equal justice to the
accused poor person facing a loss of freedom.
In keeping the pre-Gideon practices alive, where an
assigned lawyer for the indigent is nowhere to be found,
many prosecutors and judges take unfair advantage of the
unrepresented defendant. Defendants without a lawyer are
more likely to face bails they cannot afford and as a result,
lose their liberty without having been found guilty.65 Some
who maintain their innocence ultimately plead guilty to
avoid further incarceration until trial.66
61. Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 70-71 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(following arrest, a defendant must “promptly” appear within forty-eight hours
before a judicial officer).
62. See infra Part II.A.2 (only ten states guarantee counsel at the initial
appearance in court proceedings).
63. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Douglas L. Colbert,
Section Endorses Appointed Counsel at Bail Hearing, 13 CRIM. JUST. 17, 17
(1998) (“Most state courts, however, have chosen not to devote the resources
necessary to provide defense lawyers when people first enter the criminal justice
system.”).
64. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344 (“That government hires lawyers to prosecute
and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest
indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries.”).
65. Douglas L. Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and
Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1752-56
(2002) [hereinafter Colbert et al., Counsel at Bail].
66. Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process,
40 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 987 (1989) (describing the incentives for certain criminal
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Rothgery’s civil rights action represents the rare
challenge to a local government’s charging practice of
commencing
prosecution
without
guaranteeing
representation at the outset of a criminal proceeding. As
described in Part III, Rothgery’s pro-active civil rights claim
holds promise for encouraging states to conduct bail
proceedings with an assigned defense lawyer in the future.
B. The Saga Begins: Meet Walter Rothgery
Before arriving in Gillespie County, Texas, in the spring
of 2002, fifty-two-year-old Walter Rothgery lived in Arizona
where he was the manager of a storage company.67 The job
exposed him to personal danger, so he took advantage of an
Arizona law that permitted him to carry a loaded gun while
working.68 When Rothgery’s employer transferred him to
Fredericksburg, Texas, to manage a different property,
Rothgery was unaware that Texas law required a gun
permit and registration.69 Shortly after beginning his new
job, the former manager of the property threatened
Rothgery at gunpoint.70 Rothgery then decided to wear his
security gun belt and firearm at work, and continued to do
so even after he lost his job.71 “I thought it was legal,”72 he

defendants to plead guilty to charges, rather than face extended pre-trial
incarceration and a lengthier sentence after trial).
67. Civil Rights Complaint, supra note 42, ¶ 5.
68. Id. ¶¶ 6-7.
69. McGuire Interview, supra note 33; see also Civil Rights Complaint, supra
note 42, ¶ 5.
70. Civil Rights Complaint, supra note 42, ¶ 6 (“At one point during the
management transition, Mr. Rothgery went to the home of one of the outgoing
managers, Ray Barreto. When Mr. Barreto opened the door he had a gun in his
hand and was combative. Mr. Barreto lived near Mr. Rothgery’s home, and he
told Mr. Rothgery that he had a clear shot into Mr. Rothgery’s home from his
doorway.”).
71. Id. ¶¶ 7-9 (“After this confrontation during which Mr. Barreto threatened
Mr. Rothgery with a gun, Mr. Rothgery routinely wore a security guard belt
when he was in the Oakwood RV Park, where Mr. Barreto lived.”). Rothgery
contended that he lost his job due to “the outgoing management team’s failure to
cooperate with and adequately train” him. Id. ¶ 8. The police arrested him in
response to a resident’s call. Id. ¶¶ 9-10.
72. Maguire Interview, supra note 33.
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later explained to his assigned Texas lawyer, M. Patrick
Maguire.
Married for twenty-one years, Rothgery maintained a
steady employment record that supported him and his wife,
Patty.73 As a young man, he attended the United States
Military Academy at West Point until he was injured and
became disabled.74 After receiving an honorable discharge,
Rothgery attended Cleveland State College; he then worked
as a computer engineer before becoming a partner in a
jointly owned business.75 A co-partner’s embezzlement of
company funds, however, destroyed the enterprise and
resulted in Rothgery losing most of his assets.76 Despite this
setback, he soon found new employment and maintained a
law-abiding life. Indeed, before facing Gillespie County’s
firearm charge, Rothgery had never been convicted of a
crime.77 Attorney Maguire remembered their first meeting
at his law office and seeing a “well-groomed, no tattoo kind
of guy, probably in his late forties or early fifties. Walter
was a regular looking white guy,” Maguire recalled, “but
very indignant, a real firecracker. He kept saying, ‘I want to
sue the County.’ I had to talk him down before we could
have a conversation about his criminal charge.”78
Maguire soon understood why Rothgery had reason to
be upset. He had been wrongfully arrested and spent weeks
in jail after being indicted for a felony crime, unlawful
carrying of a firearm by a felon that carried a maximum of
ten-years and mandatory two-year prison sentence.79 “I have
never been a convicted felon,” Rothgery maintained.80 Aware
that this was the only time Rothgery had spoken to a lawyer
since his arrest nearly seven months earlier, Maguire
73. Id.
74. Llano Man Wins Supreme Court Decision, LLANO NEWS (Tex.) (July 2,
2008), http://www.llanonews.com/news/article/4524.
75. Id.
76. Marsh Interview, supra note 40.
77. Id.; see also Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 195 (2008);
Maguire Interview, supra note 33.
78. Maguire Interview, supra note 33.
79. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.04 (West 2004).
80. Maguire Interview, supra note 33; see also Civil Rights Complaint, supra
note 42, ¶ 11.
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listened as his client explained the many futile written
requests for counsel and lost application forms he had
submitted. As they continued speaking, Maguire considered
how any person would react if prosecuted and jailed for a
felony crime he was certain he did not commit and then was
refused counsel.81
Attorney Maguire recalled that he had been on trial
when he received the court’s assignment and had been
unable to see Rothgery while he was in jail. “Rothgery had
been transferred to the county jail, a three-and-one-half
hour drive, and I could not manage to take a full day to get
there,” Maguire explained.82 He remembered speaking to
Rothgery’s wife, who emphasized that his weapon always
remained holstered. “Once I heard that information, I called
the Assistant District Attorney who reviewed the police
report. After that, she had no difficulty consenting to a bail
reduction to the prior amount.”83
Rothgery told Maguire everything that happened
following his arrest and release from jail. He explained his
unsuccessful search for new employment.84 Rothgery found
the pending felony blocked any job possibilities. “No one
wanted to hire someone they thought was a prior felon who
now faced a new felony of carrying a loaded gun and
allegedly making threats,” his lawyer explained.85 Without a
regular income, Rothgery and his wife lost their rental
home. Then when Rothgery found a landlord willing to
accept his labor in exchange for paying the monthly rent, he
faced the most serious disruption—his loss of freedom.
“Walter had been free on bail for six months when an officer
suddenly appeared and rearrested him for his original gun
charge. Only then was he told about the indictment and the
tripling of his bail,” Maguire recounted.86 Three days later,
he received more bad news: correctional officials transferred
81. Maguire Interview, supra note 33.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.; Civil Rights Complaint, supra note 42, ¶ 14 (“[A]ll of the potential
employers he contacted knew or learned of the criminal charge pending against
him in Gillespie County, and Mr. Rothgery was unable to find any employment
for wages.”).
85. Maguire Interview, supra note 33.
86. Id.
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him to the county prison, which meant he could no longer
receive regular visits from his wife.87 Adding to Rothgery’s
woes, he told his lawyer about the “half-dozen times [he]
asked for a court-appointed counsel”88 without any success.
Upon learning that Rothgery lost his home, three weeks
of freedom, had no job, was separated from his wife, and
had no legal representation, Maguire understood why
Rothgery had reason for “raising hell when we first spoke.”89
But, it was when Maguire began his factual investigation
and looked into Rothgery’s claim of innocence that the
injustice became apparent. “He kept saying he had never
been convicted of a felony crime. I have heard many clients
deny the charge, but the more I looked into it, the more I
began to truly understand. Walter Rothgery was absolutely
right. He had been wrongfully charged with a felony
crime.”90
Maguire recalled the moment of his investigation. “I
still remember the day I called Orange County. I started
with the Internet and made a dozen calls to clerks and law
officials. I finally reached a probation officer who told me
Rothgery had received a deferred adjudication and that his
felony arrest had been dismissed. Rothgery had been right
87. Id.
88. Id. On January 19, 2003, Rothgery was rearrested on the indictment. The
following day he appeared before the magistrate and asked about his pending
request for counsel that he had filed shortly after his first appearance. The
magistrate provided a new request form, which Rothgery completed and gave to
county employees responsible for filing it with the court. After he was
transferred to the Comanche County jail, Rothgery asked about the pending
request and was told no one had any information. He then re-filed his request.
On January 23, 2003, Judge Ables approved the request and appointed M.
Patrick Maguire. Id.; see also Civil Rights Complaint, supra note 42, ¶¶ 16-17.
Mr. Maguire contacted his client, “probably by phone” on January 31, 2003, and
informed Rothgery he was on trial. Maguire Interview, supra note 33; see also
Civil Rights Complaint, supra note 42, ¶ 18. Maguire explained that the County
allowed lawyers to reach clients held at Comanche by phone. Maguire
Interview, supra note 33. Having spoken to the prosecutor and arranged for a
bail reduction to the former amount, Attorney Maguire wrote Rothgery on
February 5, 2003 and told him he would soon be released. Id. On February 8,
2003, twenty-one days after his arrest, Rothgery regained his freedom. Civil
Rights Complaint, supra note 42, ¶ 19.
89. Maguire Interview, supra note 33.
90. Id.
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all along.”91 Maguire immediately called the Gillespie
County prosecutor and gained her consent for a bail
reduction that freed Rothgery. Maguire obtained the
California records and forwarded the documentation to the
Gillespie County prosecutor.92 Nine-and-one-half months
after his arrest, a judge dismissed the felony weapons
charge against Rothgery.93
Few of these facts are included in the federal court
opinions that summarily rejected Rothgery’s civil rights
action against Gillespie County. As is frequently true, a
court’s published decision rarely tells the story of a litigant’s
experience with a state’s legal system. When the United
States Supreme Court reviewed the lower court rulings, it
too presented a condensed version of the facts. Analyzing
what was said at oral argument, however, gives more flavor
to Rothgery’s ordeal. Further, the Justices’ comments shed
light on the Supreme Court’s limited knowledge of counsel’s
unavailability in state courts and surprise at learning that
jailed defendants may be without counsel.94
Rothgery represented an important affirmation of prior
right to counsel decisions that the lower federal courts had
circumvented in Rothgery’s particular case. The next
Section examines the District and Circuit Court dismissals
of Rothgery’s civil rights claim and sets the scene for the
Supreme Court’s consideration of his suit against Gillespie
County.
C. Rothgery’s Civil Rights Claim Against Gillespie County,
Texas
Rothgery’s civil rights suit against Gillespie County was
straightforward. Since 1978, the Supreme Court has
recognized that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a federal remedy
against a municipality’s policy, practice, and custom that
deprived a person of a protected constitutional right.95
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Civil Rights Complaint, supra note 42, ¶ 21.
94. See infra Part II.E.
95. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 658-59 (1978) (overruling
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), which had held that local governments are
immune from suit under § 1983).
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Rothgery’s attorneys contended that Gillespie County’s
practice of not assigning counsel at his initial bail hearing
and during the six months he remained free pending trial
until his indictment had deprived him of his Sixth96 and
Fourteenth97 Amendment right to counsel.98 The lawyers
maintained that Gillespie County engaged in an unwritten
policy, practice, and custom of systematically refusing to
appoint counsel to all alleged felons who posted bond and
gained release prior to indictment, regardless of their dire
financial circumstances.99
Rothgery’s civil rights lawyers relied on a series of postGideon, Supreme Court rulings beginning in 1972. That
year, Kirby v. Illinois established that a poor person’s right
to counsel “attached” once a criminal prosecution
commenced and a defendant appeared at an adversarial
judicial proceeding.100 The Kirby Court never explained
whether attachment entitled an accused to counsel or to the
appointment of a lawyer at the accused’s first appearance.
However, it illustrated the type of criminal proceedings that
triggered a Sixth Amendment right. As in Kirby, a
defendant might face a criminal charge contained in a
grand jury indictment or appear at the arraignment

96. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
97. Rothgery asserted that the County deprived him of access to counsel for
six months in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Id.
amend. XIV; see also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (“The right to
be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the
right to be heard by counsel.”).
98. Civil Rights Complaint, supra note 42, ¶¶ 23-24, 26-27, 29-30. When
brought before the judge, Rothgery indicated he had made a written request for
counsel. According to Rothgery, the presiding judge declared that, “he would
have to wait in jail until an appointment was made.” Rothgery v. Gillespie
Cnty., 413 F. Supp. 2d 806, 808 n.3 (W.D. Tex. 2006). Rothgery then waived his
right to counsel for purposes of the bail determination. Id.
99. Id. at 810. Rothgery’s § 1983 civil rights claim also alleged the County
engaged in a custom and practice of inadequately training its employees who
were responsible for processing indigent defendants’ requests for assigned
counsel and of not adequately monitoring assigned counsel’s prompt contacts
with their indigent clients. Id.
100. 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972).
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proceeding.101 Alternatively, a prosecutor could file charges
in a criminal information or present evidence of a felony
crime at a preliminary hearing.102 Each event, said the Kirby
Court, evidenced the State’s initiative of commencing an
“adversarial” proceeding.103 Additionally, each event showed
that “the government has committed itself to prosecute” by
placing the defendant in a situation where he “finds himself
faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society”104
and in immediate need of “rely[ing] on counsel as a
‘medium’ between him and the State.”105
While these examples were useful, Kirby left other
questions unanswered. Rothgery, for instance, had been
arrested on a weapons charge; he was not facing a
prosecutor-initiated
indictment,
information,
or
a
preliminary hearing when he first appeared before a
magistrate in the lower criminal court. Would Kirby’s
“attached” right to counsel entitle him to counsel’s in-court
representation? Or did it merely protect against a custodial
police interrogation without prior communication with a
lawyer? In other words, was the arresting officer’s
warrantless, on-the-scene arrest and filing of an affidavit
complaint enough to establish that the government was
sufficiently serious and committed to prosecution? Or was
something more “formal” needed to show that Rothgery had
become vulnerable to “prosecutorial forces of organized
society”? And, in deciding whether Rothgery’s initial
appearance was “adversarial,” must a prosecutor be present
or, at least, involved when the arresting officer filed
charges, as the County argued?106
These and other issues caused lawyers and scholars to
exercise caution when construing indigent defendants’ right
to counsel at the initial appearance.107 It also explained
101. The right to counsel “attaches only at or after the time that adversary
judicial proceedings have been initiated . . . whether by way of formal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” Id. at 688-89.
102. Id. (citing Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970)).
103. Id. at 688.
104. Id. at 68
105. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985).
106. See infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Alan Austin, Note, The Pretrial Right to Counsel, 26 STAN. L.
REV. 399, 412 (1974) (“Although the holding in Kirby is arguably not
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Rothgery’s legal strategy of advocating that his right to an
assigned counsel had “attached” when he first appeared
before the Texas magistrate, rather than asserting that he
was entitled to counsel’s actual representation. The strategy
seemed sensible for pursuing his § 1983 civil rights remedy.
It also would provide the civil rights bar with clarification of
Kirby and other post-Gideon rulings regarding the meaning
of an attached right to counsel at the initial bail hearing.108
For while the Supreme Court had made clear that an arrest
did not commence a prosecution,109 scholars were uncertain
as to whether the Court construed Kirby strictly to limit an
accused’s right to counsel to the specific examples
mentioned or whether the Court intended to offer a less
formalistic interpretation.110 As the following Sections
detail, even Rothgery’s limited right to counsel claim proved
unsuccessful before the lower federal courts.
1. Rothgery v. Gillespie County in the Federal Courts
Despite his arrest and incarceration, the United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas and a threejudge panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals did not
view Rothgery’s civil rights claim as a slam-dunk for
bringing his civil rights case before a trial jury. In fact, the
three-judge appellate panel described its struggle to discern
“the sometimes elusive degree to which the prosecutorial
forces of the [S]tate have focused on an individual”111 that
would trigger an indigent defendant’s attached right to
counsel. Both courts considered Kirby’s language
controlling; adversarial judicial proceedings commenced
when “the government has committed itself to prosecute.”112
inconsistent with prior precedent in a technical sense, the opinion is clearly
inconsistent with the functional rationale of the cases which it purports to
follow.”).
108. See Brief for Twenty-Four Professors of Law as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioner, Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191 (2008) (No. 07-440)
[hereinafter Twenty-Four Professors Brief].
109. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 190 (1984) (“[W]e have never held
that the right to counsel attaches at the time of arrest.”).
110. See supra note 107.
111. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 491 F.3d 293, 297 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Lomax v. Alabama, 629 F.2d 413, 415 (5th Cir. 1980)).
112. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
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Yet, they searched for clear signs of when the prosecution
had charged a person with a crime and commenced an
adversarial proceeding.
As explained below, neither federal court was convinced
that the arresting officer’s affidavit and criminal complaint
against Rothgery demonstrated the necessary commitment
to prosecute without a prosecutor’s participation at the
defendant’s initial appearance. Nor were they persuaded
that prior Supreme Court rulings supported Rothgery’s
claim, despite consistent language that an accused’s right to
counsel attached when he first appeared at a bail hearing
before a judicial officer.113 Indeed, in affirming the District
Court ruling, the Fifth Circuit appellate panel appeared
unimpressed with the court’s trilogy of Brewer v.
Williams,114 Michigan v. Jackson,115 and McNeil v.
Wisconsin,116 which it characterized as “[a]t most . . . neutral
on the point . . . [and] simply not enough for us to ignore our
binding authority.”117 The Fifth Circuit’s reliance on its
“prosecutorial
involvement”
theory
and
its
misinterpretation of Supreme Court precedent virtually
assured that the Justices would grant certiorari.118
2. U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas
United States District Court Judge Yeakel found little
merit to Rothgery’s civil rights cause of action. After
reviewing the arresting officer’s “Affidavit of Probable
Cause”119 in support of his weapons charge against
Rothgery, and relevant case law, Judge Yeakel was
persuaded that the magistrate judge had no constitutional

113. See infra notes 193-204 and accompanying text.
114. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
115. 475 U.S. 625, 629 n.3 (1986).
116. 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
117. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 491 F.3d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 2007).
118. See id. at 297-98.
119. “This affidavit purports to set forth facts personally observed by the
arresting officer regarding Rothgery’s actions on July 15, 2002, and charges
Rothgery committed the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, a
third degree felony.” Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 413 F. Supp. 2d 806, 808 (W.D.
Tex. 2006).
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duty to appoint counsel.120 He, therefore, granted the
County’s motion for summary judgment.121
From the outset of his written opinion, it was apparent
that the judge had determined that “no formal charges” had
been filed nor adversarial criminal proceedings initiated
when the arresting officer presented his affidavit to the
Texas magistrate.122 The judge did acknowledge, however,
that the Supreme Court had previously recognized a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel at certain
“critical stages” of criminal proceedings.123 Yet, Judge
Yeakel declared that Texas law “has not set forth a [similar]
‘bright-line rule’” for determining when criminal
proceedings commence or what constitutes a “critical
stage.”124
Indeed, reviewing Texas state court interpretations of
Texas law, the federal judge concluded that an officer’s
probable cause affidavit could not be deemed a formal
adversarial charge.125 To the contrary, he found that Texas
courts only accepted such affidavits to commence an arrest
warrant prosecution, but had never “expressly” applied the
same type of reasoning to Rothgery’s warrantless arrest.126
Finding “no case holding, or even discussing the possibility”
that the officer’s affidavit and complaint constituted a
formal charge in such situations, the court accepted Texas’s
argument.127 Rothgery had failed to establish that the
arresting officer’s affidavit formally charged him with a
crime that would trigger his Sixth Amendment right to
assigned counsel. In a warrantless arrest situation, the
officer’s affidavit was limited to the magistrate’s
determination of probable cause.128
120. Id. at 816-17.
121. Id. at 817.
122. Id. at 814.
123. Id. at 815.
124. Id. at 812.
125. Id. at 814.
126. See id. at 813, 817.
127. Id. at 813.
128. Texas procedure defines an “affidavit made before the magistrate . . . a
‘complaint’ if it charges the commission of an offense.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 15.04 (West 2010). The district judge distinguished this type of
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The semantic difference had significant constitutional
consequences. Finding that sworn allegations were
inadequate to formally charge a felony crime meant that
Rothgery’s right to counsel never “attached” and relieved
Texas of its constitutional obligation to assign counsel
“before, at or after” his initial appearance.129
Even if the affidavit had been sufficient to commence a
criminal prosecution, said Judge Yeakel, it would not suffice
to constitute an adversarial proceeding and to attach
Rothgery’s right to counsel.130 The court reasoned that
Rothgery had never been confronted “by the procedural
system, or by his expert adversary, or by both” at his initial
bail hearing.131 “[T]he summary-judgment record does not
reflect any involvement of the Gillespie County District
Attorney’s Office[,]” declared the court, adding that only a
prosecutor had the power to initiate a criminal
prosecution.132 Since none appeared or participated in the
filing of a criminal charge, Rothgery had never been an
accused “confronted with prosecutorial forces.”133 A contrary
ruling, Judge Yeakel suggested, “would violate Supreme
Court precedent equating adversarial judicial proceedings
with criminal prosecutions, which necessarily implies
involvement or, at a minimum, awareness of the
prosecutor.”134 From the court’s perspective, the arresting
officer’s affidavit and filing of a weapons charge never
complaint as limited to arrest warrants and not to Rothgery’s warrantless
arrest, but acknowledged that “there is little case law on the issue.” Rothgery,
413 F. Supp. 2d at 812-13.
129. See NACDL Brief, supra note 46, at 13 (“[Forty-three] states, the District
of Columbia, and the federal government supply counsel to indigent defendants
either before, at, or directly after an initial appearance.”); see also Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (“Whatever else it may mean, the right to
counsel . . . means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or
after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him.”).
130. Rothgery, 413 F. Supp. 2d at 814-16.
131. Id. at 815 (quoting United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 310 (1973)).
132. Id. at 816.
133. Id. at 815.
134. Id. at 816. The district court judge positioned his ruling as “consistent
with Supreme Court and with Fifth Circuit precedent . . . [that] has repeatedly
stated that ‘the initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere
formalism.’” Id. at 815 (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)); see
also infra text accompanying notes 167-73.
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initiated a criminal prosecution, and thus Rothgery was
precluded from invoking a Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.135
Such words have particular irony for defendants like
Rothgery, who had already been charged, detained, denied
counsel, brought to court, and ordered jailed by a judicial
magistrate. They would stare in disbelief if told that no
prosecution had commenced because a prosecutor chose to
remain on the sidelines while a police officer filed the
criminal charge. Such defiance of common sense illustrates
the rationale that has blocked Gideon from having real
meaning as to the right to counsel after a person has been
charged with committing a crime. The district court opinion
shows no insight as to the plight of the presumptively
innocent and falsely accused person repeatedly thwarted in
efforts to obtain assigned counsel. Surely, Rothgery felt like
“an accused confronted with prosecutorial forces” when
taken into custody and brought before a magistrate judge.
3. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Affirms
When Rothgery appealed the district court’s decision to
a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
Gillespie County maintained that the prosecution had never
committed itself to prosecute when Rothgery first appeared
before the magistrate.136 Only a prosecutor, not a police
officer, the County argued, may commit the prosecutorial
resources necessary to initiate a weapons prosecution.137 The
prosecutor here had been a passive bystander.138 Since
Rothgery had not been formally charged—Texas did not
consider the magistration bail proceeding comparable to an
arraignment within the meaning of Kirby—the County
argued that it had no constitutional obligation to assign
counsel.139 Under this view, Texas argued it could
legitimately refuse to assign a lawyer to Rothgery and other
released defendants facing felony charges until indictment
135. Id. at 814, 816.
136. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 491 F.3d 293, 297 (5th Cir. 2007).
137. Id. at 297; see also Respondent’s Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 10, Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty, 554 U.S. 191 (2008) (No. 07-440).
138. Rothgery, 491 F.3d at 297.
139. Id. at 296.
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or a recognized “critical” stage occurred.140 The County’s
position justified denying counsel to indigent defendants for
an indeterminate period after arrest, while they awaited a
prosecutor’s determination of whether or not to prosecute.
The Fifth Circuit three-judge panel provided an
excellent preview of the legal hurdles that Rothgery would
confront in the Supreme Court. The appellate panel
declared it would reject “rely[ing] formalistically” on a Kirby
“label given to a particular pretrial event” in deciding
whether Rothgery’s right to counsel attached at the initial
bail proceeding.141 The appellate judges promised to
scrutinize the point where the defendant faced the
“prosecutorial forces of organized society.”142 Yet when
applying the analysis, the panel examined only the conduct
and activities of the prosecution. It gave scant attention to
Rothgery’s experience as the subject of arrest and to
charging
procedures
central
to
a
government’s
prosecution.143
The appellate court concluded that for adversary
proceedings to commence and for counsel to attach, the
prosecution must take affirmative action and show “some
. . . awareness or involvement” related to the defendant’s
arrest, charges, or appearance at a magistration bail
hearing.144 The court’s meaning was clear: the prosecution
was the controlling force in determining the accused’s right
to counsel. The appellate panel highlighted the prosecutor’s
invisibility when the arresting officer charged Rothgery and
presented his affidavit to the magistrate judge.145
Relying on a previous Fifth Circuit ruling, the panel
found that the officer’s affidavit-complaint fell short of what
State law required to initiate an adversarial judicial
140. See id. at 296. By illustration, the State cited an accused’s right to
counsel at a felony preliminary hearing, see Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 910 (1970), while conceding that such hearings are rarely conducted. See
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 39-40.
141. Rothgery, 491 F.3d at 296.
142. Id. at 296-97 (quoting Caver v. Alabama, 577 F.2d 1188, 1195 (5th Cir.
1978)).
143. See id. at 297-300.
144. Id. at 297 n.7.
145. Id. at 297.
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proceeding.146 The prosecutor’s non-participation in
Rothgery’s arrest or the filing of charges showed the County
had not yet committed to prosecution, but would make that
decision at a later time. Rothgery gave “no reason” to
impute the arresting officer’s actions to the prosecutor.147
The filing of charges, said the appellate court, did not
“signal that Rothgery was opposed by the prosecutorial
forces of the state.”148 That conclusion must have surprised
police and prosecuting officials who work closely together to
prosecute crime and convict offenders. Prosecutorial
commitment, declared the court, requires a prosecutor to
take “some” step forward before imposing a duty on a
magistrate to assign counsel.149 Since the prosecution had
not done so, no adversarial criminal proceeding commenced.
Rothgery’s right to counsel never attached.150
The Fifth Circuit panel went on to discuss other legal
obstacles that would be the subject of Supreme Court
review. First, the panel distinguished two prior Supreme
Court rulings, Brewer v. Williams and Michigan v. Jackson,
where the Court held that adversarial proceedings begin,
and thus counsel attaches, at a defendant’s initial
appearance before a judicial officer.151 The panel asserted
that in these cases, the Court failed to “address[ ] the issue
of prosecutorial involvement, much less the relevance of
prosecutorial involvement under Texas law.”152 The Fifth
Circuit suggested that in Jackson, a prosecutor had been
involved, and contrasted Rothgery’s appearance at a
magistration hearing with Jackson’s “arraignment” where
counsel had attached.153 Though the panel had said that it
would look past formal labels, it did not. Instead, the court
146. See id. at 294 (citing McGee v. Estelle, 625 F.2d 1206, 1208-09 (5th Cir.
1980) (“[A] warrantless arrestee’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to
counsel does not attach in Texas when [a defendant] appears before a
magistrate for statutory warnings if prosecutors are unaware of and uninvolved
in the arrest and appearance [of the defendant].”)).
147. Id. at 297, 301.
148. Id. at 297.
149. Id. at 297 n.7.
150. Id. at 300-01.
151. Id. at 297-98.
152. Id. at 298.
153. See id.
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refused to consider the magistration proceeding as the
equivalent of an arraignment.
The appellate panel also agreed with distinctions as to
arrests pursuant to a warrant and warrantless arrests.154
The panel’s legal authority was unconvincing when
asserting that “the relationship between a complaint and
the commencement of a prosecution in Texas is less clear
than Rothgery claims.”155 Its’ ruling rested on a decision
where the State’s highest court “chose not to decide whether
the [warrantless] complaint initiated adversary judicial
proceedings.”156
The Fifth Circuit concluded that a criminal prosecution
and adversary proceeding had not commenced against
Rothgery, despite the arresting officer’s affidavit of probable
cause, in which he stated, “I charge . . . [the] Defendant,
Walter A. Rothgery, did . . . commit the offense of unlawful
possession of a firearm by a felon . . . .”157 Construing the
purpose of the affidavit literally, the appellate court
concluded it was intended only for a probable cause
determination, not to support a formal charge against
Rothgery.158 The Fifth Circuit panel stated: “[W]e simply
cannot assume that the affidavit filed in this case was the
same type of complaint addressed in the cases cited by
Rothgery or that it served the same function as those
complaints.”159 The court decided that the officer’s complaint
was “part of the investigatory process, serving solely to
validate the arrest without committing the state to
prosecute.”160
There was little concern for Rothgery and other indigent
defendants in similar predicaments seeking a lawyer’s
assistance to regain their liberty. Most telling, the court
rationalized that the prosecutor’s six-month delay in
154. See id. at 299.
155. Id. The appellate panel concluded that, “the filing of the affidavit was
part of the investigatory process, serving solely to validate the arrest without
committing the state to prosecute.” Id. at 301.
156. Id. at 299 (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 295.
158. Id. at 300-01.
159. Id. at 300.
160. Id. at 301.
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obtaining an indictment was necessary to determine the
government’s intention to prosecute.161 The Fifth Circuit
never considered the impact on the presumptively innocent
defendant of waiting for a lawyer to appear to commence
preparing a defense against a false accusation.
The Fifth Circuit reasoning demonstrated the barriers
to Rothgery’s claim that Gillespie County had raised by
continuing to prosecute poor people without guaranteeing a
defense lawyer. Both federal courts were reluctant to
interfere with Texas’ practice and refused to order the State
to assign counsel when indigent defendants first appeared
for a bail hearing before a judicial officer. Rothgery’s
lawyers knew they had only one remaining hope: certiorari
review. Focusing on the Fifth Circuit’s dismissive attitude
toward Supreme Court precedent,162 and on discrediting the
appellate panel’s “prosecutorial involvement” standard,
Rothgery’s petition convinced the Supreme Court to decide
whether the assigned right to counsel requires a
prosecutor’s participation in initiating a criminal charge.163
D. The Supreme Court Rules: Counsel Attaches at the
Initial Appearance
Gillespie County’s brief presented the Supreme Court
with the same seductive argument it had delivered to the
Fifth Circuit: “adversarial” criminal proceedings cannot
begin without an adversary.164 Since the prosecutor had
neither been present at the initial appearance, nor involved
161. See id.
162. The Fifth Circuit distinguished Rothgery’s warrantless arrest from the
situation the Supreme Court addressed in Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625
(1986) and Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), where the defendants had
been arraigned on an arrest warrant. Rothgery, 491 F.3d at 298. The Fifth
Circuit panel identified Brewer’s and Jackson’s arraignment as a specific Kirby
example of a pretrial event that initiated an adversary judicial proceeding and
required counsel attaching. See id.
163. The Supreme Court went on to reject Gillespie County’s opposing
argument that Rothgery’s felony was not yet a “formal charge,” that his right to
counsel had not attached, and that the Fifth Circuit had correctly construed
Supreme Court precedent to deny assigning counsel at his initial magistration
hearing. See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 210-12 (2008).
164. Brief for Respondent at 10, Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191
(2008) (No. 07-440).
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in the charging decision, the prerequisite for commencing
an adversary proceeding and for counsel attaching was
missing. Omit the prosecutor, Gillespie County seemed to be
saying, and no court could conclude the State was
committed to prosecute.
Such logic had appealed to both lower federal courts.
The Fifth Circuit’s line marking when Rothgery’s right to
counsel “attached” required a prosecutor’s visibility at the
charging and initial appearance stages.165 The panel viewed
Rothgery’s claim to counsel as an opportunity to extend the
Fifth Circuit’s “involvement and awareness” standard to
warrantless arrests.166 Neither federal court considered the
consequence of the prosecutor’s boundary line: indigent
defendants’ access to counsel would be delayed as long as a
prosecutor remained out of sight following arrest, allowing
the arresting officer to assume the charging role. This tactic
ensured that accused indigents would remain without a
lawyer, and frequently in custody, until a prosecutor
surfaced and declared: “I am ready to prosecute” or “Not
interested. Move to dismiss.”
1. The Decision
The Supreme Court Justices wasted no time rejecting
the lower court rulings. After describing the facts and
reviewing the lower court proceedings, Justice Souter, who
authored the 8-1 decision, made clear that the Fifth Circuit
had been in “error” when it rejected Rothgery’s plea for
counsel because no prosecutor had participated in initiating
his prosecution.167 That court had had been wrong, Justice
165. Rothgery, 491 F.3d at 297; see also supra notes 144-50 and accompanying
text.
166. See Rothgery, 491 F.3d at 297.
167. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 193, 198-99. While eight Justices agreed that
counsel’s attachment did not depend upon a prosecutor’s involvement or
presence at the initial appearance, two concurring opinions accompanied the
Court’s majority decision. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia wrote briefly
to indicate they believed Brewer and Jackson were controlling. Id. at 213.
Justice Alito, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia, emphasized that
the Court decided only “when” counsel attached and not whether “the [C]ounty
had an obligation to appoint an attorney to represent petitioner . . . after his
magistration . . . . That question lies beyond our reach.” Id. at 216 (Alito, J.,
concurring). Justice Alito went on to emphasize that “[t]he Court expresses no
opinion on whether Gillespie County satisfied that obligation in this case.” Id. at
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Souter explained, because it “effectively focused not on the
start of adversarial judicial proceedings, but on the
activities and knowledge of a particular state official who
was presumably otherwise occupied.”168 The eight-Justice
consensus recognized the enhanced prosecutorial power that
the “involvement” standard gave prosecutors. By remaining
absent during the days or weeks following arrest, they could
suspend an accused’s right to counsel and control when an
assigned attorney entered a felony case.
The Supreme Court’s majority opinion expressed
concern that the Fifth Circuit had invoked a constitutional
standard that the high court had never “said a word about”
in prior decisions.169 The Justices rejected the Fifth Circuit’s
“attachment rule that turned on . . . [the] prosecutor’s first
involvement[,]” and characterized it as “‘wholly unworkable
and impossible to administer.’”170 Rothgery, said the
Justices, had been accused of a crime and deprived of his
liberty when he appeared at his initial judicial proceeding.
“[W]hat counts . . . is an issue of federal law unaffected by
allocations of power among state officials under a State’s
law.”171 It did not matter whether “the machinery of
prosecution was turned on by the local police or the state
attorney general.”172 In either situation, Rothgery was
“subject to accusation . . . headed for trial . . . [and needed] to
get a lawyer working, whether to attempt to avoid that trial
or to be ready with a defense when the trial date arrive[d].”173
The Justices recognized the importance of an assigned
lawyer “working” promptly. “[C]ounsel must be appointed
218. Justice Alito’s concurring opinion added that “I interpret the Sixth
Amendment to require the appointment of counsel only after the defendant’s
prosecution has begun, and then only as necessary to guarantee the defendant
effective assistance at trial.” Id. at 217. But see infra text accompanying notes
235-38, 240 (referring to Justice Alito’s, Kennedy’s and Scalia’s comments
during oral argument suggesting an incarcerated pretrial defendant has a
strong argument for prompt assignment of counsel).
168. Rothgery, 554 U.S at 198-99.
169. Id. at 206.
170. Id. at 206 (quoting Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 496 (1964) (White,
J., dissenting)).
171. Id. at 207.
172. Id. at 208.
173. Id. at 210 (emphasis added).
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within a reasonable time after attachment to allow for
adequate representation at any critical stage before trial, as
well as at trial itself.”174
The near-unanimous ruling reflected a fundamental
difference with the State’s position during oral argument
which disregarded Gideon’s guarantee of a balance between
the government’s power to prosecute and the necessity of a
lawyer to defend an individual’s liberty when
incarcerated.175 Indeed, several Justices voiced concern with
Texas’s charging procedures and denial of counsel practices
following arrest.176 Others sounded perplexed, and even
annoyed, at the State’s position that a police officer’s filing
of a criminal charge neither commenced prosecution nor

174. Id. at 212.
175. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); see also Colbert,
Illusory Right to Counsel, supra note 15, at 52 (“Supreme Court decisions in
Gideon and Argersinger emphasized that the guarantee of counsel is
fundamental to the fairness of our justice system.”).
176. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 14 (Alito, J.); id. at 41
(Breyer, J.); id. at 28 (Kennedy, J.); id. at 12, 28, 30 (Scalia, J.); id. at 29-30, 5355 (Souter, J.); id. at 34-36, 46-48 (Stevens, J.). Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Scalia engaged in the following dialogue with Texas Solicitor General Gregory
Coleman:
Justice Souter asked: “You mean no complaint needs to be filed by the police?
. . . [D]on’t the police normally have a complaint . . . ?” Mr. Coleman said: “No,
Justice Souter.” Justice Ginsburg appeared flummoxed: “You can’t just say the
police brought someone in and they get locked up in jail. The police had to
present something.” Id. at 37.
Eventually, Mr. Coleman acknowledged the officer’s affidavit of probable cause
and said to Justice Ginsburg: “I think if he [Rothgery] had insisted on counsel
being present for the bail portion of the 1517 magistration, I believe that they
would have gotten somebody to come.” Justice Souter inquired further: “Would
they have been obligated to get somebody to come?” Mr. Coleman replied:
“Under Texas statute they would.” Justice Souter again asked whether Texas
recognized a constitutional right “[u]nder the Sixth Amendment?” “No,”
repeated Mr. Coleman. Id. at 38-39.
Justice Scalia also appeared offended at Texas’ charging procedures even when
a lawyer did appear. “[E]ven if you appoint counsel,” he told the State’s
attorney, Texas has “a problem. . . . You say you can keep people without
charging them so long as you give them counsel?” Mr. Coleman provided the
Court with a dose of Texas reality: “It happens all the time, Justice Scalia,
where people are appointed counsel but, for whatever reason, do not make bail.”
Id. at 30.
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required a lawyer’s assignment for an indigent defendant.177
Justice Souter wondered “if the [private] lawyer comes in
and says, you know, my client is sitting in jail, you’ve had
him there for three days now, and no complaint has been
filed . . . [is it a] constitutional answer to say, well, you
know, that’s for us to know and you to find out?”178 Texas
Solicitor General Gregory Coleman maintained that, while
Texas would not prevent the private lawyer from
representing a client, it did not recognize a Sixth
Amendment constitutional obligation to provide counsel.179
Justices expressed alarm when Coleman asserted that
Texas had no constitutional obligation to assign counsel,
since it had not considered Rothgery formally charged until

177. Justice Souter’s effort to understand the State’s reasoning appeared to
borrow a page from Abbott & Costello’s memorable “Who’s On First”
performance:
JUSTICE SOUTER: . . . At the examining trial [first appearance, probable cause
hearing], is there a charge filed?
MR. COLEMAN: No. . . .
JUSTICE SOUTER: What are they finding probable cause for if they don’t know
what the charge is? . . .
MR. COLEMAN: An examining trial is an extended version of a probable-cause
determination. It is not holding on a charge[.]
JUSTICE SOUTER: That is right. It is a probable-cause determination, and
you’ve got to have an answer: Probable cause for what?
MR. COLEMAN: Probable cause . . . that a crime has been committed.
JUSTICE SOUTER: So . . . in other words, you determine whether a crime has
been committed without charging the individual with the crime.
MR. COLEMAN: If . . . that were the law, Gerstein would have to be reversed.
JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, I’m just asking what you do . . . . Then, at the end of
the probable cause hearing . . . the judge says: Well, you’ve got probable cause to
hold this person for possessing a gun after having been convicted of a felony, but
there doesn’t happen to be any charge to that effect here. Is that the state of the
law, in fact?
MR. COLEMAN: That is what preliminary hearings and examining trials have
always been about. Yes, Your Honor.
Id. at 53-55.
178. Id. at 31.
179. See id. at 29-30.
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he was indicted six months later.180 Justice Kennedy asked
the State’s attorney “how could they hold [him] in jail”
without charging a crime and without providing or
assigning counsel?181 “Suppose he had been held for three
months and . . . couldn’t make bail, we don’t need counsel?
. . . [W]ould counsel be required to be appointed?”182 Justice
Kennedy demanded to know. When Coleman replied, “No,
Your Honor,”183 Justice Scalia expressed his doubt. “What
authority do you have to hold somebody who’s not been
charged? I mean I don’t understand that. You say he hasn’t
been charged, but we’re going to hold you in jail. That’s very
strange.”184 Coleman indicated that “[i]t is not uncommon—
in fact, it’s universal practice” for Texas police to arrest and
to bring a defendant before a magistrate.185 Coleman then
maintained that the right to counsel did not apply here. The
Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable

180. Justice Stevens sounded frustrated when he sought clarification about
the State’s policy of denying Rothgery an assigned lawyer to dismiss his
criminal charge at the beginning of a criminal prosecution.
JUSTICE STEVENS: Let me ask on Texas procedure. Supposing after the
magistration he wanted to have the charges dismissed. Could he have hired a
lawyer to come in and ask the judge to dismiss the charges?
MR. COLEMAN: Absolutely not, Justice Stevens. There were no charges
pending. . . .
JUSTICE STEVENS: Let’s say he wanted to get a release from bond and said he
wanted to terminate his custody. . . . [C]ould he have a lawyer appear before the
Court to ask for that? . . .
MR. COLEMAN: . . . I don’t think the Sixth Amendment would necessarily have
required it. . . .
JUSTICE STEVENS: He would not have had a right under the Constitution to
have a lawyer come in and say: I want to get released from this bond[?] I find
that hard to believe. . . .
MR. COLEMAN: It would not be a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. . . . [I]t
would not be an “attachment,” an “appointment” issue, where you are entitled to
appointment of counsel . . . .
Id. at 46-48 (emphasis added).
181. Id. at 27.
182. Id. at 28.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 27-28.
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seizures and probable cause determination, he said, would
protect a defendant’s liberty.186
Justice Souter wanted to be certain he understood
Texas’s position. “What you’re saying, in answer to Justice
Kennedy’s question, that an individual can be brought into
court, held in jail for three weeks without charge, and no
right to counsel applies? I think that’s your answer, but I
want to make sure. I’ll be candid to say I’m surprised.”187
The Texas prosecutor turned again to the Fourth
Amendment, “Gerstein says that there must be . . . .”188
Justice Souter interrupted:
I want to know what your answer is here. Get to authority later,
but I want to know whether your position is that an individual
may be brought by a police officer before a magistrate, charged
with no crime, required to post bail, and if he doesn’t post bail,
held for three weeks without charge. . . . I’m asking whether it
189
would be constitutional without appointing counsel.

The Texas prosecutor maintained that “[i]t would . . . not be
a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”190
Listening to the exchange, Justice Scalia registered
disbelief: “No counsel right would attach?”191 Holding tightly
to his position, the prosecutor answered, “That’s correct.”192
The Supreme Court ruling reflected the Justices’
frustration with Texas’s position and with the Fifth
Circuit’s decision to uphold the State’s practice, contrary to
Supreme Court decisions that had “twice held” poor people’s
right to counsel attached at the initial appearance where a
judicial officer decided bail.193 The Justices carefully
186. Id. at 28.
187. Id. at 29.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 29-30.
190. Id. at 30.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty, 554 U.S. 191, 199 (2008) (citing Michigan v.
Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629 n.3 (1986); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399
(1977)). At times during oral argument, Coleman appeared to move away from
embracing the Fifth Circuit’s “prosecutor involvement” theory. See Transcript of
Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 39-40, 49-50 (responding to Justice Alito’s
questions). In reply to Justice Stevens’s “simple question” of whether a
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reviewed the existing case law, beginning three decades
earlier, and declared, “there can be no doubt . . . that
judicial proceedings had been initiated.”194 In Brewer v.
Williams, the right to counsel attached when a represented
defendant first appeared before a judge to answer an out-ofstate warrant.195 Like Rothgery’s initial “article 15.17
hearing,” said the Court, “the judge at defendant Brewer’s
[first appearance] arraignment explained the charge,
advised him of his rights, ordered bail and committed him
to jail.196 No one doubted Brewer faced a criminal
prosecution for which his right to counsel attached.
The Supreme Court rehashed the same conclusion it
had reached nine years later in Michigan v. Jackson.197
“[W]e had no more trouble answering it the second time
around,” Justice Souter stated.198 “[T]his attempt to explain
Jackson as a narrow holding is impossible to square with
Jackson’s sweeping rejection of the State’s claims.”199 The
Justices showed little patience with the Texas attorney’s
prosecutor’s participation at the initial magistration hearing would have been
“relevant” in commencing a prosecution, Mr. Coleman maintained Rothgery was
not entitled to an assigned lawyer because “[t]here is no role for a prosecutor at
a magistration.” Id. at 34. Justice Stevens then asked if a prosecutor had been
present at Rothgery’s magistration and “the prosecutor said: This is a case we
intend to pursue more seriously. That’s all he says to the judge. Would have that
[sic] been sufficient?” Id. at 35. Mr. Coleman still held onto his belief that such a
statement would not commence “formal adversary judicial proceedings.” Id. at
36.
194. See Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 200 (quoting Brewer, 430 U.S. at 399).
195. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 390, 397-99. In Brewer, the defendant voluntarily
surrendered to the Davenport, Iowa police on a warrant issued in Des Moines,
Iowa, for the alleged abduction of a ten-year-old girl. Id. at 390. After counsel
represented the defendant at the initial appearance, the Davenport police drove
and interrogated the defendant during a 160 mile car ride. Id. at 390-93. A court
suppressed the evidence after finding that the Davenport police had initiated
criminal proceedings and had not notified Brewer’s attorney. Id. at 397-99, 406.
196. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 199-200; see also Kirk v. State, 199 S.W.3d 467,
476-77 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining that Texas procedure refers to the
defendant’s initial appearance as an article 15.17 hearing wherein a magistrate
determines the issues of probable cause and bail and informs the accused of the
charge).
197. 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
198. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 201.
199. Id. at 202-03 n.13.
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attempt to distinguish Michigan’s two-stage arraignment
system by arguing that only the second proceeding
mandated counsel in cases where the defendant entered a
formal plea.200 “We flatly rejected the distinction between
initial arraignment and arraignment on the indictment, the
State’s argument being ‘untenable’ in light of the ‘clear
language in our decisions about the significance of
arraignment.’”201
The Rothgery Court concluded its rebuke of the State’s
argument and the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning by referring to
its third decision affirming attachment within a fifteen year
period, McNeil v. Wisconsin.202 In McNeil, the Supreme
Court once again reaffirmed that “[t]he Sixth Amendment
right to counsel attaches at the first formal proceeding
against an accused,” namely, when the defendant initially
appeared before the judicial officer who set bail.203 The
McNeil Court connected counsel’s “attachment” to the
assigned lawyer’s representation at the initial bail hearing
by asserting that “in most States, at least with respect to
serious offenses, free counsel is made available at that time
. . . .”204
Rothgery’s majority indicated it did not matter that
Texas called the defendant’s initial appearance by a
different name than the “arraignment” stage referred to in
Kirby.205 A rose by any other name is still a rose.206 The
Supreme Court explained that, from a constitutional
perspective, the Texas “article 15.17 hearing is an initial
appearance.”207 It serves the same purpose as the
arraignment in Brewer or Jackson or McNeil, where the

200. See id. at 201-02.
201. Id. at 202 (quoting Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629 n.3 (1986)).
202. 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
203. Id. at 180-81.
204. Id. at 181.
205. Id. at 198-99.
206. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, act 2, sc. 2. (“What’s in a
name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet.”).
207. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 199 (2008); see also Kirk v.
State, 199 S.W.3d 467, 476-77 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining an article 15.17
hearing).
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Court confirmed that a criminal prosecution commenced
and an accused’s right to counsel attached.
The Justices put to rest other technical distinctions
Texas used to deny Rothgery assigned counsel. The Justices
rejected Texas’s explanation for accepting a police affidavit
as a “formal complaint” for initiating an arrest warrant
prosecution and treating warrantless arrests differently.208
Such an artificial distinction, said the Justices, would allow
“the constitutional significance of judicial proceedings . . . to
founder on the vagaries of state criminal law,” and render
“the attachment rule . . . utterly ‘vague and
unpredictable.’”209 The Court ruling made explicit that
Kirby’s enumerated examples were only illustrative and
were not intended to allow states to delay assigning counsel
indefinitely.210
Rothgery’s unequivocal message was that indigent
defendants’ right to counsel attached at the initial
appearance, and states must not “unreasonably” delay the
assigning of counsel.211 Following arrest and the filing of
charges, a defendant’s appearance before a judicial officer
commenced an adversary criminal prosecution. “By that
point,” the Justices agreed, “it is too late to wonder whether
[the defendant] is ‘accused’ within the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment, and it makes no practical sense to deny it.”212
The Court left no doubt that when Rothgery appeared
before the County magistrate, his relationship to the State
had become adversarial. He was the criminal defendant
facing “formal charges,” and had been confronted with the
“prosecutorial forces of organized society and . . . the
intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law.”213
The initial appearance “mark[ed] that point” where the
County was committed to prosecute Rothgery; he was now
208. See Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 199 n.9. (“[W]e are reluctant to rely on the
formalistic question of whether the affidavit here would be considered a
‘complaint’ or its functional equivalent under Texas case law . . . a question to
which the answer itself is uncertain.” (quoting Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty. 491
F.3d 293, 300 (5th Cir. 2007))).
209. Id. (quoting Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 175 (2008)).
210. Id. at 198, 207.
211. Id. at 213.
212. Id. at 207.
213. Id. (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)).
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the defendant “headed for trial” and the County had the
“consequent state obligation to appoint counsel within a
reasonable time once a request for assistance [was] made.”214
While Rothgery clarified that the right to counsel
attached at the initial judicial appearance and that counsel
must be appointed “within a reasonable time” thereafter,
the majority concluded by declaring that the Court’s present
“holding is narrow.”215 For the time being, the Justices opted
to leave undeclared the most important issue for accused
poor persons: When are they entitled to their assigned
lawyer’s representation in court and for counsel to begin
“working” on their behalf? As the following Section
indicates, during oral argument many Justices wanted to
answer this question and appeared sympathetic to the
detained unrepresented defendant. The colloquy between
the Justices and attorneys provides insight regarding how
the Court will likely decide the issue in the future.
E. Oral Argument: Previewing the Future
1. Rothgery’s Counsel
When Rothgery’s attorney, Danielle Spinelli, began oral
argument, it was clear that most Justices expected her to
contend that her client had a constitutional right to counsel
when first appearing before the Texas magistrate. The
comments of Justices Alito, Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy,
Scalia, Souter, and Stevens suggested they were prepared to
consider whether a constitutional rule mandated states to
assign counsel and to regulate when advocacy
commenced.216
Rothgery’s legal strategy, though, was much narrower
than the Justices anticipated. By defending her client’s civil
rights claim that Gillespie County had deprived him of an
assigned counsel, Ms. Spinelli avoided doing battle over
214. Id. at 198, 210.
215. Id. at 213 (“We do not decide whether the 6-month delay in appointment
of counsel resulted in prejudice to Rothgery’s Sixth Amendment rights, and have
no occasion to consider what standards should apply in deciding this. We merely
reaffirm . . . a criminal defendant’s initial appearance before a judicial officer . . .
marks the start of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”).
216. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 5-7, 12-15.
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whether Rothgery was entitled to his lawyer’s presence at
the initial bail hearing. She maintained that the assigned
right to counsel “attached” when judicial proceedings
commenced and required the magistrate to grant Rothgery’s
request.217 At no point did Spinelli insist that Texas had an
obligation to produce a lawyer at the hearing.218 Her
strategy succeeded in gaining the support of all but one
Justice, but left unrepresented defendants in limbo.
Attorney Spinelli knew she must dispel the lower
courts’ belief that a prosecutor’s involvement was a
prerequisite for commencing an adversarial proceeding and
triggering the attachment of counsel. She seized the
opportunity after Chief Justice Roberts challenged her
assertion that an adversary proceeding had begun when
Rothgery was brought before a magistrate. “[H]ow can this
be part of an adversary proceeding when there’s no other
adversary on the field?” asked the Chief Justice.219 “The
prosecution’s not present. They don’t even know anything
about this.”220
Ms. Spinelli’s response startled the Justices. “[W]e don’t
contend that it is adversarial[,]” she said, adding that the
prosecutor’s presence was irrelevant “because the
consequences of the initial appearance for the defendant are
precisely the same whether or not a prosecutor is
involved.”221 Justice Ginsberg sought clarification. “Ms.
Spinelli, there’s something confusing about your
presentation of this, because . . . you are not contending that
there was a right to counsel at that very proceeding.”222
Rothgery’s lawyer agreed and reminded the Court it had
granted certiorari only to “resolve the threshold question . . .
did a criminal prosecution commence at Rothgery’s
magistration?”223 If it did, Ms. Spinelli contended, then the
right attached and Gillespie County was required to assign
counsel.
217. Id. at 8.
218. See id. at 13 (“We’re not contending that an attorney was required.”).
219. Id. at 4.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 5-6.
222. Id. at 7.
223. Id. at 10.
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Justice Kennedy then indicated that the Court’s
interest, when granting certiorari, lay in considering the
broad right to counsel issue. “But what we’re looking for
here, at least one of the things we might look for in this
case, is a specific rule to give to the States so the State
knows when counsel has to be appointed.”224 Justice
Kennedy then asked, for example, if the state must appoint
a lawyer for someone released on personal recognizance who
had never appeared before a judicial officer.225 Rothgery’s
lawyer indicated that “would seem less likely.”226 Justice
Ginsberg interceded: “So when, at what point in time, did
this right to counsel attach?”227 Ms. Spinelli responded, “at
the time a criminal prosecution commences.”228
Other Justices wanted to know as well whether
attachment translated to requiring a lawyer’s appearance
as an advocate. Justice Alito must have had this thought in
mind when he asked the $64,000 threshold question: “What
does ‘attachment’ mean?”229 Receiving a textbook response,230
Justice Alito sought to pinpoint the specific moment when
Rothgery’s right attached at the “magistration” hearing. Did
this take place “[a]t the beginning [or] at the end” of a
defendant’s initial appearance?231 Justice Alito also
wondered—if Spinelli believed the defendant could insist
that the magistrate assign counsel, might the defendant
demand a lawyer’s immediate representation?232 Spinelli
responded that Rothgery’s right to counsel attached “at the
time that the magistrate informed [him] of the accusation
against him [and] he became a defendant in a criminal
case.”233 His in-custody status, she added, made the need for
224. Id. at 6.
225. Id. at 6-7.
226. Id. at 7.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 8.
229. Id.
230. Once the right attached, Ms. Spinelli told the Justices, “the State cannot
interfere after that point with the attorney-client relationship . . . the defendant
has the right to counsel to serve as an intermediary.” Id.
231. Id. at 9.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 9-10.
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counsel substantially greater than someone who receives a
traffic citation and goes home. “Here, we have an arrest. We
have a person who has been held for a period of time.”234
Justice Scalia suggested that Rothgery’s pretrial
incarceration—“a very strong point in your favor”—might
satisfy his colleagues’ quest for a constitutional standard
that would tell Texas and other states when it must assign
an attorney.235 Justice Kennedy posed the question directly.
Was she advocating, he asked, “that an attorney is required
whenever bail is set?”236 Ms. Spinelli returned to the safety
of her main position: “We’re not contending that an attorney
was required.”237 Justice Kennedy persisted, “[W]hat do we
tell Texas it has to do in all these cases? . . . Does it make a
difference that you’re held in custody or not held in custody?
I don’t understand the rule you want us to adopt.”238
As the Court moved toward considering such a broad
right to counsel rule, Ms. Spinelli did her best to deflect the
inquiry. Her client, she asserted, was “not asking the Court
to adopt any new rule today, but simply to reaffirm the rule
it has already announced in Brewer and Jackson,” namely
that the right to counsel attached at the initial proceeding—
the magistration hearing in Rothgery’s case.239 Ultimately,
the Court agreed. It declined establishing an explicit
constitutional mandate that would guarantee detainees the
immediate assignment and assistance of an appointed
attorney.
Some Justices, though, pondered how an attached right
to counsel connected to the assigned lawyer’s appointment
and courtroom appearance. Take the defendant who
remains in jail, Justice Alito hypothesized—how long could
the State persist in delaying his counsel’s appointment?
“[W]hen do you say[,]” he asked Spinelli, that “counsel has
to be appointed? . . . [T]en days after the magistration?”240
Deciding the legal argument did not require that she
234. Id. at 11.
235. Id. at 12.
236. Id. at 13.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 14.
240. Id.
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endorse an exact time frame, Ms. Spinelli indicated that a
ten-day delay would be impermissible.241 The County, she
replied, should have made the assignment “promptly after
Rothgery renewed his request for an attorney following the
magistration.”242
Justice Souter identified the moment when a defendant
requested counsel as the constitutional “point at which a
reasonable time starts running within which Texas must
afford—appoint counsel.”243 Justice Souter clarified
Rothgery’s position: “So there’s no claim that there was
anything invalid about the magistration proceeding . . .
itself because there was no counsel there.”244 Ms. Spinelli
answered: “Not at all.”245 She agreed that counsel must be
appointed within a “reasonable” time after the defendant’s
initial appearance.246
How would the Supreme Court ultimately have decided
whether assigned counsel was required at an accused’s
initial bail hearing? Would a detainee’s jail status be
determinative of the State’s constitutional obligation to
appoint counsel? For bonded defendants, how long must a
released defendant wait for an assigned lawyer?
The Justices tested numerous theories beyond the idea
that bail or jail time requires counsel’s immediate
appointment for an in-custody defendant. Justice Scalia
said he would be “quite more sympathetic” if Rothgery’s
argument did not require appointment until a “critical
stage” occurred.247 Ms. Spinelli rejected a critical stage rule
because of her concern that the defendant’s recognized right
241. Id.
242. Id. (emphasis added).
243. Id. at 14-15.
244. Id. at 15.
245. Id.
246. Id. Justice Thomas took issue with this conclusion and thus was the lone
dissenter in this case. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 218 (2008)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
only attaches at the beginning of a criminal prosecution, and that the article
15.17 hearing—nor any type of initial appearance—are not the beginning of a
criminal prosecution).
247. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 20. “[O]nly when there
is some later proceeding [after the initial appearance], which is an essential part
of the prosecution, must you have counsel.” Id. at 19.
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to counsel at a preliminary hearing might be illusory and
that many defendants would remain without representation
for much longer periods before indictment.248 She reminded
the Court that her client had needed a lawyer at his initial
appearance when deciding whether or not to request a
preliminary hearing.249
Drawing a broader perspective, Rothgery’s attorney
asserted that a lawyer is necessary “to ensure that the
defendant understands and is able to invoke all of his rights
[,] . . . [including] demonstrat[ing] his innocence prior to
being indicted, rearrested, and incarcerated.”250 Ms. Spinelli
argued that a lawyer’s counsel was required “not only to
conduct and prepare for critical stages, but also to assist a
defendant in deciding whether to undergo them.”251 When
Justice Scalia pressed her to identify whether Texas must
“promptly” assign counsel “as soon as the magistration was
completed,” Ms. Spinelli replied: “Not necessarily
immediately, but within some reasonable time after his
request.”252
Spinelli had accomplished her primary objective—
sustaining Rothgery’s civil rights claim against the County
for failing to assign him a lawyer after the County
commenced prosecution. By avoiding the controversial
“when is counsel required?” question, she persuaded eight
Justices that Rothgery’s right to counsel attached at his
initial bail hearing. Though her legal strategy failed to tell
Texas and other states when they were required to assign
counsel and ensure counsel’s appearance, the Justices’
commentary revealed many factors they would consider in
arriving at a constitutional standard, such as a defendant’s
jail status, the delay in assigning counsel, the lawyer’s
248. See id. at 19-22. While a preliminary hearing is a critical stage that
requires an assigned counsel’s presence, it remains within a prosecutor’s
discretion whether to conduct the courtroom hearing or present evidence to a
closed and non-adversarial grand jury proceeding. Texas’s state attorney
acknowledged that preliminary hearings are “rare” in Texas. Id. at 40.
Typically, they are scheduled within thirty days following the initial
appearance, at which time a prosecutor selects the course of action. See app.
tbl.II (Tex.).
249. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 25.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 22.
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eventual appearance, and the defendant’s explicit request
and necessity for counsel’s assistance.253 Justices Alito,
Kennedy and Scalia indicated that an incarcerated pretrial
defendant had the strongest argument for counsel at the
initial appearance.254
Analyzing the Justices’ response to the Texas Solicitor
General’s argument provides added insight into the Court’s
interest in wanting to learn more about the reality and
deficiencies of states’ assignment-of-counsel practices.
2. Gillespie County’s Argument
Solicitor General Gregory Coleman passionately
defended Gillespie County’s six-month delay in appointing
counsel to Walter Rothgery and indigent defendants in
general. In turn, the Supreme Court Justices strongly
responded to a state criminal prosecution that proceeded
without assigning counsel to indigent defendants. Several
Justices admitted unfamiliarity with state court right to
counsel practices—not surprising, considering that the
Justices’ experience had been limited to federal courts.255
The Justices expressed collective surprise with the
State’s criminal procedure that regarded in-custody
defendants like Rothgery as still being under investigation,
despite having been arrested and charged with a felony
crime as described in an officer’s sworn and filed
complaint.256 For most Justices, the assignment-of-counsel
clock began ticking at the bail hearing.
The Justices rejected the State’s interpretation of Kirby
that justified undue delay in assigning counsel and
ensuring counsel’s assistance to accused poor people incustody.257 Several Justices expressed alarm that Rothgery
253. See id. at 5-7, 11-14, 24-25.
254. See id. at 6-7, 11-14.
255. See, e.g., id. at 27-33; see also Ifill, supra note 50.
256. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 54 (Souter, J.) (“Well,
I’m just asking what you do . . . . Then at the end of the probable cause hearing .
. . the judge says: Well, you’ve got probable cause to hold this person for
possessing a gun after having been convicted of a felony, but there doesn’t
happen to be any charge to that effect here. Is that the state of the law, in
fact?”).
257. Id. at 40.

380

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

had remained in jail for three weeks after Texas assigned a
lawyer.258 Others appeared bewildered when Texas
maintained it could hold a defendant in jail without
assigning counsel for three to ten days.259
Lastly, many Justices revealed an interest in learning
about states’ and localities’ right to counsel assignment
practices. The more the Justices became aware about
Texas’s delay in assigning counsel practices and an
accused’s lengthy wait before counsel appeared, the more
they gravitated toward federal constitutional right to
counsel protection.
Justice Scalia was the first to ask how much Texas’s
pretrial procedure and assignment of counsel practices had
in common with other states’ early judicial proceedings.
“Mr. Coleman, what happens in other jurisdictions? I
probably ought to know this, but I don’t.”260 Hearing no
response, Justice Scalia asked the Texas prosecutor what
happened when “someone is taken before a magistrate and
with the prosecutor present, is the indictment at that point
drawn up[?] . . . [D]oesn’t the prosecutor have some time to
decide what the indictment ought to contain?”261 Mr.
Coleman told the Justice that a felony indictment involved a
grand jury presentment and did “take a little bit more
time.”262 In Rothgery’s situation, the government had waited
six months to indict after he posted bail and was released
from jail. Justice Scalia asked what would have happened to
a person who remained in jail during this period. “[I]s he
just held because he is going to be charged, which is what’s
going on here[?]”263 Mr. Coleman indicated the defendant “is
not charged during that interim.”264 He remained silent
about the substantial time Texas defendants remained in

258. See id. at 11-14 (comments of Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Alito).
259. Id. at 29-31.
260. Id. at 36.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 36-37.
264. Id. at 37.
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jail without counsel’s in-court representation while waiting
for the prosecutor’s decision.265
Justice Kennedy also inquired into what happened to
indigent defendants after they appeared without counsel at
the first bail hearing. “[H]ow many people[,]” he asked Mr.
Coleman, “are being held in custody after a probable-cause
determination and do not have counsel appointed for them
. . . until some other critical phase takes place?”266 Mr.
Coleman replied that in Texas, every detainee is appointed
counsel “within one business day in the large counties and
. . . within three business days in the smaller counties.”267
Justice Kennedy then asked Mr. Coleman why Rothgery
remained in custody for three weeks after indictment before
seeing his assigned lawyer. Was there a mistake? “No[,]”
said Mr. Coleman, “he was appointed counsel immediately
upon indictment.”268 Mr. Coleman did not explain that
appointing counsel does not translate to the lawyer’s
appearance.
Justice Alito moved the discussion from the murky
waters of the attached right to counsel and searched for a
clear constitutional rule that would value counsel’s timely
assignment. He asked Mr. Coleman whether Rothgery was
entitled to counsel’s appointment to prepare for the critical
stage of a preliminary felony hearing, assuming the
defendant requested one.269 When Coleman agreed, Justice
Alito queried “[w]hy would the situation be different simply
because Texas law doesn’t require [counsel at] the
examining [probable cause] trial, but gives the defendant
the option of demanding one?”270 Mr. Coleman explained the
reality of the vanishing preliminary hearing: “[I]n Texas
[and elsewhere] they are very rare because in the very
unusual circumstances where somebody asks for one, more

265. See infra text accompanying note 267 (noting where Solicitor General
Coleman instead referred to Texas providing assigned counsel for a detainee
within one to three days of the defendant’s request).
266. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 51.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 51-52.
269. Id. at 39.
270. Id. at 39-40.
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often than not the prosecutor will simply hurry up and do
an indictment.”271
Justice Alito wondered:
Why is the question of whether the right attaches . . . a separate
question from what I would think would be the question here:
Whether [Rothgery] had the right to have counsel appointed for
him[?] Why isn’t that the question, and ‘attachment’ is simply a
label that is used to express one of the conditions for having the
272
right to appoint a counsel?

The Texas Solicitor General agreed “that the analysis is
essentially the same . . . there is a right to have the
assistance of counsel without having a critical stage.”273
Justice Kennedy then explored whether a constitutional
rule could address when an incarcerated accused should
expect to see a lawyer. “If we said that when a defendant is
ordered held in custody, that there is then a right of
counsel, would we be contradicting any of our precedents as
opposed, say, to extending them?”274 Mr. Coleman indicated
he was “not clear” whether the fact of an accused’s pretrial
incarceration “makes a constitutional difference.”275 He did
not respond when Justice Breyer asked “[w]hat harm[,] . . .
[w]hat inconvenience[,] . . . what difficulties” would result if
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached for pretrial
detainees awaiting trial.276
As oral argument came to a close, it became clear why
the Court postponed a ruling that would guide Texas and
other states on when counsel must be assigned and be
present. Delay would allow states to consider proactive
measures to change their assignment of counsel practices.
The Court had not faced a similar issue in almost two
decades, and both Rothgery’s and Texas’s lawyers had
focused on the considerably narrower certiorari issue here.
The Justices knew little about state court practices and
welcomed additional data about national practices, after
271. Id. at 40.
272. Id. at 49.
273. Id. at 50.
274. Id. at 40.
275. Id. at 41.
276. Id.
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seeing it might not be true that counsel is available in most
states for felonies.277 By the conclusion of oral argument, the
Justices appeared to be moving closer to an agreement that
a jailed defendant was entitled to a lawyer’s assignment
and
representation
within
the
forty-eight
hour
constitutional rule requiring a defendant to first appear
before a judicial officer.
The results of a national survey inform when an
accused should expect to obtain counsel’s assistance after
entering the criminal justice system in each of the fifty
states and appearing before a judicial officer in select
jurisdictions.
II. STATES’ PRACTICES IN APPOINTING COUNSEL AT THE
INITIAL APPEARANCE
In Rothgery v. Gillespie County, the Supreme Court
remanded the case and asked the trial court to determine
whether Gillespie County had delayed assigning a lawyer to
Walter Rothgery for an unreasonable period, after
commencing prosecution against him.278 The Justices’ ruling
reinstated Rothgery’s § 1983 claim based on the County’s
tardiness in assigning counsel more than six months after
the right had attached at Rothgery’s initial hearing.279 The
Rothgery Court ruling invites further inquiry concerning the
timeliness of counsel’s actual appearance in local criminal
courts across the country. The Justices appear prepared to
consider the broader issue of when states must assign
counsel. When that day arrives, the Justices will want to
take a close look at states’ assignment and guarantee of
counsel.
Specifically, the Justices will want to know whether
indigent defendants are represented at the initial
appearance and, if not, the extent of delay before counsel is
appointed and begins representing an assigned client. In
localities that do not provide counsel, the Justices will be
interested in learning how long an incarcerated defendant
waits for counsel’s in-court representation. When the Court
reviews that information, it will discover that many states’
277. See supra pp. 366-69, 379-82.
278. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008).
279. See id.
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jurisdictions delay counsel’s courtroom advocacy for five,
ten, twenty, or thirty or more days beyond an accused’s first
appearance before a judicial officer.
The following Section presents a composite picture
within the different states and representative counties of
the limited extent to which they protect indigent
defendants’ right to counsel during the initial stage of
prosecution. The results obtained from more than four
hundred public defenders and appointed counsel measure
the
impact
of
Gideon
and
of
states’
flawed
“experimentation” of denying counsel at the preliminary
stages of a criminal prosecution.280 The survey’s findings
reveal which states and localities regard indigents’ right to
assigned counsel as fundamental and which place less value
on counsel’s early assistance.
A.

Surveying the Fifty States: Counsel at Initial
Appearance

Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rothgery,
student researchers mailed more than nine hundred
surveys to public defenders and assigned counsel in judicial
districts in each state to learn whether indigent state
defendants were first represented after prosecution
commenced, and, if not, when in-court representation
began.281 The 2008-2009 survey followed a previous right to
280. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 123 (1975) (recognizing the value of
“experimentation” among the states to determine whether the Fourth
Amendment required the presence of counsel at pretrial hearings).
281. In an effort to obtain this information, student researchers mailed the
following questionnaire to 931 public defenders and attorneys who are the
contract providers in multiple localities in the fifty states. They received
answers to the following questions from 308 individuals representing one third
of the sample population from every state except Maryland. Additionally, we
conducted telephone interviews with approximately ninety-five assigned
attorneys in which the same questions were asked.
1) COUNSEL’S APPEARANCE: Following arrest, how many days typically pass
before assigned counsel represents a jailed defendant before a judicial officer,
i.e., magistrate, commissioner, judge?
2) INITIAL APPEARANCE:
(a) In your jurisdiction, are indigent defendants represented by a public
defender or assigned counsel at the defendant’s initial bail appearance before a
judicial officer?
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counsel study, published ten years earlier, that uncovered
serious deficiencies in assigned counsel’s representation at
the initial bail stage in states’ criminal courts.282 At that
time in 1998, responding defenders indicated that only eight
states and the District of Columbia guaranteed assigned
counsel’s immediate in-court representation after a criminal
prosecution began.283 More than twice as many states—
eighteen altogether—uniformly denied an appointed lawyer
(b) If indigent defendants are NOT represented by a public defender or assigned
counsel at the initial appearance, do judicial officers order counsel’s
appointment?
(c) Would the result in (b) change if the defendant specifically asked the
presiding judge to appoint counsel?
3) PRETRIAL DETENTION: Defendant’s Second Judicial Appearance
(a) For defendants who remain in jail because they cannot afford bail, how many
days usually pass until they next appear in court?
(b) Is counsel typically present at this proceeding?
To gain a fair sampling of a state’s response, researchers insisted upon receiving
information from a minimum of one out of four attorneys. Researchers
recommend a 25% response rate for mail-in surveys. See Scott Keeter et al.,
Gauging the Impact of Growing Nonresponse on Estimates from a National RDD
Telephone Survey, 70 PUB. OPINION Q. (SPECIAL ISSUE) no. 5, 759, 763, 766 (2006)
(showing that a 25% response rate yielded results that were statistically
indistinguishable from a 50% response rate); see also, Penny S. Visser et al.,
Mail Surveys for Election Forecasting? An Evaluation of the Columbus Dispatch
Poll, 60 PUB. OPINION Q. no.2, 181, 181-82 (1996) (demonstrating that surveys
with low response rates are “not necessarily low in validity”). Surveys invariably
included defenders who practiced in a state capital or populated city to capture
the anticipated large volume of arrests. In the few instances where researchers
received fewer than 25% responses, they conducted additional telephone
interviews. The survey results are included in the Appendix. App. tbls.I-IV.
282. See generally Colbert, Illusory Right to Counsel, supra note 15 (describing
the results of a national survey on legal representation of the accused and
discussing deficiencies in assigned counsel’s representation).
283. Id. at 8-9 (California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Massachusetts,
North Dakota, West Virgina, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia). Mindful
of the Supreme Court’s ruling in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S.
44, 56 (1991), where the majority held that an accused must be brought before a
judicial officer within forty-eight hours of arrest, including weekends, the 20082009 survey provided a more generous standard: a state was in compliance with
the forty-eight-hour representation standard when assigned counsel represented
an indigent defendant at the first bail hearing within three days from the date
of arrest, if it included one or more weekend days. Longer delays until an
attorney’s in-court representation were regarded as a “No” representation
response for purposes of collecting data.
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to lower-income people at their first appearance.284 The
survey revealed that most of the remaining twenty-four
states refused to assign a lawyer with the exception of a few
limited localities in their jurisdiction.285
The results of the current 2008-2009 survey show a
marked change. Across the country, more states and local
defenders are now representing indigent defendants at
initial appearances held within the forty-eight hour period
following arrest.286 For instance, two additional states are
guaranteeing representation,287 and many more have
modified their practice to ensure an assigned counsel’s
presence in at least half of their judicial districts.288 Equally
significant, only ten states presently deny a lawyer’s
appearance statewide—down from the eighteen states that
conducted initial hearings without counsel a decade ago.289
Many of the eighteen previous “no counsel” states now
guarantee a lawyer’s appearance in one or two counties that
usually includes a highly populated city.290
Despite this national trend toward representing
indigent defendants at the initial appearance, about half of
the country’s local jurisdictions persist in not providing
counsel.291 Even more troubling, even after the initial
appearance, defendants are not likely to obtain counsel’s incourt representation any time soon.
1. Added Court Delays: The Need for Counsel
This survey highlights the substantial delay resulting
from court administrators’ scheduling of the unrepresented
defendants’ next court appearance. In these “no-counsel”
284. Id. at 10-11.
285. See id. at 11.
286. See app. tbls.I-IV.
287. See app. tbl.I (indicating Hawaii, Maine, and Vermont now provide
statewide representation, but not West Virginia, which was cited in the 1998
Study).
288. See infra Part II.A.3.b.
289. See infra Part II.A.3.a; see also app. tbl.II.
290. See infra Part II.A.3.b.
291. See app. tbls.II, IV (showing ten states do not provide counsel and
eighteen others do so only in select counties).
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jurisdictions, an accused who cannot afford bail is
accustomed to waiting in jail for seven to twenty-eight days,
and frequently one month or longer, before returning to
court and finding an assigned counsel present.292
Responding lawyers provide a disturbing account of what
frequently occurs when states deny counsel at the initial
bail hearing: localities postpone cases for excessive periods,
thereby adding further delay to assigned counsel’s in-court
representation well beyond the date of counsel’s formal
appointment.293
The emphasis on the delay between a defendant’s initial
bail hearing and an assigned lawyer’s actual in-court
representation takes into account the attorney’s critical role
at this early stage. In the usual state system, where nine
out of ten people are charged with nonviolent or
misdemeanor crimes, a lawyer’s courtroom advocacy
typically means the difference between pretrial release and
unaffordable bail.294 Absent counsel, an accused is more
likely to suffer the serious consequences of pretrial
incarceration beyond personal liberty, namely economic and
social losses that the Supreme Court has recognized “may
imperil the suspect’s job, interrupt his source of income, and
impair his family relationships.”295
A defender’s courtroom presence helps balance a
playing field that otherwise leans heavily in favor of the
unopposed government prosecutor, while also serving as a
counterweight to an intimidating legal process. A lawyer’s
zealous bail argument, early investigation, and evaluation
of the State’s case allow a detainee to believe in an assigned
counsel’s dedication to the case and to consider a trial
option. In contrast, the longer the delay before counsel
292. See app. tbl.II. For example, defendants in El Paso, Texas, wait an
average of seven to ten days before receiving counsel. Id. (Tex.). Defendants in
Merrimack County, New Hampshire, wait an average of ten to thirty days
before receiving counsel. Id. (N.H.). Defendants in Shelby County, Alabama,
wait an average of twenty-one to twenty-four days before receiving counsel. Id.
(Ala.). Defendants in Aiken County, South Carolina, wait an average of fortyfive to sixty days before receiving counsel. Id. (S.C.).
293. See infra Part II.A.3.
294. See Colbert et al., Counsel at Bail, supra note 65, at 1721-22.
295. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (citing RONALD GOLDFARB,
RANSOM: A CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN BAIL SYSTEM 32-91 (1965); LEWIS KATZ ET
AL., JUSTICE IS THE CRIME 51-62 (1972)).
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appears in court, the greater the client’s reasonable anxiety
about the assigned lawyer’s competence and commitment to
defend. Many defendants, particularly those in custody,
ultimately lose the will to fight and opt to plead guilty
because they lack confidence in the late arriving, appointed
lawyer.296
Consequently, when court officials delay the scheduling
of the next court appearance, assigned counsel knows it is
imperative to meet and interview the new client. Visiting
lawyers can accomplish a lot while fulfilling their ethical
duty to communicate promptly.297 Rothgery’s counsel, for
instance, though unable to interview Rothgery in person,
succeeded in gaining his client’s release after their phone
conversation and communication with Rothgery’s wife
allowed him to engage the prosecuting attorney in
discussion.298 His subsequent investigation and procurement
of exculpatory evidence resulted in dismissal of the weapons
charge.299
In practice, most assigned lawyers find it difficult to
arrange for jail visits. Rothgery’s counsel, for instance, was
on trial on an unrelated matter when he was appointed and
never saw his client until after he regained liberty, weeks
later.300 Most colleagues would have chosen the convenience
of waiting until the next court date, rather than arranging
the time-consuming jail meeting.
When deciding whether counsel’s attachment requires
early representation, the Supreme Court should consider
the total time period in which a state delays assigning
counsel and schedules the next court appearance where
counsel is expected to appear. Understanding the full extent
296. See McMunigal, supra note 66, at 987.
297. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct require that “[a] lawyer
shall . . . promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect
to which the client’s informed consent . . . is required.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2003). Rule 1.3 also requires a lawyer to “act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2003). However, clients frequently complain about lawyers’
dereliction in communication. See RICHARD ZITRIN ET AL., LEGAL ETHICS IN THE
PRACTICE OF LAW 857 (3d ed. 2007).
298. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 196-97 (2008).
299. Id.
300. Maguire Interview, supra note 33.

2011] PROSECUTION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION

389

of delay provides a crucial perspective for considering
whether indigent defendants ought to receive the benefit of
counsel’s courtroom assistance at the first judicial bail
proceeding, particularly for in-custody defendants.
The next Section presents the collective fifty states’
practices. It begins by identifying the approximately one out
of five states which guarantee representation at bail within
forty-eight hours of arrest, and the equivalent same number
that decline to do so. The following Section explains the
thirty “hybrid” states where representation at the initial
appearance is spotty and where counsel’s ultimate presence
depends upon the local jurisdiction where prosecution
occurs.
2. Ten States Guarantee Representation
Gideon’s constitutional right to counsel has not yet
extended to a poor person’s initial bail hearing. Indeed, the
current 2008-2009 survey shows that only ten states—
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Maine,
Massachusetts, North Dakota, Vermont, Wisconsin, and the
District of Columbia,301 ensure representation within the
forty-eight-hour initial bail hearing.302 Several additional
states, including Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, and
Washington also guarantee counsel in about three out of
every four localities where an indigent defendant first
appears following arrest.303
During Rothgery’s oral argument, several Justices
reacted sharply to the Texas prosecutor’s bold defense of
Gillespie County’s rejection of the defendant’s plea for
counsel.304 At that time, the Justices did not know how few
states honored counsel’s presence at the initial bail hearing;
they were likely more familiar with federal practice that
guarantees counsel’s presence and were taken aback when
301. In the nation’s capital, defenders represent indigent clients at the initial
bail proceeding, which usually occurs within twenty-four hours of arrest, except
when “the arrest occurs on Saturday after the cutoff time.” Survey Response
from Amanda Davis & Jason Downs, Pub. Defender. Wash., D.C. (Summer
2009); see also app. tbl.I (D.C.).
302. App. tbl.I.
303. See app. tbl.III.
304. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 28-37.
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confronted with Texas’s practice of denying counsel after
prosecution commenced.305 The Justices probably expected
Texas to be less dismissive of post-Gideon protections, and
for the State prosecutor to take a less hard-line position in
defending a system that denied counsel to an incarcerated,
and innocent, person like Rothgery. The Court’s rejection of
Texas’s position revealed its appreciation for a shared
Gideon principle: access to counsel at the initial bail hearing
and thereafter can no longer be ignored. More states and
localities can be expected to embrace Rothgery and join the
“YES, we guarantee representation” category after a
criminal prosecution has begun.
a. Why These States?
No clear explanation appears for understanding why
the current group of “YES, We Do” states provide counsel
for indigent defendants when they first appear at a bail
hearing before a judicial officer. Most share an important
feature: they employ a statewide public defender system to
meet their constitutional duty to poor people accused of
crime.306 A statewide organization charged with
responsibility for indigent representation makes it easier to
employ uniform right-to-counsel standards. Yet a statewide
Office of the Public Defender does not always guarantee
counsel’s advocacy at the earliest stage.307
States’ common location and regional culture might be
thought to account for inter-regional differences. Examining
the 2008-2009 survey reveals some support and evidence of
a geographic pattern.308 “YES, We Do” states are found
305. See supra notes 176-92 and accompanying text.
306. A statewide office of the public defender exists in California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin.
307. Maryland’s statewide Office of the Public Defender does not represent
indigent defendants at the initial bail hearing at any of its’ judicial districts. See
app. tbl.II (Md.). Hybrid states Alaska, Colorado, New Jersey, New Mexico, and
Wyoming also fund a statewide office, but are present at the initial appearance
only in a minority of localities. See app. tbl.IV. For a general overview of
indigent defense in state courts, see Access and Fairness: Indigent Defense
FAQs,
NAT’L
CTR.
FOR
STATE
COURTS,
http://www.ncsconline.org/
topics/access-and-fairness/indigent-defense/faq.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
308. The United States Census Bureau places individual states in the
following nine divisions: Pacific, West North and West South Central, Mountain,
East North and East South Central, South Atlantic, Middle-Atlantic, and New
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disproportionately in the New England coastal region
(including Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, and
Vermont—four out of its six states),309 and in two other
areas, the Pacific (including California and Hawaii—two out
of its five states)310 and in the South Atlantic region where
England. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS REGIONS AND DIVISIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES, http://www.census.gov/geo/www/us_regdiv.pdf (last visited Feb. 15,
2011).
309. New England Division states consist of Connecticut, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, supra note 308. In the six-state New England Division, Connecticut,
Maine, Massachusetts, and Vermont represent indigent defendants at the
initial bail proceeding. App. tbl.I. New Hampshire is the lone New England
state that refuses to guarantee representation at the first bail hearing, with the
exception of defendants charged with felony crimes in Grafton County. See app.
tbl.II; see also infra note 328.
In Rhode Island, the statewide Public Defender John Hardiman initiated a right
to counsel, which allows public defenders to represent many poor people at the
initial bail hearing in most counties. Public Defender Hardiman reported that
Providence public defenders are present in the three largest judicial districts,
but not in the two smallest counties where defendants wait three to seven days
for their appointed counsel. See app. tbl.III (R.I.). Warwick, Kent County Public
Defender Christine O’Connell indicated that, “prior to the establishment of our
program, it was unusual to see counsel present at those events, except for the
most affluent defendants. I am present at arraignment [bail hearing] pursuant
to a program set up by my office—not by court procedure/policy.” O’Connell
added that early representation “saves our state about nine million dollars a
year.” Letter from M. Christine O’Connell, Pub. Defender, Warwick, R.I., to
author (July 1, 2008) (on file with author).
310. Pacific Division states consist of Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and
Washington. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 308. Ten years ago, only one of
four Hawaii circuits guaranteed the right to counsel at the initial bail hearing.
Colbert, Illusory Right to Counsel, supra note 15, app. tbl.B at 56. Currently,
Hawaii has joined California, whose defenders are also present at the first bail
determination throughout the state. Public defenders from Kauai, Hawaii, say
their office has the quickest public defender involvement statewide: an incustody defendant appears with counsel at a bail hearing before a judicial officer
within forty-eight hours (weekends included) of arrest. Telephone Interview
with Edmund Acoba, Pub. Defender, Kauai, Haw. (Aug. 13, 2009); see also app.
tbl.I (Cal., Haw.).
In Washington, six of the eight responding jurisdictions, including Seattle,
Tacoma, and Spokane (for felonies), the state’s most populated cities, guarantee
representation within one business day. App. tbl.III (Wash.). Spokane County
Public Defender Kathy Knox confirmed representation at the initial bail hearing
for defendants charged with felonies, but not for defendants facing
misdemeanors who wait six days. Id. In less populated communities, such as
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Delaware, Florida, and the District of Columbia provide
representation at the initial bail hearing. New England is
the only region where a majority of states guarantee counsel
at the initial bail hearing.
Of the remaining two “YES, We Do” states, North
Dakota and Wisconsin are randomly located in two other
regions. Delaware and Florida are the only two states in the
South Atlantic region (consisting of eight states and the
District of Columbia in total) to provide counsel at the
initial bail proceeding.311 North Dakota is the only state
from the West North Central region to represent indigent
defendants throughout its borders.312 Wisconsin completes
Port Townsend (population 8,300) and Port Angeles (population 18,800), Public
Defenders Ben Critchlow (Jefferson County) and Harry D. Gasnick (Clallam
County) report that indigent defendants wait up to ten days before obtaining
legal representation. See id.
Responding public defenders and assigned counsel in Oregon indicated they are
present at initial bail hearings in seven out of the eleven counties where surveys
were mailed, including Portland, Salem, and Oregon City. Delays may occur in
Baker County (three days), Douglas County (three to five days), Coos County
(seven days), and Washington County (five to fourteen days). App. tbl.III (Or.).
Oregon law requires arraignments to occur during the first thirty-six hours of
custody, excluding holidays, Saturdays, and Sundays. OR. REV. STAT. § 135.010
(2007).
311. The eight-state South Atlantic Division includes Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West
Virginia. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 308. Aside from Delaware and
Florida, three of these states—Georgia, North Carolina, and West Virginia—
provide timely representation in only one or two jurisdictions. App. tbl.IV.
Maryland defendants are unrepresented at the initial bail hearing and, with the
exception of Baltimore City and Montgomery County, counties wait at least
thirty days for assigned counsel’s representation in court. App. tbl.II (Md.). No
defendant is guaranteed counsel anywhere in South Carolina where substantial
delays also follow. App. tbl.II (S.C.).
Florida law guarantees indigent defendants’ representation at the initial bail
determination. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.111, 3.130. Public defenders in seven
jurisdictions confirmed their presence at initial appearances. App. tbl.I (Fla.).
Clearwater Public Defender Bob Dillinger said, “we always attend first
appearance bail hearings, which in Florida occur within twenty-four hours of
arrest.” Survey Response from Bob Dillinger, Pub. Defender, Clearwater, Fla.
(Summer 2009). In Delaware, public defenders for all three counties verified
that they provided counsel for indigent defendants at the initial bail hearing.
App. tbl.I (Del.).
312. The seven-state West North Central Division consists of Iowa, Kansas,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, South Dakota, and North Dakota. U.S. CENSUS
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the group of the “YES, We Do” states. It is the only state
that guarantees first appearance representation in the East
North Central region.313
Few assigned lawyers are found within the nineteen
states located within the West South Central, East South
Central, Mountain, and Middle Atlantic areas. In the West
South Central region,314 indigent defendants represent
themselves at bail hearings in Oklahoma and Texas.315 In
Arkansas, only indigent defendants in the city of Little Rock
enjoy counsel’s assistance.316 Overall within this region,
Louisiana indigent defendants stand the best chance of
being represented by an assigned counsel at initial bail
proceedings conducted in the state.317
A similar pattern exists in the neighboring East South
Central region318 where Alabama, Mississippi, and

BUREAU, supra note 308. While North Dakota defenders are present at initial
bail hearings throughout the State, Minnesota defenders provide similar
representation in every county but one. App. tbl.I (N.D.); app. tbl.III (Minn.).
Most counties in Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, and South Dakota do not ensure
legal representation at the first bail hearing (more “no” than “yes” states). App.
tbl.IV. In Sioux Falls, South Dakota, indigent defendants wait only one business
day before counsel advocates for their pretrial release. Yet, in Deadwood, South
Dakota, poor people charged with felony crimes wait thirty days before being
represented by counsel at their next appearance. App. tbl.IV (S.D.). In
comparison, neighboring Kansas never provides counsel at bail for its’ indigent
defendants. App. tbl.II (Kan.). In Iowa and Nebraska, defendants in the cities of
Dubuque, Lincoln, and Mason City are the only ones defended at their states’
initial bail hearings. App. tbl.IV (Iowa, Neb.).
313. Wisconsin is one of five states in the East North Central division, along
with the hybrid states of Indiana, Illinois, and Ohio, and the no-counsel state of
Michigan. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 308; see also app. tbl.II (Mich.).
314. West South Central Division states consist of Arkansas, Louisiana,
Oklahoma, and Texas. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 308.
315. Defenders in Oklahoma report delays of about three weeks before counsel
appears to represent a poor person. App. tbl.II (Okla.). Most Texas detainees
experience similar delays that extend to thirty days in some jurisdictions. App.
tbl.II (Tex.).
316. App. tbl.IV (Ark.).
317. See infra note 356 (reporting on Louisiana counties that do and do not
provide counsel); see also app. tbl.III (La.).
318. The East South Central Division states consist of four states: Alabama,
Kentucky, Mississippi, and Tennessee. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 308.
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Tennessee uniformly fail to provide counsel.319 Kentucky’s
indigent defendants are the most likely to be represented by
assigned counsel.320 The Mountain region321 reflects a clear
divide: lower-income defendants in Idaho and Montana are
likely to be defended at their initial bail hearing in local
courts.322 An indigent arrestee faces much longer odds of
finding an assigned lawyer in the states of Arizona,
Colorado, New Mexico, and Wyoming.323 In the Middle
Atlantic region324 indigent defendants in New York are more
likely to be appointed counsel than in neighboring states
New Jersey or Pennsylvania.325
319. App. tbl.II.
320. See app. tbl.III (Ky.).
321. The eight Mountain Division states include Arizona, Colorado, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
supra note 308.
322. See app. tbl.III.
323. See app. tbl.IV.
324. The Middle Atlantic Division includes the hybrid states of New Jersey,
New York, and Pennsylvania. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 308.
325. See app. tbl.III (N.Y.); app. tbl.IV (N.J., Pa.). New York defendants are
more likely to obtain counsel when first appearing at bail hearings in New York
City, and in Albany, Buffalo, Nassau, Suffolk, Syracuse, Utica, Watertown (for
felonies), and Westchester, but not in upstate districts such as Ulster County
(three days), Steuben County (three to four days), St. Lawrence County (six
days), Broome County (ten days), and Schenectady County (ten to twenty days).
App. tbl.III (N.Y.); see also Telephone Interview with Renee Captor, Pub.
Defender, Syracuse, N.Y. (Aug. 9, 2009); Telephone Interview with Dale Jones,
Pub. Defender, Albany, N.Y. (Aug. 13, 2009); Telephone Interview with Helen
Zimmerman, Pub. Defender, Buffalo, N.Y. (Aug. 9, 2009).
In New Jersey, four out of eleven responding defenders said they appear at the
initial bail hearing, including those in a large city like Newark, but not Camden
where defendants wait seven to twelve days for counsel to appear, or Trenton
where a three to six day delay occurs. App. tbl.IV (N.J.).
Most of Pennsylvania’s indigent defendants are unrepresented by counsel; only
Belleforte and Philadelphia County defenders guarantee representation at the
initial appearance before a judicial officer. App. tbl.IV (Pa.). Philadelphia
County defender Ellen Greenlee explained that “this representation service is
part of our contract to provide legal services [for] the city.” Telephone Interview
with Ellen Greenlee, Pub. Defender, Phila., Pa. (Aug. 13, 2009). Bellaforte Chief
Public Defender David Crowley stated, “most of Pennsylvania has a three to ten
day rule when assigned counsel first appears in court and meets her assigned
lawyer.” Telephone Interview with David Crowley, Pub. Defender, Belleforte,
Pa. (Aug. 13, 2009). Cumberland defendants wait about five to ten days, similar
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In brief, the New England, South Atlantic, and Pacific
areas are the choice locations for predicting that a lowerincome defendant will be represented when first brought to
a bail hearing. Outside of these two areas, individual states
that have an Office of the Public Defender are more likely to
provide legal representation at indigent defendants’ initial
bail hearings.326
3. Limited Right to Counsel in Most States
In the four out of every five states that do not uniformly
guarantee counsel, the picture is less rosy. Nearly twothirds of these states conduct initial bail hearings in all or
in most parts of their jurisdiction without ensuring a
lawyer’s representation to poor and lower-income
defendants. Indigent defendants are likely to face a lengthy
postponement before they are scheduled to return to court
again and see their assigned counsel present for the first
time.
The following Section begins by identifying the ten
states that continue to deny representation when
defendants first appear at a bail proceeding. It then focuses
on the thirty states that fall within the hybrid pattern of
assigning counsel for indigent defendants’ initial
appearance in only some local proceedings.
a. Ten States Deny Counsel
Compared to a decade ago, the number of states that
systematically refuse to guarantee representation to
indigent defendants at their initial bail hearing following
arrest has been reduced almost by half. At that time,
eighteen states conducted bail hearings without assigned
counsel.327 Today, ten states still decline to guarantee such
protection.
to detainees in Scranton (six days), Jim Thorpe (seven days), Media (ten days),
and Somerset (ten days). App. tbl.IV (Pa.). According to the survey responses,
delays were considerably longer in Reading, where Defender Glenn Welsh said
defendants wait eleven to twenty-one days, in Johnstown, where Prosecutor Bob
Jones estimated defendants wait twenty days, and in Lancaster where Chief
Public Defender James Karl estimated a thirty-day delay. Id.
326. See supra note 306.
327. Colbert, Illusory Right to Counsel, supra note 15, at 10-11.
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Indigent defendants in Alabama, Kansas, Maryland,
Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire,328 Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas appear alone and represent
themselves at the initial bail hearing before a judicial
officer.329 Within these ten “No, We Don’t” [provide a lawyer]
states, many defendants unable to afford bail remain in jail
for prolonged periods, often many weeks beyond the fortyeight-hour initial appearance, until their next court date
when they finally receive in-court representation.
Following the initial bail hearing, a range of delays
exists among the different states and within a specific
state’s localities. In Alabama, for instance, defendants
charged with a felony crime in Birmingham, Jefferson
County, usually wait fourteen to twenty-one days for incourt representation.330 Montgomery County defendants
wait seven to fourteen days after their initial appearance
while Shelby County defendants wait twenty-one to twentyfour days.331 Alabama detainees charged with misdemeanors
wait ten to seventeen days in Montgomery County and
about four weeks (twenty-eight days) in Jefferson County
before gaining their lawyer’s assistance in court.332

328. New Hampshire defendants are not represented at the first bail hearing
according to the counties survey responses, with one exception: in Grafton
County, Hanover and Oxford public defenders represent people charged with
felony crimes. See app. tbl.II (N.H.). Because misdemeanors represent the bulk
of arrests entering a locality’s criminal justice system, and because Grafton
represents a fraction of the State’s population (population 88,522), the author
opted to place New Hampshire in the “NO” representation category to reflect
New Hampshire’s practice of not guaranteeing counsel at bail.
329. App. tbl.II.
330. App. tbl.II (Ala.); see also Telephone Interview with Bill Blanchard, Pub.
Defender, Montgomery, Ala. (July 28, 2009) (estimating a delay of seven to
fourteen days before indigent defendants see their assigned counsel); Telephone
Interview with Bill Hill, Pub. Defender, Columbiana, Ala. (July 28, 2009)
[hereinafter Hill Interview] (“[An] indigent defendant charged with felony will
not see a lawyer for twenty-one to twenty-four days, 95% of the time it is at least
twenty-four days.”); Telephone Interview with John Lentine, Pub. Defender,
Birmingham, Ala. (July 28, 2009) [hereinafter Lentine Interview] (“In-custody
defendants facing felony charges will have counsel’s assistance at preliminary
hearing held fourteen to twenty-one days after initial appearance, and will wait
twenty-eight days for misdemeanor charges.”).
331. App. tbl.II (Ala.).
332. See Hill Interview, supra note 330; Lentine Interview, supra note 330.

2011] PROSECUTION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION

397

Mississippi has shorter postponements for a defendant’s
second appearance. Gulfport defendants charged with a
felony meet their assigned counsel at a preliminary hearing
somewhere between two to fourteen days after their initial
bail hearing; Greenville and Jackson defendants return to
court and meet their assigned counsel approximately seven
days after they first appeared.333
According to Oklahoma City Public Defender Robert
Ravitz, indigent clients remain without counsel during the
first ten days following arrest while prosecutors decide
whether or not to pursue prosecution.334 After the ten-day
period, defenders are assigned. “We try to get there [to the
jail] as soon as possible; our clients appear again in court
within seventeen to twenty-four days after the initial bail
determination,” reports Ravitz.335 His colleague, Tulsa
Public Defender Pete Silva, agrees that “our time is
essentially the same as Oklahoma City’s. Defendants return
to court twenty-one to twenty-four days after their first bail
hearing.”336
In Tennessee, defendants in several districts, including
Nashville, have average waits of three to five days before
assigned counsel appears in court.337 Ashland City,
Chattanooga, Jasper, and Maryville defendants typically
remain in jail for six to twelve days following arrest before
gaining counsel’s courtroom assistance.338 McMinnvale
detainees have the longest delay of three weeks (twenty-one
days) before returning for their second court appearance.339
333. See App. tbl.II (Miss.).
334. Telephone Interview with Robert Ravitz, Pub. Defender, Oklahoma City,
Okla. (Nov. 25, 2008).
335. Id. (estimating that defendants wait about thirty days for counsel’s incourt appearance).
336. Telephone Interview with Pete Silva, Pub. Defender, Tulsa, Okla. (Nov.
25, 2008).
337. See app. tbl.II (Tenn.).
338. See app. tbl.II (Tenn.); see also Survey Response from Ardena Garth, Pub.
Defender, Chattanooga, Tenn. (Summer 2009); Survey Response from Jake
Lockert, Pub. Defender, Ashland City, Tenn. (Summer 2009).
339. Survey Response from Tremena Wilcher, Pub. Defender, McMinnvale,
Tenn. (Summer 2009) (“[I[f they are incarcerated and request counsel at their
initial [bail] appearance, counsel is appointed and the case is reset for hearing
within thirty days.”).
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As Walter Rothgery learned, Texas defendants also are
not represented at the initial bail proceeding before a
magistrate. Throughout the state, in-custody detainees’
next scheduled court appearances varies, depending on the
prosecuting jurisdiction. San Antonio and Kaufman
defendants wait thirty days before obtaining their assigned
lawyer’s representation in court, and Lubbock defendants
wait for twenty to thirty days, while Edinburg defendants
wait fifteen days.340 El Paso defendants wait between seven
to ten days.341 Houston defendants have the speediest
turnaround—“within two business days.”342
In the remaining “NO We Don’t” states—Kansas,
Maryland, Michigan, New Hampshire, and South
Carolina—wide differences exist. In some Maryland and
Kansas counties, defendants fare best. In Montgomery and
Baltimore City, Maryland, for instance, public defenders
represent in-custody defendants two to three days after a
judicial officer decides bail.343 In Wichita, Kansas,
340. App. tbl.II (Tex.); see also Telephone Interview with Miriam Burleson,
Pub. Defender, San Antonio, Tex. (Aug. 17, 2009). In Lubbock, Texas, Public
Defender Jack Stoffregen reported that “representation is generally a letter
from counsel to the judge; twenty to thirty days pass before a defendant who
cannot afford bail appears before a judicial officer.” Survey Response from Jack
Stoffregen, Pub. Defender, Lubbock, Tex. (Aug. 23, 2009).
341. App. tbl.II (Tex.).
342. Houston (Harris County) criminal defense lawyer, Tom Moran, stated
that Harris County conducts initial appearances before a magistrate “24/7” at
the local jail. Following arrest, detainees appear in court “the next business day”
where a judge appoints an attorney who is the assigned “lawyer of the day.”
Moran stated that indigent defendants arrested on a Monday are not
represented at the initial bail hearing, but will see their appointed lawyer “not
later than Wednesday.” Telephone Interview with Tom Moran, Criminal Def.
Attorney, Houston, Tex. (Aug. 19, 2009).
343. App. tbl.II (Md.). Though indigent defendants are never represented by
assigned counsel at the initial bail hearing, Baltimore City and Montgomery
County public defenders are present at detainees’ second bail review hearing
that is held within the next two weekdays after arrest. See Richmond v. Dist.
Court of Md., 990 A.2d 549 (Md. 2010) (describing a class action lawsuit on
behalf of unrepresented Baltimore City indigent detainees’ right to counsel at
the initial appearance). Outside of these two counties, defendants wait thirty
days before receiving the benefit of counsel’s representation in court. The ten
remaining Maryland jurisdictions do not provide counsel to indigent detainees
at the forty-eight hour bail review hearing; they obtain a lawyer’s in-court
representation at their next scheduled court appearance, thirty days later. App.
tbl.II (Md.).
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defendants meet their assigned counsel two days after the
initial bail hearing.344 Salina defendants wait between two
and seven days, while Topeka detainees’ assigned counsel
appears one week later.345
Michigan’s indigent detainees in Ingham County have
their second judicial appearance two to five days following
their initial bail hearing.346 Detainees in Detroit, Grand
Rapids, and Lansing, and Wayne, Michigan, though, wait
ten to fourteen days.347
In Concord, New Hampshire, the state’s Public
Defender Chris Keating estimates assigned counsel’s delay
as between ten to thirty days “depending on the speed with
which defense counsel is appointed, goes to see the client,
files a bail motion, et cetera.”348 Nashua defendants wait ten
days for counsel’s appearance at a felony hearing and
twenty-one to twenty-eight days when charged with a
misdemeanor, while Stratham defendants wait ten business
days to obtain counsel’s assistance for felonies and thirty to
forty-five days for misdemeanors.349 In comparison, Oxford
and Hanover defendants receive in-court representation for
felonies, but must wait seven days when charged with
misdemeanor crimes, although it is “very court
dependent.”350 In Nashua and Stratham, a defendant’s

344. App. tbl.II (Kan.).
345. Id.
346. App. tbl.II. (Mich.).
347. See id. Ingham Public Defender Michael J. Nichols responded that orders
of appointment “are faxed and can take time to get . . . to my desk. It seems like
a phone call might speed up the client contact.” Survey Response from Michael
J. Nichols, Pub. Defender, Ingham Cnty., Mich. (Summer 2009). In a telephone
interview, Detroit Public Defender James O’Donnell estimated that a detainee’s
second court appearance and meeting with counsel occurred within “fourteen
days more or less,” adding that a range of ten to twenty days “sounds about
right, too.” Telephone Interview with James O’Donnell, Pub. Defender, Detroit,
Mich. (Aug. 17, 2009).
348. Telephone Interview with Chris Keating, Pub. Defender, Concord, N.H.
(Aug. 13, 2009).
349. App. tbl.II (N.H.).
350. Telephone Interview with Tony Hutchins, Pub. Defender, Oxford, N.H.
(Aug. 6, 2009).
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second appearance might occur within twenty-one to fortyfive days after the initial bail hearing.351
South Carolina indigent defendants unable to afford
bail suffered the longest delays in jail before meeting their
assigned counsel. In Charleston, defendants reappear in
court “within twenty-eight days.”352 Defendants in Marlboro
County wait fifteen to thirty days, while defendants in
Aiken County charged with misdemeanors or felonies wait
forty-five to sixty days.353
In conclusion, people accused of crimes in the ten states
that deny representation at the defendant’s initial bail
determination face delays, generally ranging from two to
sixty days, before they obtain a lawyer’s assistance.
b. The Thirty Hybrid States: Where Were You
Arrested?
In the remaining thirty “hybrid” states, a defendant’s
chance for a lawyer’s advocacy at the initial bail hearing
depends on the county where the arrest occurred. The larger
hybrid group of eighteen minority hybrid states guarantee
an assigned counsel’s presence in less than one half of
localities, and often as few as one or two counties. In these
“minority hybrid” states, only select localities guarantee
assigned counsel’s representation. The second, smaller
group of twelve hybrid states provides assigned counsel at
351. App. tbl.II (N.H.).
352. Charleston (Charleston County) Public Defender Ashley Pennington
stated that there is “not sufficient funding to provide counsel at initial bail
hearings.” Telephone Interview with Ashley Pennington, Pub. Defender,
Charleston, S.C. (Aug. 6, 2009). Delays in other South Carolina counties
sometimes fit within ten days, but more likely fall closer to the thirty days
range. See app. tbl.II (S.C.). Delays were ten days in Laurens County, ten to
fourteen days in Claredon County, fifteen to thirty days in Marlboro County,
thirty days in Anderson County, and forty-five to sixty days in Aiken County. Id.
353. App. tbl.II (S.C.). Aiken County Public Defender Walter Aves indicated he
provides in-court representation “for the first time at defendant’s second judicial
hearing . . . normally held forty-five to sixty days after arrest.” Telephone
Interview with Walter Alves, Pub. Defender, Aiken Cnty., S.C. (Aug. 6, 2009).
He also indicated South Carolina law gives prosecutors forty-five to sixty days to
decide whether to prosecute. Id. Alves added that he usually waits for a
prosecutor to indicate whether they intend to pursue charges, rather than filing
a habeas writ, which results in a probable cause hearing and further delay. Id.
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the initial appearance in the majority of the state’s local
courtrooms (“majority hybrid”).
Majority Hybrid States: Favoring Representation.
The twelve “majority hybrid” states354 provide a likely
scenario for finding assigned counsel present and ready to
represent indigent defendants when they are first brought
before a judicial officer for a bail determination. Based on
survey and telephone interview responses, an indigent
defendant’s odds are fifty-fifty or better for finding counsel
available at the initial bail hearing in state courts in
Idaho,355 Kentucky, Louisiana,356 Minnesota, Montana, New
354. See app. tbl.III.
355. Two of Idaho’s three responding Public Defenders indicated indigent
defendants are represented at the initial bail appearance. App. tbl.III (Idaho).
“Boise defenders appear for in-custody defendants at video broadcast, bail
hearings.” Telephone Interview with Alan Trimming, Pub. Defender, Boise,
Idaho (Aug. 13, 2009). In the smaller county of Elmore and in Boise (Ada
County), defendants’ assigned counsel represents defendants within forty-eight
hours of arrest. Telephone Interview with Terry Ratliff, Pub. Defender, Elmore
Cnty., Idaho (July 28, 2009). In Kootenai County, Public Defender John Adams
indicated that “when I have staff, I tell my lawyers to go to the initial
appearance.” Telephone Interview with John Adams, Pub. Defender, Kootenai
Cnty., Idaho (Aug. 13, 2009). Adams indicated his lawyers typically do not begin
representation for indigent defendants charged with felonies until fourteen to
twenty-one days following the initial appearance. Id. For defendants charged
with misdemeanors, Adams stated, “if they cannot make bail, it could be six
months before an in-custody defendant returns to court. It happens, it is
definitely possible.” Id.
356. Survey responses from eleven Louisiana county defenders reflected the
extreme differences throughout the state. In six jurisdictions—Caddo Parish,
Jefferson Parish, Lafayette Parish, Orleans Parish, Ouachita Parish, and Saint
Bernard Parish—defendants can expect counsel at the first bail hearing within
one to three days of arrest. See App. tbl.III (La.). In Bossier Parish, defendants
obtain assigned counsel within seventy-two hours of their initial bail hearing.
Id. In comparison, Natchitoches Parish Public Defender Brett Brunson and St.
John the Baptist Public Defender Richard Stricks declared in their surveys that
indigent defendants typically waited thirty days for counsel’s representation. Id.
Lincoln Parish defendants faced longer delays where defendants “are usually in
jail three to six weeks” before obtaining a lawyer’s assistance. See id. Jefferson
Davis Parish holds the dubious distinction for maintaining pretrial defendants
in jail for the longest period before providing counsel. Jefferson Davis Public
Defender David Marcantel stated that “the first time is typically at arraignment
which can vary from about fifty to about seventy days following arrest.”
Telephone Interview with David Marcantel, Pub. Defender, Jennings, La. (Aug.
13, 2009).
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York, Ohio,357 Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia,358 and
Washington. Eight of these “majority hybrid” states—
Kentucky,359 Minnesota,360 Montana,361 New York,362
357. Lawyers from nineteen Ohio counties responded to the survey. App.
tbl.III (Ohio). In nine counties, including the cities of Akron (felonies), Athens,
Batavia, Canton, Chillicothe, Columbus, Marietta, Sidney, and Van Wert (and
sometimes Wapakaneta), public defenders confirmed that attorneys represent
individuals at the initial bail hearing. Id. In the remaining counties, defendants
are not represented at the initial hearing, but the presiding judge assigns a
defender later on. Dayton Public Defender Glen Dewar describes the typical
process in his county where defendants are not represented by counsel: “Public
defender intake workers meet with every jailed defendant . . . judges appoint the
[public defender] to every qualified defendant . . . a lawyer [then] meets with the
client within a day or two.” Telephone Interview with Glen Dewar, Pub.
Defender, Dayton, Ohio (Aug. 9, 2009). Defendants then return to court within
five to fifteen days “depend[ing] upon particular courts’ practices” where they
are represented by an assigned lawyer. Id. Other public defenders confirmed a
normal delay of five to ten days before an assigned advocate appeared in county
courts in Carroll County, Knox County, Lake County, Medina County, Portage
County, and Springfield County. App. tbl.III (Ohio). Portage County Public
Defender Dennis Day Lager explained that Ohio law requires a felony
preliminary hearing be scheduled within ten days of the defendant’s initial
appearance where counsel appears; counsel also is present for misdemeanors
“not later than three days after arrest.” Telephone Interview with Dennis Day
Lager, Pub. Defender, Ravenna, Ohio (Aug. 23, 2009).
358. See supra note 311. Aside from those in Alexandria and Petersburg,
Virginia defendants are represented at initial bail proceedings in Martinsville
as well. See app. tbl.III (Va.). Fairfax Public Defender Todd Petit, indicated that
defendants obtain representation between two to four days after the bail
determination. Id. Public Defender Susan Herman explained what happens
following arrest in Richmond: “Defendants are brought before a judge within
twenty-four hours and we’re in some arraignments and not others.” Telephone
Interview with Susan Herman, Pub. Defender, Richmond, Va. (Nov. 25, 2008)
[hereinafter Herman Interview]. Following the court’s indigency determination,
Herman adds, the public defender is appointed within twenty-four hours and
sees the new client within two court days. When appropriate, the assigned
lawyer will appear at a bail review within five court days. A defendant facing a
misdemeanor charge may wait fourteen to twenty-eight days before returning to
court and obtaining an assigned lawyer’s representation. Individuals charged
with a felony may remain in jail for six to eight weeks before gaining in-court
representation. Id.
359. Kentucky provides representation at defendants’ initial bail hearings in
Colombia (Adair County), Covington (Kenton County), Frankfurt (Franklin
County), Lagrange (Oldham County), and Morehead (Rowan County). App.
tbl.III (Ky.). In Oldham County, La Grange Public Defender Liz Curtin
explained that “though we are not appointed before arraignment, our office is
usually present when defendants are arraigned.” Survey Response from Liz
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Oregon,363 Rhode Island, Utah,364 and Washington365—offer
considerably better odds for an indigent defendant gaining
Curtin, Pub. Defender, La Grange, Ky. (Summer 2009). In Adair County, Public
Defender Glenda Edwards indicated that defendants are represented at bail
within the first twenty-four hours in the “several counties I cover. In the most
rural counties, as much as six days could pass before appearance.” Telephone
Interview with Glenda Edwards, Pub. Defender, Columbia, Ky. (Aug. 23, 2009).
Public defenders from Daviess County reported that defendants obtain counsel’s
representation three days after the initial appearance. App. tbl.III (Ky.). Public
Defender Linda West explained that defendants in Bell County, however, wait
fourteen days. Id. In Laurel County, Public Defender Roger Gibbs stated that,
“we cover five counties, each one does it differently; average time between two to
ten days.” Survey Response from Roger Gibbs, Pub. Defender, London, Ky. (Fall
2009).
360. Minnesota State Public Defender, John Stuart, indicated that public
defenders in Duluth (St. Louis County), Minneapolis (Hennepin County),
Rochester (Olmsted County), and St. Paul (Ramsey County), represent incustody indigent defendants at bail hearings within the first forty-eight hours
after arrest, despite the fact that “we have lost 15% of staff attorneys.”
Telephone Interview with John Stuart, Pub. Defender, Rochester, Minn. (July
30, 2009). Duluth’s Chief Public Defender Fred Friedman reported defendants
obtain counsel’s representation at bail hearings within two days. App. tbl.III
(Minn.). Similarly, Minneapolis’s Criminal Defense Attorney, Leonardo Castro,
indicated that counsel is present at the initial bail hearing within two days of
arrest. Id. The Public Defender’s reduced staff, though, has resulted in some
exceptions. In nine of Owatonna district’s eleven counties, defenders are unable
to represent indigent defendants until fourteen to twenty-one days—the length
of time varies county to county—after arrest. Id. Public Defender Martha
Albertson explained that heavy caseloads prevent her from representing
indigent defendants in Steele County (population 33,000). Telephone Interview
with Martha Albertson, Pub. Defender, Steele Cnty., Minn. (Aug. 10, 2009). In
Kandiyohi County, Public Defender Tim Johnson stated there was a three to
five-day delay. App. tbl.III (Minn.). In Beltrami County, defendants also wait
three to five days. Id. Anoka County Chief Public Defender William Ward stated
that Anoka defendants were assigned counsel within two to three days. Id.
361. In Montana, defenders who represent indigent clients in Billings,
Bozeman, Great Falls, Helena, Lewiston, and Missoula indicated they are
present at initial bail hearings. App. tbl.III (Mont.). Montana Chief Public
Defender Randi Hood stated that “in-custody indigent defendants are
represented at their initial appearance within twenty-four hours usually.”
Telephone Interview with Randi Hood, Helena, Mont. (Aug. 17, 2009).
Lewistown Public Defender Douglas Day indicated that two days typically pass
before counsel is assigned in Fergus County. App. tbl.III (Mont.). Kalispell
Public Defender John Putikka stated the average time is four to six days in
Flathead County. Id.
362. See supra note 325.
363. See supra note 310.
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early representation in most locations within the statewide
jurisdiction. At the other extreme, where a particular
locality in a majority hybrid state does not provide counsel
right away, an accused faces substantial delay before
gaining a lawyer’s in-court representation. Court
postponements following the initial bail hearing may
stretch the detainee’s next appearance to several weeks,
and sometimes even to many months later—comparable to
and exceeding the longest delays that occur in “minority
hybrid” states that uniformly deny counsel.366
Minority Hybrid States: The Exceptional County.
The second hybrid category consists of eighteen states—
Alaska,367 Arizona,368 Arkansas,369 Colorado,370 Georgia,371
364. In Salt Lake City (Salt Lake County) public defenders represent indigent
defendants at the initial bail proceeding. App. tbl.III (Utah). Assigned counsel in
Davis County, Provo (Utah County), and Wasatch County also represent
indigent defendants when they first appear at a bail hearing. Id. In American
Fork (also Utah County) defendants wait three days for assigned counsel. Id.
365. See supra note 310.
366. Compare app. tbl.III (Idaho) (fourteen to twenty-one days for felonies and
approximately six months for misdemeanor crimes in Koontenai County, Idaho),
and app. tbl.III (La.) (fifty to seventy days in Jennings, Louisiana, a majority
hybrid state), with app. tbl.IV (N.J.) (thirty day delay in Somerville, New
Jersey, a minority hybrid state), and app. tbl.IV (Ark.) (thirty-five to forty-five
days in Texarcana, Arkansas, a minority hybrid state).
367. Survey responses show that defendants in the Anchorage Municipality,
Juneau Borough, and the Nome Census Area are most likely to have
representation at their initial bail hearing. App. tbl.IV (Alaska). In Juneau,
defendants are represented at their initial bail hearing which occurs one day
after arrest. Id. In Nome, defendants charged with felony crimes see an attorney
one day after arrest. Id. In Anchorage, defendants wait one to four days. Id.
Defendants elsewhere in the state usually wait between two to seven days for
their assigned counsel’s courtroom representation. See id.
368. Arizona’s assigned counsel in Tucson (Pima County), Florence (Pinal
County), and the City of Phoenix (Maricopa County) represent indigent
defendants at their initial appearance before a judicial officer. App. tbl.IV
(Ariz.), In Navajo County, a defendant will be represented within two days if
they specifically request counsel and five days if they do not. Id. Throughout the
rest of the state, however, early representation is infrequent and is usually
delayed until assigned counsel is appointed and appears at a defendant’s next
court appearance. See id. In La Paz County, counsel is delayed by two to ten
days. Id. In Yuma County, counsel is delayed by four to ten days. Id. In
Flagstaff (Coconino County), counsel is delayed by ten days. Id. In Apache
County, defendants wait thirty days or more for counsel to appear. Id.
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369. Little Rock (Pulaski County) attorney Mary Catherine Williams indicated
that “we represent defendants [at bail hearings] who are charged with felony
and misdemeanor crimes within seventy-two hours,” adding that “we also have
jail court on Saturdays.” Telephone Interview with Mary Catherine Williams,
Attorney, Little Rock, Ark. (Aug. 11, 2009). Outside of Little Rock, however,
Arkansas defendants typically wait lengthy periods for counsel’s representation.
Defendants in Conway County wait thirty days for felony offenses and fourteen
days for misdemeanors. App. tbl.IV (Ark). According to attorney James
Dunham, defendants in Pope County wait thirty days for assigned counsel. In
Washington County, attorneys also estimate a similar delay of thirty days. Id.
Texarkana attorney Wayne Dowd indicates that a typical delay is thirty to fortyfive days in Miller County. Id. Attorney Dowd explained that Arkansas criminal
procedure permits a prosecutor to deliberate for sixty days before deciding
whether to prosecute and file formal charges in Circuit Court. Consequently, he
explained that judges usually delay appointing an assigned counsel until the
defendant’s Circuit Court appearance, which occurs between fourteen to sixtyfive days after a prosecution commences. Telephone Interview with Wayne
Dowd, Attorney, Texarkana, Ark. (Aug. 10, 2009). Dowd suggests that “counsel
should be appointed at the initial appearance . . . for bond purposes.” Id.
Attorney John Bradley stated that Mississippi County defendants wait thirty to
sixty days for counsel’s representation in court. App. tbl.IV (Ark.).
370. Colorado Public Defender Douglas Wilson explained the variances that
exist in Colorado’s sixty-four counties:
We try and often are able to represent indigent defendants at their
initial bail hearing. In the larger counties, a public defender is present
for individuals charged with felonies. In smaller counties, a judge or
magistrate may appear once a week and defenders will be present
within one to seven days from arrest.
Telephone Interview with Douglas Wilson, Pub. Defender, Colo. (Aug. 25, 2009).
Wilson explained that misdemeanor cases create longer delays in some counties.
In Colorado Springs, the state’s second largest city, he said “it is very difficult
[for the defendant] to see counsel within seven days.” Id. Sterling Public
Defender Mike Boyce, indicated that in Logan County, a lawyer will appear to
represent someone charged with a felony in seven days and for a misdemeanor
in fourteen days. See app. tbl.IV (Colo.). For most counties in the State, counsel
is assigned within one to two weeks. Id.
371. Atlanta and Conyers defendants charged with felony crimes are the only
exceptions to Georgia’s statewide practice of not providing counsel to indigent
defendants at their initial appearance hearing. See app. tbl.IV (Ga.). In
Rockdale County, defendants gain a lawyer’s courtroom assistance within two to
ten days. Id. In Butts County defendants wait ten to twenty-one days, and in
Douglas County the delay ranges from four to five weeks. Id. In DeKalb County,
felony defendants see their assigned lawyer fourteen to thirty days after arrest.
Id.
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Illinois,372 Indiana,373 Iowa,374 Missouri,375 Nebraska,376
Nevada,377 New Jersey,378 New Mexico,379 North Carolina,380
372. Only four of the thirty-one survey responses from Illinois state that an
indigent defendant is represented by a defense attorney at his or her initial bail
proceeding before a judicial officer. App. tbl.IV (Ill.). In many of the remaining
counties where assigned counsel does not represent indigent defendants at the
initial bail hearing, less than four days pass before the defendant sees an
attorney. See, e.g., id. (Edwards County two to three days) (Shelby County three
days) (LaSalle County three to four days) (Woodford County four days).
However, in other counties, defendants can wait twenty days or more before an
assigned defendant represents them before a judicial officer. See, e.g., id.
(Franklin County twenty days) (Saline County twenty-one to twenty-eight days)
(Hamilton County twenty-one to thirty days) (DuPage County thirty days)
(Wabash County thirty days).
373. Indianapolis (Marion County) and Bloomington (Monroe County) public
defenders indicate that they represent indigent defendants at initial bail
hearings. App. tbl.IV (Ind.). However, Gary defendants wait five to seven days
for counsel to be assigned and Fort Wayne defendants wait between seven and
ten days. Id. Auburn defendants usually wait forty-five days, while Salem
defendants remain without counsel’s in-court representation for fourteen to
twenty-one days. Id.
374. In almost every Iowa district, defendants are not represented at their
initial bail hearing before a judicial officer. See app. tbl.IV (Iowa). Defendants
are only represented within twenty-four hours in Dubuque County and in Cerro
Gordo County. Id. Delays elsewhere range from twenty days in Waterloo to ten
days in Des Moines, Marshalltown, and Sioux City, and seven to ten days in
Cedar Rapids. Id.
375. According to the survey responses, four Missouri counties, including St.
Louis, reported representation at the initial bail healing. App. tbl.IV (Mo.).
District Defender Mary Fox indicated that in St. Louis, defendants are
represented at bail hearings within one to two days after arrest. Id. This fact
was echoed by her colleague, St. Louis County District Defender Steven
Reynolds. “A public defender is present at the initial appearance, eligible
defendants are always represented.” Telephone Interview with Steven Reynolds,
Dist. Defender, St. Louis, Mo. (Aug. 10, 2010). Defenders also advocate for
clients at the initial bail hearing within seventy-two hours in Caruthersville
(Pemiscot County) and forty-eight to seventy-two hours in Clayton (St. Louis
County). App. tbl.IV (Mo.). In Moberly, defenders advocate for clients “most of
the time in the five counties we cover,” according to Public Defender Leecia
Carnes. Telephone Interview with Leecia Carnes, Pub. Defender, Moberley, Mo.
(Aug. 2009). In Dunklin County, representation takes three to five days. See
App. tbl.IV (Mo.). In Callaway County, representation takes four days. Id. In
Lincoln County, representation takes up to a week. Id. Defendants wait seven to
ten days in Boone County. Id. Defendants are not represented in Kansas City
(Jackson County) for seven to twenty-one days. Telephone Interview with Leon
Munday, Pub. Defender, Kansas City, Mo. (Aug. 2009). In Nevada, Missouri,
Public Defender Joe Zuzul indicates that counsel appears in the four counties
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his office represents in one to fourteen days. App. tbl.IV (Mo.). In Nodaway
County, representation takes twenty-one days. Id.
376. In Lincoln (Lancaster County), Nebraska, assigned defenders are present
and represent indigent defendants when they first appear at a bail hearing.
App. tbl.IV (Neb.). In other counties, defendants must wait between three to
seven days for their assigned counsel. Id. According to Madison County
Defender Melissa A. Wentling, defendants in Madison wait three to five days
after a client’s arrest. Id. Platte County Public Defender Nathan Sobriakoff
indicated that in Columbus, an assigned lawyer is not present at a defendant’s
initial appearance, but appears within one day. Id.
377. Three Nevada defenders responded to the survey. Jeremy Bosler, Washoe
County Public Defender, indicated counsel is assigned in Reno two days after
indigent defendants’ initial bail hearing. App. tbl.IV (Nev.). Countering this
delay, defenders in Washoe County are making a strong effort to provide early
representation for their clients. Public Defender Bosler explained that, “this
office currently has an attorney appearing at all initial appearances [at a video
arraignment], but courts are inconsistent whether counsel can argue
bail/release status.” Telephone Interview with Jeremy Bosler, Pub. Defender,
Washoe Cnty., Nev. (Aug. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Bosler Interview]. Bosler added
that the District Attorney is challenging the defender’s eligibility to appear prior
to appointment. Id. Clark County Public Defender Philip Kohn said defendants
in Las Vegas are not represented at the initial bail proceeding but, following a
judge’s appointment, many defendants request a bail review within the next
forty-eight hours. Telephone Interview with Philip Kohn, Pub. Defender, Clark
Cnty., Nev. (Aug. 9, 2009). In White Pine County, defendants in Ely charged
with felonies wait seventeen days for their assigned lawyer at a scheduled
preliminary hearing. App. tbl.IV (Nev.).
378. Defendants in Essex County (Newark), Gloucester County, Morris
County, and Salem County, New Jersey are represented at the bail hearing
within forty-eight hours following arrest, but the rest of the state is less
expeditious. App. tbl.IV (N.J.). Gloucestor County Public Defender Jeffrey
Wintner indicated that in-custody defendants in Woodbury are represented by
assigned counsel within two days of arrest. Id. In Trenton, defendants wait
three to six days, and in other New Jersey jurisdictions, defendants typically
wait seven to fourteen days for an assigned defender. See id. Bridgeton Public
Defender Jorge Godoy estimated a seven day delay. Id. Camden Public Defender
Michael Friedman indicated seven to twelve days pass before assigned counsel
appears in-court. Id. Cape May Public Defender Timothy Gorny estimated a
similar seven to ten day delay. Id. The delay is seven to fourteen days in
Burlington. Id. Somerset County Public Defender Johnny Mask explained his
county’s lengthy thirty-day delay: “we have had [the] same procedure as Texas
in Rothgery.” Survey Response from Johnnie Mask, Pub. Defender, Somerville,
N.J. (Summer 2009). Ocean County Public Defender Frank Gonzalez indicated
that the court does not assign an attorney until a formal bail hearing is held.
379. In Albuquerque and Las Cruces, New Mexico, public defenders represent
indigent defendants at their first judicial bail appearance within one to two
days. App. tbl.IV (N.M.). In Santa Fe, Public Defender Ben Bauer explained that
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Pennsylvania,381 South Dakota,382 West Virginia,383 and
Wyoming384—that are selective about where assigned
indigent defendants usually wait two weeks before obtaining counsel. Telephone
Interview with Ben Bauer, Pub. Defender, Sante Fe, N.M. (Aug. 13, 2009). San
Juan County Public Defender Christian Hatfield estimated that in Aztec, a
seven-day delay follows the video arraignment before counsel appears. App.
tbl.IV (N.M.). Lea County Public Defender Rebecca Reese provided a wide range
of two to fifteen days of delay for defendants in Hobbs, and explained that, “if a
client cannot bond, appointed [public defender] usually requests a prompt new
bond hearing but still some people fall through the cracks—misdemeanors will
often plea without any contact with a lawyer. Some of our more experienced
magistrates will refuse to take the plea.” Telephone Interview with Rebecca
Reese, Pub. Defender, Hobbs, N.M. (Aug. 20, 2009). Reese describes video bail
proceedings as “the worst of the worst! No lawyer, no judge present.” Id.
380. In North Carolina, the only county in which defendants obtain counsel’s
assistance at the initial bail proceeding is Durham County. App. tbl.IV (N.C.).
Public Defender Lawrence Campbell explained that resources became available
for first appearance representation following a suit based on the jail’s
overcrowding. Telephone Interview with Lawrence Campbell, Pub. Defender,
Durham, N.C. (Aug. 20, 2009). Most Raleigh and Greenville defendants,
however, who are charged with a felony crime wait fourteen days for their
lawyer’s courtroom advocacy, and up to thirty days for misdemeanors. See app.
tbl.IV (N.C.). Winston-Salem defendants wait between fifteen to thirty days,
although Public Defender Peter Clary stated that, “my office appears at first
appearance to make bond reduction motions on certain defendants.” Telephone
Interview with Peter Clary, Pub. Defender, Winston-Salem, N.C. (Aug. 9, 2009).
In Lumberton, defendants have the longest wait. Public Defender Angus
Thompson, II estimates that defendants there remain without a lawyer for up to
forty-eight days. See app. tbl.IV (N.C.).
381. See supra note 325 (describing length of delays in Pennsylvania).
382. In South Dakota, assigned counsel is present and represents Sioux Falls
(Minnehaha County) defendants at the initial bail hearing. App. tbl.IV (S.D.). In
Pierre (Hughes County), however, defendants wait seven days for assigned
counsel to appear. Id. In Rapid City (Pennington County), indigent defendants
wait up to fifteen days when charged with felony crimes, and two to five days for
misdemeanor crimes. Id. Lawrence County Public Defender Matt Pike estimates
that defendants in Deadwood wait about twenty-one days for counsel’s in-court
representation of felony crimes and fourteen days for misdemeanor charges. See
id.
383. Charleston (Kanawha County) is the only West Virginia venue where
counsel represents indigent defendants at the initial bail hearing. App. tbl.IV
(W. Va.). In custody felony defendants in Martinsburg (Berkeley County), West
Virginia typically wait ten days for counsel’s courtroom advocacy, but detainees
charged with misdemeanors wait forty-five days. Id. Defendants in Fayette
County and Mingo County wait ten days and defendants in Harrison County
wait between eight to ten days. Id. Defendants in Jefferson County, however, do
not gain the assistance of counsel for up to forty-five days. Id. Additionally,
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counsel will appear to represent indigent defendants at the
initial bail hearing. Indeed, most states included in the
“minority hybrid” category deny representation in all but
one or two local jurisdictions within the state.
In Arkansas, for instance, only Little Rock defendants
are represented when a judicial officer first determines bail
or pretrial release. In all other Arkansas counties,
defendants represent themselves and remain without
counsel for significant periods of time.385 The same pattern
holds true for defendants who stand alone when arguing for
pretrial release or bail in seven other “minority hybrid”
states: Alaska, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, South
Dakota, West Virginia, and Wyoming.386
Some “minority hybrid” states ensure representation in
several locations that are clear exceptions to that state’s
general “no counsel at initial bail hearing” practice. In
Illinois, for example, defenders are present in the local
courtrooms of Albion, Chicago, Urbana, and Vermillion to
represent indigent defendants when they first enter the
judicial system.387 Illinois’ remaining twenty-seven counties
do not provide assigned defenders at the initial bail
appearance, and unrepresented detainees experience
lengthy delays before returning to court and meeting their
assigned counsel.388
In sum, because eighteen “minority hybrid” states
typically conduct initial appearance hearings without an
assigned defender present, a person accused of a crime may
individuals facing misdemeanor charges wait up to forty-five days for counsel’s
advocacy in Preston County and up to one-hundred and twenty days in Mingo
County. Id.
384. With the exception of defendants charged with felony crimes in Gillette
(Campbell County) and Cheyenne (Laramie County), Wyoming defendants are
not represented at their initial bail hearing. App. tbl.IV (Wyo.). Defendants wait
for assigned counsel approximately five days in Park County, five to ten days in
Washakie County, and seven days in Converse County. Id. According to Public
Defender Mike Shoumaker, defendants charged with misdemeanors in
Campbell County wait sixty days for counsel’s courtroom representation, but
wait only ten days if charged with a felony. Id.
385. See supra note 369; see also app. tbl.IV (Ark.).
386. See app. tbl.IV.
387. See supra note 372; see also app. tbl.IV (Ill.).
388. See app. tbl.IV (Ill.).
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wait from several days to several weeks, and possibly even
longer, before returning to court and obtaining the
assistance of an assigned counsel.389 The need for
enforcement of Gideon’s promise of counsel is profound in
these minority hybrid states. A new national rule is needed.
B. Recap
The national survey captures two pictures showing the
extent of indigent defendants’ constitutional right to counsel
at initial bail hearings in state courtrooms. Across half of
the country, it is not unusual for indigent, often uneducated
and ill-equipped incarcerated defendants, to do their best to
speak and self-advocate for their liberty when brought
before a judicial officer. Detainees who cannot afford bail
remain in custody without the benefit of assigned counsel’s
representation until the next scheduled court appearance.
Jailed defendants have become accustomed to waiting
anywhere from several days to several weeks, and
considerably longer in certain jurisdictions,390 before seeing
their assigned lawyer appear in court. Defendants who post
bond, like Rothgery, may have to wait until a court-defined,
“critical” moment for counsel’s assignment, such as
indictment or the infrequent felony preliminary hearing.
In the remaining half of the country, most indigent
defendants are represented by assigned counsel or a public
defender at the initial bail appearance. Ten states provide
counsel uniformly throughout their jurisdiction.391 In twelve
other states, an accused is likely to find a lawyer present
when appearing before a judicial officer at the first
proceedings in most localities.392 In counties that do not
provide counsel, however, an in-custody defendant may wait
weeks or even months before obtaining an assigned
counsel’s assistance. Some states and localities justify
389. Compare app. tbl.IV (Alaska, Neb.) (noting defendants usually wait
between one to seven days), with app. tbl.IV (Ark.) (noting defendants are likely
to wait a month or longer).
390. Defendants in some parts of Arizona may wait more than thirty days. See
app. tbl.IV (Ariz.). In Arkansas, some defendants have to wait between thirty
and sixty days. Id. (Ark.). In West Virginia, the wait can be as long as onehundred and twenty days. Id. (W. Va.).
391. App. tbl.I.
392. App. tbl.III.
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denying a defendant assigned counsel by arguing that it is
too costly. In a perfect world, they note, counsel should be
present, but the money is just not there.393 Studies appear to
refute the cost argument, however, and demonstrate that
substantial savings would result from early representation,
particularly involving defendants charged with the typical,
nonviolent offense who are much more likely to be released
from jail.394 Pretrial, court-supervised monitoring represents
a suitable and effective alternative for ensuring a
defendant’s reappearance in court.395
Timely legal representation reinforces the longcherished principle of equal justice and presumption of
innocence396 and acts to limit pretrial incarceration to

393. For example, current Maryland Public Defender Paul DeWolfe agrees
that indigent defendants’ constitutional right to counsel extends to bail, but
asserts he lacks the resources and staff to implement the right. See Affidavit of
Paul B. DeWolfe, Jr., in Support of Public Defender’s Response to Plaintiff’s and
District Court Defendant’s Motions for Summary Judgment ¶ 12, Richmond v.
Dist. Court of Md., 990 A.2d 549 (2010) (No. 24-C-06-009911 CN) (“Were this
Court to declare a right to appointed counsel at initial bail hearings and order
the Public Defender to effectuate that right . . . [given] the Public Defender’s
current personnel and budget constraints, without a significant and immediate
increase in funding, the Office of the Public Defender would be unable to provide
adequate representation at initial bail hearings in Baltimore City (and
elsewhere), while still meeting its constitutionally-derived obligation to provide
effective assistance of counsel at all stages of criminal proceedings.”); see also
Transcript of Official Proceedings, Motions Hearing at 40, Richmond v. Dist.
Court of Md., 990 A.2d 549 (2010) (No. 24-C-06-009911 CN) (“If the Public
Defender is going to supply responsible representation when the pedal hits the
metal, when it really matters [at trial], the Public Defender simply lacks the
resources at this juncture to provide meaningful representation of the kinds
that the plaintiffs’ complaint seeks.”).
394. See, e.g., Colbert et al., Counsel at Bail, supra note 65, at 1720 (explaining
that represented defendants charged with nonviolent offenses are 2.5 times as
likely to be released on recognizance and 2.5 times as likely to receive affordable
bail); see also Letter from M. Christine O’Connell, supra note 309 (stating that
early representation “saves our state about nine million dollars a year”).
395. See Baltimore Behind Bars: How to Reduce the Jail Population, Save
Money and Improve Public Safety, JUST. POL’Y INST. 30 (June 2010), available at
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/10-06_REP_BaltBehindBars_MDPS-AC-RD.pdf.
396. See, e.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (“Unless th[e] right to bail
before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after
centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning.”).
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“carefully limited exception[s].”397 Depriving low-income
defendants like Walter Rothgery of his ability to defend
himself against unfounded charges for six months
highlights the dilemma a released detainee faces.
Rothgery’s inability to afford bail and his experience of
spending weeks in jail without a lawyer captures what
happens to many defendants in a state’s pretrial system.398
Denying indigent defendants access to representation
by counsel at the earliest stage of a criminal proceeding has
resulted in experiences like Rothgery’s becoming the
accepted practice in many state criminal courtrooms across
the country. Yet, unlike most defendants who passively
accept the consequences, Rothgery initiated a civil rights
§ 1983 suit that may now alter the legal landscape and
liability for municipalities that delay assigning and
providing counsel. The next Part describes and analyzes
Rothgery’s claim against Gillespie County, Texas.
III. SECTION 1983 REMEDY FOR DEPRIVING COUNSEL
The Supreme Court’s 2008 ruling brought Rothgery’s
§ 1983 civil rights claim sharply into focus. Texas could no
longer be confident that the County had no constitutional
duty to appoint counsel for a bonded defendant like
Rothgery during the six months between his release from
jail and indictment. Once a criminal prosecution
commenced with the filing of criminal charges and the
defendant’s first appearance before a magistrate, a
municipality had to act “within a reasonable time once a
request for [counsel’s] assistance is made[,]”399 or risk § 1983
liability. At the accused’s initial bail hearing, the Supreme
Court held that Rothgery’s Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee to counsel attached and obligated

397. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (“In our society liberty
is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited
exception.”).
398. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
399. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 198 (2008). In Rothgery, the
Supreme Court declared that the attachment of the right to counsel carries “the
consequent state obligation to appoint counsel within a reasonable time once a
request for assistance is made.” Id.
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Gillespie County to assign a lawyer without unreasonable
delay.400
While the Court did not delineate the exact time frame
for counsel’s appointment and appearance or explicitly rule
that the six-month delay before assigning counsel was
unreasonable,401 the Justices raised serious doubts about
Texas’s practice that deprived Rothgery and other released
indigent defendants of counsel’s assistance during the
period from the initial bail determination to indictment.402
Several Justices also expressed concern about a state’s
reluctance to assign counsel and ensure representation
promptly to in-custody detainees,403 such as the period
Rothgery remained in jail post-indictment while awaiting
assigned counsel’s appearance.
The Supreme Court ruling gave a boost to the validity of
Rothgery’s § 1983 claim that the County deprived him of his
constitutional right to timely access of appointed counsel.
The holding allowed Rothgery to pursue his claim, and
should also encourage similarly situated defendants to
initiate a § 1983 suit against a municipality that does not
guarantee representation at a bail proceeding and delays
assignment thereafter.
Rothgery’s strategy of relying on the federal civil rights
statute has significant potential for changing a county’s
practice. Simply stated, a municipality that ignores the
Rothgery Court’s concerns, risks liability and economic
peril. Failing to provide counsel at an accused’s first
appearance before a judicial officer may expose a
municipality to costly compensation where a defendant can
establish that the delay “cause[d him or her] to be
subjected”404 to injury, including loss of liberty.405 A court’s

400. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 213.
401. See id.
402. See supra Part I.E (discussing the concerns raised by Justices during oral
argument). The Texas Solicitor General indicated that detainees are assigned
counsel one to three days after the request has been made, yet Rothgery’s
lawyer did not appear for two to three weeks. See supra notes 266-68 and
accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 176-92 and accompanying text (referring to questions and
concerns raided by the Justices during oral argument).
404. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); supra note 8.
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granting of declaratory or injunctive relief would increase a
municipality’s vulnerability against similar claims.406
Municipalities could gamble that the Supreme Court
ultimately will rule that a “reasonable” delay justifies
appointing counsel sometime after a bail proceeding for a
detained or released defendant. But the longer the
municipality delays appointing counsel, particularly for an
incarcerated defendant, the more financial risk the
municipality will face. Additionally, a municipality invites
further exposure when it appears “indifferent” toward
monitoring the timing of counsel’s actual appearance.
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983: A Strategy for Redressing the Denial of
Counsel
Section 1983 appears to be an ideal mechanism for
motivating local governments to revisit their assignment of
counsel policy. Enacted in 1871, the statute holds that
“[e]very person who, under color of any statute . . . custom,
or usage . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . .
other person . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured.”407 Congress created the
remedy during the Post-War Reconstruction period because
local government and law enforcement officials had failed
miserably to take action against individuals and groups
responsible for a reign of terror against recently freed
African-Americans.408 The Civil Rights Act of 1871
405. Rothgery’s undisputed innocence was an important factor in showing that
a lawyer’s early assignment would have likely accomplished the subsequent
dismissal and spared him the loss of liberty for three weeks.
406. Gillespie County eventually reached a settlement with Rothgery and
avoided a jury verdict that might have encouraged additional suits. See infra
Part III.B. A municipality would be less likely to follow a similar strategy when
dealing with a class-certified plaintiff.
407. § 1983.
408. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION,
1863-1877, at 119-20, 203-05 (1988) (describing whites’ widespread violence
against black citizens after the Civil War concluded in April 1865, and localities’
refusal or inability to prosecute and convict the people responsible); DONALD G.
NIEMAN, TO SET THE LAW IN MOTION: THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND THE LEGAL
RIGHTS OF BLACKS, 1865-1868, at 25 (1979) (“[B]ecause Southern whites viewed
violence as an acceptable means of labor and race control, white sheriffs,
magistrates, judges, and jurors often proved unwilling to mete out justice to
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empowered private lawyers to initiate litigation to deter
such violence and counter a municipality’s failure to hold
wrongdoers accountable.409 Despite Congress’ intention,
during the next ninety years, § 1983 was used sparingly;410
narrow interpretation limited its scope and application.411
In 196l, the Supreme Court acted to revive the civil
rights remedial statute. In Monroe v. Pape,412 the Supreme
Court upheld Congress’s power to provide a federal torts
remedy when the state’s remedial procedure “though
adequate in theory, was not available in practice.”413 In
Monroe, an African-American family claimed city police
officers violated their Fourth Amendment right against
unlawful searches and seizures when they entered and
searched their home without a warrant and held a family
member in custody during a ten-hour interrogation.414 The
whites who committed acts of violence against freedmen.”); Douglas L. Colbert,
Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the
Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 39-43 (1990). In
response, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the criminal counterpart
to § 1983, which empowered federal prosecutors to initiate prosecution against
the responsible people who acted “under color of any law” to deprive AfricanAmericans of enumerated federally protected rights. 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified
as amended in 18 U.S.C § 242 (2006)); see also United States v. Price, 383 U.S.
787, 794 & n.7, 803-05 (1966) (comparing § 242 to § 1983 and describing
congressional reports of post-War violence), superseded by statute on other
grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) (2006).
409. See § 1983.
410. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE
CONSTITUTION 42 (2d ed. 2007) (reporting that only twenty-one § 1983 cases
were reported between 1871 and 1920, and very few during the next decade).
411. See Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants:
Undermining Monell in Police Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 518-19
nn.89, 92-93 (1993).
412. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978).
413. Id. at 174.
414. The Supreme Court opinion described the plaintiffs’ ordeal:
The complaint alleges that 13 Chicago police officers broke into
petitioners’ home in the early morning, routed them from bed, made
them stand naked in the living room, and ransacked every room,
emptying drawers and ripping mattress covers . . . . Mr. Monroe was
then taken to the police station and detained on “open” charges for 10
hours, while he was interrogated about a two-day-old murder . . . . [H]e
was not taken before a magistrate, though one was accessible . . . . [H]e
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Court ruled that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was the appropriate
remedy to counter the family’s remote hope of success in
state court after they had been wronged by the “[m]isuse of
power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of
state law.”415 Seventeen years later, in Monell v. Department
of Social Services,416 the Supreme Court extended § 1983
liability to a municipality whose city policy mandated that
female workers take unpaid leaves of absence from their
jobs after their fifth month of pregnancy.417 In Monell, the
Court concluded that Congress had intended to include a
municipality as a “person” within the statute’s coverage and
hold it liable for a custom or practice that deprived
individuals of a federally protected right.418
In 1980, in Owen v. City of Independence, the Supreme
Court rejected a municipality’s claim for Eleventh
Amendment immunity419 from § 1983 liability.420 The Court
reasoned that Monell’s remedy against local government
was needed to “create an incentive for officials who may
harbor doubts about the lawfulness of their intended
was not permitted to call his family or attorney, [and] he was
subsequently released without criminal charges being preferred against
him.
Id. at 169.
415. Id. at 184.
416. 436 U.S. at 658.
417. Id. at 701.
418. Id. Monell reversed the Supreme Court’s previous ruling in Monroe v.
Pape, which concluded that municipal corporations could not be held liable
under § 1983. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187. Reviewing the congressional debate with
a “fresh analysis,” the Monell Court held that a corporation may be sued when a
government policy or custom caused the constitutional deprivation. Monell, 436
U.S. at 665, 700-701. It affirmed Monroe’s holding that a municipality may not
be liable under a respondeat superior theory. Id. at 691.
419. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or
subjects of any foreign State.”); see also Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 811 (6th
Cir. 2003) (quoting Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274, 280 (1977)) (“The bar of the Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal courts
extends to States and state officials in appropriate circumstances . . . but does
not extend to counties and similar municipal corporations.”).
420. 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980).
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actions” and to encourage these state actors “to err on the
side of protecting citizens’ constitutional rights.”421 The
Court envisioned that § 1983’s “threat that damages might
be levied against the city may encourage those in a
policymaking position to institute internal rules and
programs designed to minimize the likelihood of
unintentional infringements on constitutional rights.”422
Such reform measures would work well when applied to
indigent defendants who are denied assistance of counsel
since they address the “systemic injuries” that result from
delaying an assigned counsel’s in-court representation.
B. Rothgery: The Civil Rights Litigant
Walter Rothgery was the ideal plaintiff for bringing the
§ 1983 action against Gillespie County. His lack of a prior
criminal conviction, combined with a favorable work,
military, and educational background, added to his
favorable public image and credibility. The government
could not dispute that a mistake had been made, and he
should not have been arrested or indicted. At the first Texas
bail hearing proceeding, neither a prosecutor nor defense
lawyer was present to listen to Rothgery’s claim that he had
been incorrectly identified as a prior felon. The County
magistrate responded as expected and informed Rothgery
that Texas law did not entitle him to the assignment of
counsel until indictment.
Rothgery’s § 1983 claim required proof that he was
deprived of a right secured under the Constitution, and that
the deprivation was caused by a municipality’s practice of
not assigning counsel until indictment.423 The Supreme
Court ruling fulfilled the first requirement: Rothgery’s right
to counsel attached at the magistration hearing, and he was
entitled to appointment of counsel within a reasonable time
after he requested a lawyer.424 The trial jury would hear
evidence and determine the reasonableness of the County’s
six-month delay in assigning counsel.

421. Id. at 651-52.
422. Id. at 652.
423. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
424. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008).
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Rothgery relied on Monell’s § 1983 remedy against a
municipality’s practice of depriving him an assigned lawyer
to establish that Gillespie County is a “person” for purposes
of liability. Monell was meant to apply to circumstances like
the one Rothgery faced, where the constitutional
deprivation of counsel “result[ed] not so much from the
conduct of any single individual, but from the interactive
behavior of several government officials, each of whom may
be acting in good faith.”425 Rothgery had no cause of action
against any of the individual officials; the judge, prosecutor,
or arresting officer could claim immunity or a good faith
defense for merely following Texas procedure.426 It was
Texas state law, Rothgery argued, which gave Gillespie
County the ultimate policymaking responsibility for
establishing an indigent defense services system.427 The
municipality created the policies and practices. Under the
Texas Fair Defense Act, each municipality decided when
counsel should be appointed, and provided the bulk of the
funding for the assigned lawyers.428
425. Owen, 445 U.S. at 652.
426. The Owen Court noted that Supreme Court decisions:
[C]onferring qualified immunities on various government officials are
not to be read as derogating the significance of the societal interest in
compensating the innocent victims of governmental misconduct.
Rather, in each case we concluded that overriding considerations of
public policy nonetheless demanded that the official be given a measure
of protection from personal liability. The concerns that justified those
decisions, however, are less compelling, if not wholly inapplicable, when
the liability of the municipal entity is at issue.
Id. at 652-53 (citations omitted).
427. See Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 197 & nn.6-7; see also City of St. Louis v.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988) (stating that state law determines the
ultimate policymaker responsible for municipal liability). To establish § 1983
liability, the County must be responsible for administering indigent defense
practices, not state officials who have immunity.
428. In 2001, the Texas legislature enacted the Texas Fair Defense Act, which
gives counties the responsibility for administering an indigent defense program.
See 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1800. The legislation established “countywide
procedures” for the appointment of counsel to eligible defendants in each county.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.04(a) (West 2005). It created a county
commissioner court that has the budgetary and administrative authority over
county government operations, such as the indigent defense program that the
county selects, i.e. a public defender office or contract defender. Id. § 26.044(b).
The Act created a statewide “Task Force on Indigent Defense” that awards
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The most challenging element of Rothgery’s § 1983
claim required showing that his injuries—namely being
indicted and subsequently incarcerated for three weeks, as
well as experiencing economic and reputation loss—were
“caused” by being deprived of assigned counsel for six
months.429 Based on counsel’s success in gaining a dismissal
once he commenced representation, Rothgery stood a very
good chance of showing that the County’s custom and
practice of delaying a lawyer’s assignment was responsible
for causing his continued prosecution, indictment, and
return to jail. He might also have been able to demonstrate
that his inability to gain employment and loss to reputation
could have been avoided had the County assigned him
counsel promptly.
Eventually, the Texas Solicitor General settled the case
in the mid five figures.430 The success of Rothgery’s claim
shows that § 1983 remains a strategy for relief for similarly
situated defendants and detainees without counsel.

grants and provides “technical support to assist counties in improving their
indigent defense systems.” 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1815. In 2002 and 2003,
Gillespie County contributed 75% and State grants totaled 25% of the total
expenses to operate the indigent defense office. Task Force on Indigent Defense,
TEX. CTS. ONLINE, http://www.courts.state.tx.us/tfid/Resources.asp (last visited
Mar. 14, 2011). The Supreme Court has ruled that the source of funding for a
program—the who pays for damages issue—is “of considerable importance” to
determining whether the county or state is the policymaker. Regents of Univ. of
Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 430 (1997); see also Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson
Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 48 (1994).
429. Proving causation represents a necessary and often difficult aspect for
establishing a § 1983 violation. In most circumstances, a jury decides whether
the municipality’s policy of not assigning counsel for defendants released on bail
“caused” the defendant’s subsequent injury of having been indicted and jailed.
In some situations, a judge decides the issue as a matter of law and may find
that a plaintiff’s allegation of damages is too remote. See MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ &
KATHRYN R. URBONYA, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 104-05 (2d ed. 2008) (citing Jett
v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989)).
430. Telephone Interview with Andrea Marsh, Esq., Texas Fair Defense
Project (June 25, 2010).
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IV. CALL FOR THE AMICUS BRIEF
In Rothgery, the Supreme Court ruling illustrated the
value and influence431 of the “friend of the court,”432 or
amicus curiae brief. The Justices’ lack of knowledge about
state court practices of not assigning counsel to indigent
defendants paved the way for welcoming amicus
participation from legal groups that could present some of
the missing information.433 Indeed, the majority opinion
relied on the data offered by the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers that showed forty-three states
designated assigned counsel “before, at, or just after” a
defendant’s initial appearance before a judicial officer, as
well as the American Bar Association’s amicus curiae
brief.434 The Justices cited the amicus brief to support the
431. Scholars continue to examine the primary influences of Supreme Court
decision-making to determine whether amicus briefs affect Justices’ rulings.
See, e.g., Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus
Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 752 (2000); Kelly J.
Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae
Briefs, 20 J.L. & POL. 33 (2004).
432. The “friend of the court” label is misleading. Amicus third parties are
typically advocates for a particular point of view and usually identify with one
side of a dispute. They are rarely neutral. See Linda Sandstrom Simard, An
Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A Fine Balance of Access,
Efficiency, and Adversarialism, 27 REV. LITIG. 669, 670-71, 676-77 (2008) (citing,
for example, the “Brandeis Brief” that relied on social science studies to show
the harmful effect of long working hours on working women in Muller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412 (1908), and Dr. Kenneth Clark’s doll studies in Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), showing that segregation perpetuates African
Americans’ feelings of inferiority); see also Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae
Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694, 695 (1963).
433. See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 204-05 & n.14 (2008) (citing
the amicus brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
(“NACDL”) and the brief submitted by the American Bar Association (“ABA”)).
The ABA has steadfastly maintained for forty years that counsel should be
appointed “certainly no later than the accused’s initial appearance before a
judicial officer.” Brief of the Am. Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 5-8, Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191 (2008) (No. 07-440)
[hereinafter ABA Brief].
434. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 192, 203-04 (“We are advised without contradiction
that . . . 43 [s]tates take the first step toward appointing counsel ‘before, at, or
just after initial appearance.’” (citing NADCL Brief, supra note 46, at app.)); see
also ABA Brief, supra note 433, at 5-8 (declaring that since 1968, the ABA has
called for counsel’s appointment at the initial appearance).
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finding that Texas’ six-month delay was out of line with
sister states’ practices of counsel attaching at the initial bail
hearing.435 The Supreme Court placed high value on the
amici’s participation when reaching their ultimate ruling.436
When the Court next considers a defendant’s right to
counsel at initial appearance, Justices are once again likely
to turn to amicus briefs to decide two issues: (1) Must states
assign counsel to represent incarcerated indigent
defendants at the initial appearance?; and (2) If not, what is
the constitutionally permissible period for an accused to
wait before being assigned a lawyer and obtaining counsel’s
in-court appearance? Since the Court is not likely to be
aware of actual practices in states’ judicial proceedings,
amicus participation will be essential.
A.

The Value of Providing Additional Data

Commentators recognize that amicus briefs assume an
important role in persuading the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari.437 Once the Court accepts a case, an informative,
data-filled amicus brief stands an equally good chance of
influencing the Justices’ eventual ruling.438

435. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 204-05.
436. See generally Paul M. Collins, Jr., Lobbyists Before the U.S. Supreme
Court: Investigating the Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs, 60 POL. RES. Q. 55
(2007) (“[I]ndicat[ing] that elite decision makers can be influenced by persuasive
argumentation presented by organized interests.”); Kearney & Merrill, supra
note 431, at 745; Lynch, supra note 431, at 35-36.
437. See Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and
Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109 (1988)
(discussing the importance of amicus curiae briefs).
438. Some scholars believe that Justices give weight to amicus briefs of
organized “interest” groups that address policy consequences. See, e.g., Collins,
supra note 436, at 55 (“[P]ressure groups are effective in shaping the Court’s
policy outputs . . . [and] elite decision makers can be influenced by persuasive
argumentation presented by organized interests.”); see also Paul M. Collins, Jr.,
Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation in
U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 807, 810 (2004); Caldeira &
Wright, supra note 437, at 1109-27. Other potential factors that may affect the
success of an amicus brief include the identity, prestige, and experience of the
organization or lawyers participating. Simard, supra note 432, at 688.

422

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

Jurists recognize the enormous value an amicus brief
may serve in providing needed information.439 Supreme
Court Justice Stephen Breyer praised the informative
amicus brief for “helping make us not experts, but
moderately educated lay persons . . . . [E]ducation helps to
improve the quality of our decisions.”440 In Rothgery, the
amici briefs allowed the Justices to learn about the delayed
assignment practices throughout the country that resulted
in indigent defendants first appearing without counsel and
remaining unrepresented long after the first appearance.441
In the next round of litigation, the Justices’ interest will
shift toward assessing the extent to which Gideon’s
guarantee has meaning for indigent defendants at first bail
proceedings. The Court will seek information that reveals
what is happening in other parts of the country.442
Specifically, Justices will want to know whether indigent
defendants receive representation at initial bail
proceedings, and if not, how long they remain without
counsel. The Court likely will welcome amicus briefs that
illuminate the typical scene at the early stage of a state
prosecution.
Public defenders and assigned counsel are in an
excellent position to provide a first-hand account of
practices in their local jurisdiction. The Rothgery Court’s
embrace of the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers’ data presented the Justices with a much needed
picture. Delaying counsel’s appointment, as defenders know,
439. See id. at 690-91. Simard distinguishes the influence of the informative
amicus brief from the “affected group[‘s]” third party brief. Id. at 683-84. Other
scholars conclude that the Supreme Court’s refusal to limit the number of
amicus briefs evidences the Court’s positive view regarding their value. See, e.g.,
Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Amici Curiae Before the Supreme Court:
Who Participates, When, and How Much?, 52 J. POL. 782, 786 (1990).
440. Stephen Breyer, The Interdependence of Science and Law, 82 JUDICATURE
24, 26 (1998). Justice Breyer has said that amicus briefs “play an important role
in educating judges.” Associated Press, Justice Breyer Calls for Experts to Aid
Courts in Complex Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1998, at A17.
441. See supra notes 433-35 and accompanying text.
442. Compare Jaffee v. Redmond, in which Justice Scalia explained that the
unanimous support offered by psychiatry and social worker organizations for a
psychotherapist privilege reflected that “no self-interested organization out
there [was] dedicated to pursuit of the truth.” 518 U.S. 1, 36 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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is part one of the “waiting for a lawyer” story. Amicus briefs
provide the opportunity to educate the Court about the
further
wait
before
obtaining
counsel’s
actual
representation. When the next Rothgery issue reaches the
Court, national and state defender organizations and bar
associations are in a position to detail whether and when
indigent defendants receive an assigned counsel’s in-court
representation after a criminal prosecution has commenced.
Prosecutors, too, know that a system of equal justice for
indigent defendants depends upon a defense lawyer’s timely
presence. From their perspective as “minister[s] of
justice,”443 prosecutors can speak to the fairness flowing
from early representation. Absent a defender, court dockets
become more congested and many defendants remain in jail
longer because of the lawyer’s delay.444 The system moves
more slowly and less efficiently, and cases are less likely to
be resolved. Local prosecutors are aware that unnecessary
delay may undermine a community’s faith in the justice
system.445 When cases are postponed, prosecution witnesses
become frustrated. When a family member remains
unnecessarily in jail, that defendant’s family or friends are
less inclined to cooperate when asked to testify in an
unrelated prosecution.446 Finally, prosecutors know the

443. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2010) (“A prosecutor has
the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”).
444. See Colbert et. al, Counsel at Bail, supra note 65, at 1756. A 1998 study
showed that represented indigent defendants charged with non-violent offenses
“were substantially more likely to be released on their own recognizance . . . to
have affordable bails . . . set [and] served less time in jail.” Id.
445. Providing counsel at bail hearings may help to reassure defendants that
the state intended to respect their right to liberty. See id. at 1759 (“Defendants
represented by counsel were also queried about how fairly they thought they
were treated and how satisfied they were with the procedures. In virtually every
dimension investigated, defendants who had lawyers were more satisfied with
the manner in which they were treated.”); see also State v. Keller, 553 P.2d
1013, 1019 (Mont. 1976) (“Delayed criminal justice proceedings are undermining
public confidence in the system itself. Justice delayed may not only be justice
denied but justice brought seriously under question. The backbone of law
enforcement and the justice system is public support. The courts must not
permit the erosion of that support by permitting unnecessary delay between
charge and conviction or release.”).
446. See id. It stands to reason that when a state denies counsel, thereby
adding to the time an accused remains in jail, the individuals are unlikely to
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difference an advocate can make at bail determinations for
nonviolent offenses.447 Their ethical duty to justice has
resulted in the support of measures that would guarantee a
lawyer for the indigent defendant.448 Consequently, a
prosecutor’s amicus brief may speak directly to the policy
implications of failing to extend Gideon’s guarantee.
B.

Policy Concerns and Consequences

Research suggests that Supreme Court Justices attach
considerable weight to amicus briefs that highlight the “farreaching societal consequences” of a ruling.449 Amicus briefs
are likely to influence a ruling when the policy analysis
coincides with a Justice’s philosophy.450 As Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor explained, an amicus brief that discusses
policy consequences, “invaluably aid[s] our decision-making
process and often influence[s] either the result or the
reasoning of our opinions.”451
Consider the social and political impact that would have
resulted had the Supreme Court decided Rothgery
differently and affirmed Texas’s lengthy delay procedures of
assigning counsel. Such a ruling would have undermined
Gideon’s commitment to equal justice.
cooperate with law enforcement officials who are seen as responsible for
depriving people of liberty.
447. Colbert et al., Counsel at Bail, supra note 65, at 1762.
448. In 1998, the American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice Council, which
is comprised of prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges, proposed a resolution
that would guarantee representation at the initial bail stage. Annual Report of
the American Bar Association Including Proceedings of the 120th Annual
Meeting of the House of Delegates, 123 No. 2 ANNU. REP. A.B.A. 1998, at 389, 392.
The resolution was approved. Id.
449. Collins, supra note 436, at 58. After reviewing Supreme Court amicus
briefs between 1946 and 1995, Collins concluded that an amicus participant
aims at the “broader societal ramifications of the case, while advocating for a
particular policy outcome.” Id. (citing LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES
JUSTICES MAKE (1998); James F. Spriggs, II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Amicus Curiae
and the Role of Information at the Supreme Court, 50 POL. RES. Q. 365 (1997)).
450. See Collins, supra note 436, at 58.
451. Sandra Day O’Connor, Supreme Court Justice, Henry Clay and the
Supreme Court, Speech Delivered to the Henry Clay Memorial Foundation (Oct.
4, 1996) (transcript available in the Register of the Kentucky Historical Society,
Vol. 4, No. 4 (1996)).

2011] PROSECUTION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION

425

Ruling for Texas would have had other harmful
consequences to the perceived unfairness of a state’s justice
system. State prosecutors could choose, if they wanted, to
proceed as cautiously as they thought “reasonable” against
a lower-income detainee since no lawyer would be present to
challenge their actions. Many prosecutors would regard the
ruling as a signal that it was okay to take months before
deciding whether to pursue a prosecution.
Amicus support for Rothgery’s situation allowed the
Justices to appreciate the “broad policy concerns” if the
Court sanctioned these practices. The briefs submitted by
the American Bar Association,452 law professors,453 and the
criminal defense bar,454 demonstrated the legal system’s
embrace and insistence upon equal justice for “any person
haled into court.”455 In short, amici’s focus on the impact of
the Court’s right-to-counsel ruling presented the Justices
with a clear choice: affirm Gideon’s principles at the outset
of a judicial criminal proceeding or postpone a lawyer’s
assistance until a future date.
C. The Influential Amicus
Research shows that Supreme Court Justices may be
influenced by the particular party who submits an amicus
brief. The position of the United States Solicitor General, for
instance, enjoys considerable weight.456 Law clerks
acknowledge that they “always consider[]” the Solicitor
General’s brief because it represents “excellent written and
oral advocacy” and an extremely well-researched
argument.457 According to their law clerks, Justices also
examine the amicus brief of legal organizations known for
their high quality of work, including the ABA, ACLU, AFLCIO, and NAACP.458 The clerks also value amicus briefs
452. ABA Brief, supra note 433.
453. Twenty-Four Professors Brief, supra note 108.
454. NACDL Brief, supra note 46.
455. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
456. See Lynch, supra note 431, at 46. For example, 81.6% of all employment
discrimination cases supported by the Solicitor General have won at the
Supreme Court level. Id.
457. Id. at 47.
458. Id. at 46, 50-51.
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submitted by certain attorneys, such as a former Solicitor
General, or a well-known law professor.459 An amicus filed
by an individual state “warrant[s] close consideration . . .
because of federalism concerns.”460 A Justice “with strong
allegiance to states[‘] rights theories” usually gives
additional attention to their position.461
D. Recap
The Supreme Court is likely to look to amicus briefs to
gain a state-by-state picture of when indigent defendants
are receiving counsel’s assistance and how long they wait.
While this Article’s survey contributes to the Justices’
understanding, amici can fill in the additional important
details. Amicus briefs of defenders and prosecutors can
complete the picture and tell the full story of the right to
counsel in their jurisdictions. When they do, the Court will
better appreciate the high stakes involved in deciding what
Gideon requires to make the right to counsel meaningful.
Additionally, the position taken by the United States
Solicitor General, states’ attorney generals, and the
organized bar may be pivotal. Clearly, amici have a vital
role to play.
CONCLUSION
Chief Justice Roberts’ final comment at the close of
Rothgery’s counsel’s oral argument revealed a hurdle that
indigent defendants must overcome if they are to persuade
the high court to extend Gideon’s fundamental right to the
initial bail determination stage of a criminal proceeding.
“Well,” said the Chief Justice, “what’s in it for the State to
provide this additional layer [of a magistration hearing]?
Because, of course, the person gets Miranda warnings when
he is arrested. And so why—why should the State do
this?”462 Speaking for unrepresented indigent defendants
459. Id. at 52-53.
460. Id. at 48.
461. Id.
462. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 57. A defendant’s
invocation of Miranda’s right to counsel never meant that the State must
immediately produce a lawyer, but only required counsel when the police
wanted to continue interrogation and sought the defendant’s waiver of the right
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everywhere who have no lawyer to explain, advise, or
advocate, Ms. Spinelli replied that, “this is the proceeding at
which the defendant is informed: You are now a criminal
defendant. This is the accusation against you, and these are
your rights as a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”463
Ms. Spinelli might well have asked the Chief Justice the
following questions as well: How can a state’s criminal
justice system maintain the respect and even-handedness
required when it denies representation to people unable to
retain a private lawyer? What justifies local government
prosecuting and jailing the poor and lower-income person
without guaranteeing legal representation until after
prosecution when judicial proceedings have already
commenced? What compelling reason trumps Gideon’s
fundamental right to counsel to ensure equal justice and
justifies delaying representation for days and often weeks?
And she might have asked the Chief Justice, who
appreciates parallels to his role as an impartial baseball
umpire,464 whether he would consider the officiating fair
where the other side’s most important defender and
offensive player was ruled ineligible before the game even
began and for many innings following.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s answer to the “what’s
in it for the State” question will determine whether the
Justices extend Gideon’s promise of representation. The
amicus participation of the legal community is likely to play
a decisive role in contributing more details to the fifty-state
survey that describes what currently occurs in local courts
across the country. Nearly fifty years after Gideon spoke to
to remain silent. During the 2010 term, the Supreme Court ruling in Berghuis v.
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010), modified Miranda’s protection of
suppressing a statement obtained after a defendant invokes silence. Now a
defendant’s invocation of Miranda’s right to remain silent requires an
affirmative and unambiguous statement to suppress any subsequent statement.
See Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2264.
463. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 57.
464. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be
Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (testimony of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr.)
(“Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them. The
role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the
rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the
umpire.”).
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equal justice for every person “haled into court” and facing a
criminal charge, the bar can provide the critical answer to
the “what is in it” for every State dedicated to ensuring fair
safeguards for an accused facing a criminal charge.
The Justices’ sharp reaction to Texas’s practice of
failing to provide counsel to an incarcerated defendant
suggests that the Supreme Court may now be ready to
extend Gideon’s protection to the initial bail stage of a
criminal prosecution and to what the high court recognized
long ago is “perhaps the most critical period of the
proceedings . . . from the time of . . . arraignment until the
beginning of . . . trial, when consultation, thoroughgoing
investigation and preparation [are] vitally important.”465 It
lends hope that the day is near when every state will
guarantee representation to an incarcerated defendant at
the initial assessment of bail, and soon thereafter for
released indigent defendants. That is, after all, what is
necessary to restore the fundamental American principle of
guaranteed right counsel.
APPENDIX
I. “YES WE DO” STATES
Location:
City (Cnty.)

Represented at
Initial Bail
Hearing?

If No, Days of
466
Delay?

Attorney

CALIFORNIA
San Mateo

Yes

2

Myra A. Weiker

San Diego

Yes

2–3

Vincent Garcia

Yes

2

Michael Fitzgerald

Yes

1–2

Robert Dahlstedt

(San Diego Cnty.)
Madera
(Madera Cnty.)
Riverside
(Riverside Cnty.)

465. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
466. Unless otherwise indicated, the period of delay does not include a weekend
day when a local court may be closed.
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(Solano Cnty.)

Yes

2

Jeffrey E. Thoma

San Joaquin

Yes

2

Peter Fox

Yes

2

David Hunt

Yes

2

John Abrahams

Yes

2–3

Michael Pro

(Kern Cnty.)

Yes

2–3

Mark Arnold

Ventura

Yes

2

Howard Asher

Yes

2

Lael Kayfetz

2

Terry Davis

Yes

2–4

Rebecca S. Young

Yes

2–3

Charles Murphy

(San Joaquin Cnty.)
Sacramento
(Sacramento Cnty.)
Sonoma
(Sonoma Cnty.)
Merced
(Merced Cnty.)

(Ventura Cnty.)
(Siskiyou Cnty.)
Napa

Yes (felony)

(Napa Cnty.)
San Francisco
(San Francisco Cnty.)
Monterey
(Monterey Cnty.)
Santa Cruz

Yes

Larry Bigam

(Santa Cruz Cnty.)

CONNECTICUT
Hartford

Yes

1–2

(Hartford Cnty.)
Litchfield

Sandra Davis
Susan Brown

Yes

2

Carol R. Goldberg

Yes

2

Omar A. Williams

Yes

1

Brian J. Bartley

(Litchfield Cnty.)
New Haven
(New Haven Cnty.)

DELAWARE
New Castle
(New Castle Cnty.)
(Kent Cnty.)

Yes

1–2

Dawn Williams
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(New Castle Cnty.)
(Sussex Cnty.)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Washington, D.C.

Yes

1

Amanda Davis
Jason Downs

FLORIDA
Palm Beach

Yes

1

Carey Haughwout

Yes

1

Julianne M. Holt

Yes

1

J. Marion Moorman

Yes

1–2

Nancy Daniels

Yes

1–2

James S. Purdy

(Palm Beach Cnty.)
Tampa
(Hillsborough Cnty.)
Polk City
(Polk Cnty.)
Tallahassee
(Leon Cnty.)
(Putnam Cnty.)
Daytona Beach

Craig Dyer

(St. Johns Cnty.)
Jacksonville

Yes

1

Bill White

Yes

1

Diane Cuddiky

Yes

2

Edmund Acoba

Yes

1–2

Wendy Hudson

(Berkshire Cnty.)

Yes

1

Nathaniel Green

Worcester

Yes

1

Michael S. Hussey

Yes

1

Christopher Skinner

(Duval Cnty.)
Fort Lauderdale
(Broward Cnty.)

HAWAII
Kauai
(Kauai Cnty.)
Maui
(Maui Cnty.)

MASSACHUSETTS

(Worcester Cnty.)
Boston
(Suffolk Cnty.)
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(Barnstable Cnty.)

Yes

1

William Robinson

Yes

2

Robert Ruffner

431

MAINE
Portland
(Cumberland

Cnty.)

Lewiston
(Androscoggin Cnty.)
Portland

2

Yes

Deidre Smith
Prof. Chris Northrup

(Cumberland Cnty.)

NORTH DAKOTA
(Barnes Cnty.)

Yes

2

Robin Huseby

(Stark Cnty.)

Yes

2

Kevin McCabe

Yes

1–2

Kevin Griffin

Yes

1–3

Jerry L. Schwarz

Yes

1

Dan Albert

(Washington Cnty.)

Yes

1

John P. Kuczmanski

Madison

Yes

1–3

Catherine Dorl

Yes

1–3

Thomas Reed

(Outagamie Cnty.)

Yes

1

Eugene A. Bartman

Shawano

Yes

1

Steve Weerts

Yes

1–3

Catherine

VERMONT
Windsor
(Windsor Cnty.)
Addison
(Addison Cnty.)
Franklin
(Franklin Cnty.)

WISCONSIN

(Dane Cnty.)
Milwaukee
(Milwaukee Cnty.)

(Shawano Cnty.)
Sauk City

Ankenbrauwelt

(Sauk Cnty.)
(Dodge Cnty.)

Yes

1–3

Joe Moore

Eau Claire

Yes

1–2

Dana Smetana

(Eau Claire Cnty.)
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(Lincoln Cnty.)

Yes

3

Jim Lex

Ashland

Yes

1–4

Mark Perrine

Yes

1

Suzanne O’Neill

Yes

2

John Rhiel

Yes

1–3

John W. Kuech

(Portage Cnty.)

Yes

1–3

David R. Dickmann

Fond du Lac

Yes

2

Mary Wolfe

(Ashland Cnty.)
Marathon
(Marathon Cnty.)
Jefferson
(Jefferson Cnty.)
Winnebago
(Winnebago Cnty.)

(Fond du Lac Cnty.)

II. “NO, WE DON’T” STATES

Location:
City (Cnty.)

Represented at
Initial Bail
Hearing?

If No, Days of
Delay?

Attorney

ALABAMA
Columbiana

No

21 – 24

Bill Hill

No

14 – 21

John Lentine

No

7 – 14

Bill Blanchard

No

2–7

Mark J. Dinkel

No

2

Steve Osburn

No

7

Tom Bartee

(Shelby Cnty.)
Birmingham
(Jefferson Cnty.)
Montgomery
(Montgomery Cnty.)

KANSAS
Salina
(Saline Cnty.)
Wichita
(Sedgwick Cnty.)
Topeka
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(Shawnee Cnty.)
Liberal

No

14 – 30

Razmi Tahirkheli

No

30

(Montgomery Cnty.)

No

2

(Prince George’s Cnty.)

No

30

Baltimore City

No

2

(Baltimore Cnty.)

No

30

(Carroll Cnty.)

No

30

No

30

No

30

No

14

Fred Bell

(Ingham Cnty.)

No

2–5

Michael J. Nichols

Detroit

No

10 – 20

James O’Donnell

(Wayne Cnty.)

No

10

Donald L. Johnson

Grand Rapids

No

14

Richard E. Hillary

(Seward Cnty.)
467

MARYLAND
Annapolis

(Anne Arundel Cnty.)

(Baltimore City Cnty.)

(Howard Cnty.)
Fredrick
(Fredrick Cnty.)
Aberdeen
(Harford Cnty.)

MICHIGAN
Lansing
(Ingham Cnty.)

(Wayne Cnty.)

467. Information provided by Maryland Public Defender Paul DeWolfe and
General Counsel to the Office of the Public Defender Peter Rose. The Maryland
Public Defender does not represent indigent defendants at the first bail hearing;
it indicated that defenders represent indigent defendants at a subsequent
judicial bail review hearing in three out of Maryland’s twelve jurisdictions. Email from Peter Rose, General Counsel, Md. Office Pub. Defender, to author
(July 19, 2010) (on file with author); see also supra note 393.
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(Kent Cnty.)
(Kent Cnty.)

No

2

Richard E. Hillary

No

14

Glenn F. Rishel, Jr.

No

7

Carol L. White-Richard

No

10 – 30

Chris Keating

MISSISSIPPI
Gulfport
(Harrison Cnty.)
Greenville
(Washington Cnty.)
468

NEW HAMPSHIRE
Concord
(Merrimack Cnty.)
Stratham

469

F:

No

470

M:

(Rockingham Cnty.)
Hanover, Oxford

M: No

(Grafton Cnty.)

F: Generally Yes

Nashua

No

(Hillsborough Cnty.)

10

Luci A. Smith

30 – 45

7

Tony Hutchins

F: 10

James D. Quay

M: 21 – 28

OKLAHOMA
Tulsa

No

24

Peter Silva

No

30

Robert Ravitz

No

28

Ashley Pennington

No

30

Robert A. Gamble

(Tulsa Cnty.)
Oklahoma City
(Oklahoma Cnty.)

SOUTH CAROLINA
Charleston
(Charleston Cnty.)
Anderson
(Anderson Cnty.)

468. See supra note 328.
469. Felonies are represented by “F”.
470. Misdemeanors are represented by “M”.
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No

45 – 60

Wallis Alves

No

10 – 14

Harry L. Devoe, Jr.

No

15 – 30

Daniel Blake

Yes

14

Harris L. Beach, Jr.

No

10

Claude H. Chip Howe,

(Aiken Cnty.)
New Zion
(Clarendon Cnty.)
Bennettsville
(Marlboro Cnty.)
Walterboro
(Colleton Cnty.)
Columbia
(Richland Cnty.)
Clinton

III

(Laurens Cnty.)
Darlington

No

30

Robert Kilgo

No

5

Dawn Deaner

No

4

Joe Atnip

No

3

Ed Miller

No

5 – 10

Mark Garner

No

10

Phillip A. Condra

No

4–5

Gary F. Antrican

No

30

Angelo Moore

(Darlington Cnty.)

TENNESSEE
Nashville
(Davidson Cnty.)
Dresden
(Weakley Cnty.)
Dandridge
(Jefferson Cnty.)
Maryville
(Blount Cnty.)
Jasper
(Marion Cnty.)
Somerville
(Fayette Cnty.)

TEXAS
San Antonio
(Bexar Cnty.)
Lubbock
(Lubbock Cnty.)

Melissa Barlow
No

20 – 30

Jack Stoffregen
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El Paso

No

7 – 10

Robert Riley

(Kaufman Cnty.)

No

30

Andrew Jordan

Edinburgh

No

15

Jaime Gonzalez

(El Paso Cnty.)

(Hidalgo Cnty.)

III. HYBRIDS: 50-50 OR MORE “YES” THAN “NO”

Location:
City (Cnty.)

Counsel at
Initial
Appearance
within

Days Between
Arrest and
Representation

Attorney

48 Hours?
IDAHO
(Kootenai Cnty.)

No

F: 14 – 21

John Adams

M: up to 6
months
(Elmore Cnty.)

Yes

2

Terry Ratliff

Boise

Yes

2

Alan Trimming

Yes

4 – 10

Rodney Barnes

(Ada Cnty.)

KENTUCKY
Frankfurt
(Franklin Cnty.)
Covington

Dennis Shepard
Yes

1–2

John Delaney

No

14

Linda West

Yes

1

Liz Curtin

Yes

2

Steven Geurin

Yes

1

Glenda Edwards

(Kenton Cnty.)
Pineville
(Bell Cnty.)
La Grange
(Oldham Cnty.)
Morehead
(Rowan Cnty.)
Columbia
(Adair Cnty.)

(except 6 days in

(unless weekend)
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“the most rural”
counties)
Owensboro

No

3

Jerry Johnson

No

2 – 10

Roger Gibbs

Yes

1

Christine Lehmann

Yes

1–3

Alan Golden

Yes

1–3

David Balfour

No

30

Brett Brunson

No

50 – 70

David Marcantel

Yes

21 – 42

Lewis Jones

Yes

1–3

Michael Courteau

Yes

1–3

Richard Tompson

No

30

Richard Stricks

Yes

1

Gregory Duley

No

3

James Phillips

(Daviess Cnty.)
London
(Laurel Cnty.)

(differences in 5
counties)

LOUISIANA
New Orleans
(Orleans Parish)
Shreveport
(Caddo Parish)
Lafayette
(Lafayette Parish)
Natchitoches
(Natchitoches Parish)
Jennings
(Jefferson Davis
Parish)
Ruston
(Lincoln Parish)
Monroe
(Ouachita Parish)
Gretna
(Jefferson Parish)
LaPlace
(St. John the Baptist
Parish)
Chalmette
(Saint Bernard Parish)
Benton
(Bossier Parish)
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MINNESOTA
Owatonna

2 counties Yes

(11 counties)

9 counties No

N
14 – 21

Anoka (Anoka Cnty.)

5 counties Yes

2–3

(8 counties)

3 counties
sometimes

Bemidji

Karen Duncan

M. Ward

No

3–5

Yes

2

Fred Friedman

Yes

2

Leonardo Castro

No

3–5

Tim Johnson

Yes

2

James Hankes

Yes

2

State PD John

(Beltrami Cnty.)
Duluth
(St. Louis Cnty.)
Minneapolis
(Hennepin Cnty.)
Willmar
(Kandiyohi Cnty.)
St. Paul
(Ramsey Cnty.)
Rochester

Stewart

(Olmsted Cnty.)

MONTANA
Helena
(Lewis and Clark Cnty.)
Missoula

Yes

1–2

(in-custody)
Yes

Chris Abbot
1–3

(Missoula Cnty.)
Billings

Randi Hood

Brian Smith
Ed Sheehy

Yes

Kris Copenhaver

(Yellowstone Cnty.)
Lewiston

No

3–6

(Fergus Cnty.)
Bozeman

Douglas Day
John Oldenberg

Yes

1

Peter Ohman

No

4–6

John Putikka

Yes

1–2

Betty Carlson

(Gallatin Cnty.)
Kalispell
(Flathead Cnty.)
Great Falls
(Cascade Cnty.)
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NEW YORK
Albany

Yes

3

Dale Jones

No

10

Jay Wilber

No

3–5

Majer Gold

Yes

1–3

Frank Nebush

(Albany Cnty.)
Binghamton
(Broome Cnty.)
Kingston
(Ulster Cnty.)
Utica
(Oneida Cnty.)

David Cooke

(Jefferson Cnty.)

Yes

1

Julie Hutchins

(Steuben Cnty.)

No

3–4

Byrum Coope, Jr.

Batavia

Varies

1–5

Gary Horton

(Genesee Cnty.)
Canton

Jerry Ader
No

1–6

Brian Pilatzke

Yes

1–2

Renee Captor

Yes

1–2

Helen Zimmerman

F: Yes

1

Yeura Venters

No

5 – 15

Glen Dewar

1–5

S. Mark Weller

1

Joe Kodish

(St. Lawrence Cnty.)
Syracuse
(Onondaga Cnty.)
Buffalo
(Erie Cnty.)

OHIO
Columbus
(Franklin Cnty.)
Dayton
(Montgomery Cnty.)
Wapakoneta

Generally No

(Auglaize Cnty.)
Akron

F: Y

(Summit Cnty.)

M: N

Batavia
(Clermont Cnty.)

Yes

1

R. Daniel Hannon

Medina

No

F: 10

Tim Lutz

(Medina Cnty.)

M: 2
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James Nichelson

M: 5
No

14

(Wayne Cnty.)

John Leonard

Athens
(Athens Cnty.)

Yes

1

Mike Westfall

Van Wert

Yes

3

Kelly Rauch
Steve Diller

(Van Wert Cnty.)
Mt. Vernon
(Knox County.)

No

5–7

Bruce Maler

Springfield

No

F: 10

Jim Marshall

(Clark Cnty.)

M: 5

Greenville
(Darke Cnty.)

No

Varies

Paul Wagner

(Shelby Cnty.)

Yes

1

Timoney Sell

Painesville

No

Sidney

(Lake Cnty.)
(Carroll Cnty.)

F:10

Paul La Plante

M: 14
No

F: 10
M: 3

Canton
(Stark Cnty.)

Yes

1

Tammi Johnson

(Washington Cnty.)

Yes

1

Raymond Smith

Chillicothe

Yes

1–2

Dan Siclott

Marietta

(Ross Cnty.)
Ravenna

Jessica McDonald
No

(Portage Cnty.)

F: 10

Dennis Day Lager

M: 3

OREGON
Salem

Yes

Richard Cowan

(Marion Cnty.)
Bend

Yes

1–2

Jacques A. Delkalb
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(Deschutes Cnty.)
Hillsboro

Wade Whiting
No

5 – 14

(Washington Cnty.)
Baker City
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Steve Verhulst
Robert Harris

No

3

Kenneth Bardizian

Yes

1–2

Brian Aaron

(Baker Cnty.)
Portland
(Multnomah Cnty.)

Paul Petterson
Chris O’Connor

Oregon City

Yes

2–3

Aimee McGee

Yes

2

Lonnie Smith

No

3–5

Tom Bernier

Yes

2–4

Douglas Fischer

Yes

1–2

Holly Preslar

(Clackamas Cnty.)
The Dalles
(Wasco Cnty.)
Roseburg
(Douglas Cnty.)
Pendleton
(Umatilla Cnty.)
Grants Pass
(Josephine Cnty.)
Coos Bay

Peter Smith
No

F: 7

Sharon Mitchell

Yes

1–3

John Hardiman

(Coos Cnty.)

RHODE ISLAND
(Bristol Cnty.)
(Kent Cnty.)
(Providence Cnty.)
(Newport Cnty.)

No

John Hardiman

(Washington Cnty.)
Warwick

Yes

1

M. Christine
O’Connell

(Kent Cnty.)

UTAH
Salt Lake City
(Salt Lake Cnty.)

Yes

Within 3 days

Patrick Anderson
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(Davis Cnty.)
Provo

Yes

Josh Esplin

(Utah Cnty.)
American Fork

No

3

Sean Patton

(Utah Cnty.)
(Wasatch Cnty.)

Yes

Dana Facemyer

Ogden

Matthew Nebeker

(Weber Cnty.)
471

VIRGINIA
Alexandria

Yes

1–3
28472

Melinda Douglas

Richmond

No

5–

Fairfax

No

2–4

Todd Petit

Petersburg

Yes

Martinsville

Yes

1

Thomas Stanley

Yes

1

Bill Jaquette

(Chelam Cnty.)

Yes

1

Keith Howard

Port Townsend

No

10

Ben Critchlow

Yes

1

Anny Daly

No

3 – 10

Harry G. Gasnick

Susan Herman

WASHINGTON
Everett
(Snohomish Cnty.)
Wenatchee

(Jefferson Cnty.)
Seattle
(King Cnty.)
Port Angeles

471. Most of the major cities in the state of Virginia are not part of counties,
but rather are independent cities.
472. “We’re in some arraignments and not others,” said Public Defender Susan
Herman. Typically, a jailed defendant charged with a misdemeanor gains the
benefit of a lawyer’s representation within two to four weeks, while a defendant
facing a felony charge will wait four to six weeks or longer for a drug charge.
Herman stressed that following the initial appearance, a lawyer will appear at a
bail review “within five court days where appropriate.” Herman Interview,
supra note 358.
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(Clallam Cnty.)
Spokane

Yes

(Spokane Cnty.)

F: 1

Kathy Knox

M: 14

Mark Hannibal

Bellingham
(Whatcom Cnty.)

Yes

1

Stark Follis

Tacoma

Yes

1

Michael R.
Kawamura

(Pierce Cnty.)

IV.

Location:
City (Cnty.)

HYBRIDS: MORE “NO” THAN “YES”

Counsel at
Initial
Appearance
within

Days Between
Arrest and
Representation

Attorney

48 Hours?
ALASKA
Anchorage

No

1–4

Marjorie Allard

No

2

John Richard

Yes

1

Kirsten Bey

No

3–4

Terry Rodgers

No

F: 7

Stephen Hale

(Anchorage
Municipality)
Palmer
(Matanuska-Susitna
Borough)
Nome
(Nome Census Area)
Dillingham
(Dillingham Census
Area)
Kotzebue
(Northwest Arctic

M: 2 – 3

Borough)
Bethel
(Bethel Census Area)

No

3–6

Megan Brady
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Sitka

No

2–7

Jude Pate

Yes

1

Eric Hedland

(Sitka Borough)
Juneau
(Juneau Borough)

Kevin Higgins

ARIZONA
Florence

Yes

Mary Wisdom

(Pinal Cnty.)
Tucson

Yes

1

Robert Hirsh

Yes

1

Jimi Haas

Yuma

No

F: 4 – 10

Michael Breeze

(Yuma Cnty.)

No

(Pima Cnty.)
Phoenix
(Maricopa Cnty.)

Holbrook
(Navajo Cnty.)
Flagstaff

No
(unless counsel
requested)
No

Jose DelaVara
2 (if requested)

Alan LoBue

5 (if no request)

Emery LaBarge

10

H. Gerhardt

(Coconino Cnty.)
Parker

Michael Breeze

(La Paz Cnty.)

No

2 – 10

Window Rock

No

30+

Kathleen Bowman

No

30

James Dunham

(Apache Cnty.)

ARKANSAS
Russellville
(Pope Cnty.)
Texarcana

Wayne Dowd

(Miller Cnty.)

No

35 – 45

Morrilton

No

F: 30

(Conway Cnty.)

Michael Allison

M: 14

Fayetteville

Greg Paris

(Washington Cnty.)

No

30

Blytheville

No

30 – 60

John Bradley
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(Mississippi Cnty.)
Mary Catherine
Little Rock
(Pulaski Cnty.)

Williams, Bill
Yes

2–3

Simpson

COLORADO
Sterling
(Logan Cnty.)

Mike Boyce
No

7 – 14

No

7 – 14

La Junta
(Otero Cnty.)
Denver

F: 1 – 2

(Denver Cnty.)

Yes

Burlington

Yes

M: 1 – 7
2

Douglas Wilson
Jennifer Ahnstedt

(Kit Carson Cnty.)
Pueblo

Douglas Wilson

No

1–2

Douglas Wilson
Michael Garlan

(Pueblo Cnty.)

GEORGIA
Conyers

James Purvis

(Rockdale Cnty.)

Yes

3

(Rockdale Cnty.)

No

2 – 10

Tom Humphries

Atlanta

Yes

2–3

Vernon Pitts, Jr.

No

10 – 21

Donna Seagraves

(Glynn Cnty.)

No

Varies

Karen Maid

Douglas

No

28 – 35

Michell Entie

No

14 – 30

Claudia Saari

No

21 – 28

Jason Olson

No

12 – 14

Patricia Gross

(Fulton Cnty.)
Jackson
(Butts Cnty.)

(Coffee Cnty.)
(DeKalb Cnty.)

ILLINOIS
Harrisburg
(Saline Cnty.)
Murphysboro
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(Jackson Cnty.)
Effingham

No

2–5

Lupita Thompson

Yes

2–3

Jerry Crisel

No

21 – 30

Nathan Rowland

No

4

William Rasmussen

No

30

Valerie Pacis

(Clinton Cnty.)

No

2 –14

Richard Goff

Chicago

Yes

2-3

Lindsay Huge

(Fulton Cnty.)

No

7 – 14

Walter Barra

Mason City

No

4

Roger Thomson

(Vermilion Cnty.)

Yes

2

Robert McIntire

Madison

No

5 – 10

John Rekowski

No

10

Edward Glazar

No

7

David Williams

No

5 – 10

Frederick Bernard, I

Yes

1

Randy Rosenbaum

No

7

Karen Sorenson

No

3–4

Timothy Lapellini

(Effingham Cnty.)
Albion
(Edwards Cnty.)
McLeansboro
(Hamilton Cnty.)
Carthage
(Hancock Cnty.)
Wheaton
(DuPage Cnty.)

(Cook Cnty.)

(Mason Cnty.)

(Madison Cnty.)
Kankakee
(Kankakee Cnty.)
Fairfield
(Wayne Cnty.)
Pekin
(Tazewell Cnty.)
Urbana
(Champaign Cnty.)
Rockford
(Winnebago Cnty.)
Ottawa
(LaSalle Cnty.)
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Mt. Carmel
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No

30

Cassandra Goldman

No

Varies

John Carter

No

10 – 30

Thomas Piper

No

7 – 10

Azhar Minhas

No

7 – 14

No

5

Eugene Stockton

No

4

Don Pioletti

No

7 – 10

Brian Trentman

(Marion Cnty.)

No

2–7

L. E. Broeking

Benton

No

20

Eric Dirnbeck

No

14 – 24

Dennis Riley

No

3

Robert Swiney

Yes

3

Michael Hunt

(Wabash Cnty.)
Macomb
(McDonough Cnty.)
White Hall
(Greene Cnty.)
Belvidere
(Boone Cnty.)
(Clark Cnty.)
(Edgar Cnty.)
Cambridge
(Henry Cnty.)
Eureka
(Woodford Cnty.)
Nashville
(Washington Cnty.)

(Franklin Cnty.)
Oregon
(Ogle Cnty.)
Shelbyville
(Shelby Cnty.)

INDIANA
Bloomington
(Monroe Cnty.)
Fort Wayne

Anne Payne
No

7 – 10

(Allen Cnty.)
Auburn

Randall Hammond
Krista Cook

No

45

Pappas

Yes

3

Ann Sutton

(Dekalb Cnty.)
Indianapolis
(Marion Cnty.)
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Salem

No

14 – 21

Mark Clark

No

5–7

Alex Woloshansky

No

10

Valorie Wilson

No

10

Matt Pittenger

Yes

1–3

Paul Kaufman

No

15 – 20

David Staudt

No

2 – 10

Paul Rounds

No

8 – 10

Brian Sissel

No

10

John Robertson

Yes

1–3

Susan Flunder

No

10

D Sallen

No

10

Tomas Rodriguez

Yes

1–3

Roberta Megel

No

1–7

Kathleen Brown

No

3–5

Catherine Rice

(Washington Cnty.)
Gary
(Lake Cnty.)

IOWA
Des Moines
(Polk Cnty.)
Sioux City
(Woodbury Cnty.)
(Plymouth Cnty.)
Dubuque
(Dubuque Cnty.)
Waterloo
(Black Hawk Cnty.)
Nevada
(Story Cnty.)
Cedar Rapids
(Linn Cnty.)
Iowa City
(Johnson Cnty.)
Mason City
(Cerro Gordo Cnty.)
Fort Madison
(Lee Cnty.)
Marshalltown
(Marshall Cnty.)
Council Bluffs
(Pottawattamie Cnty.)

MISSOURI
Sedalia
(4 rural counties)
Kennett
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(Dunklin Cnty.)
Columbia

No

7 – 10

Kevin O’Brien

Yes

2

Brandon Sanchez

Yes

1–3

Patrick Brayer

(Boone Cnty.)
Caruthersville
(Pemiscot Cnty.)
Clayton
(St. Louis Cnty.)
St. Louis City

David Reynolds
Yes

1–2

(St. Louis City Cnty.)
Moberley

Steven Reynolds
Yes

1–3

(5 rural counties)
Nevada

Mary Fox

Leecia Carnes
Robert Fleming

No

1 – 14

Joe Zuzul

No

7 – 21

Leon Munday

No

4

Justin Carver

No

21

Michelle Davidson

No

7

Thomas Gabel

Yes

1–2

Dennis Keefe

No

7

(4 counties)
Kansas City
(Jackson Cnty.)
Fulton
(Callaway Cnty.)
Maryville
(Nodaway Cnty.)
Troy
(Lincoln Cnty.)

NEBRASKA
Lincoln
(Lancaster Cnty.)
Columbus
(Platte Cnty.)
Madison

(in custody)

Nathan Sohriakoff

No

3–5

Melissa Wentling

No

7

Ted Lohrberg

(Madison Cnty.)
Norfolk
(Madison Cnty.)
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NEVADA
473

Reno

474

Yes

2

Jeremy Bosler

No

17

Kelly Brown

No

2–3

Philip Kohn

No

7 – 14

Kevin Walker

No

Varies

Frank Gonzalez

Yes

2

(Washoe Cnty.)
Ely
(White Pine Cnty.)
Las Vegas
(Clark Cnty.)

NEW JERSEY
Mount Holly
(Burlington Cnty.)
Toms River
(Ocean Cnty.)
Woodbury
(Gloucester Cnty.)
Salem

P. Jeffrey Wintner

(in custody)
Yes

4–7

Nathan Davis

No

3–6

Susan Silver

No

30

Johnnie Mask

No

7 – 12

Michael Freedman

No

7 – 10

Timothy Gorny

(Salem Cnty.)
Trenton
(Mercer Cnty.)
Somerville
(Somerset Cnty.)
Camden
(Camden Cnty.)
Cape May
(Cape May Cnty.)

473. “This office currently has an attorney appearing at all IAs, but courts are
inconsistent whether counsel can argue bail/release status, and official PD
appointment occurs days later.” Bosler Interview, supra note 377.
474. Public Defender Bosler decided to staff the initial appearance video bail
hearings after he read about the Maryland right to counsel lawsuit. See
Richmond v. Dist. Court of Md., 990 A.2d 549 (Md. 2010). His lawyers are
stationed at the jail, although the Reno prosecutors have objected since formal
appointment does not occur until seven to ten days after the initial appearance.
Bosler Interview, supra note 377.

2011] PROSECUTION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION
Newark
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Yes

1–2

Michael Marucci

No

7

Jorge Godoy

Yes

2–3

Dolores Mann

No

14

Ben Bauer

No

7

Christian Hatfield

No

2 – 15

Rebecca Reese

Yes

1–2

Sergio Viscoli

Yes

1–2

Ken Henri

No

F: 14

Bryan Collins

(Essex Cnty.)
Bridgeton
(Cumberland Cnty.)
Morristown
(Morris Cnty.)

NEW MEXICO
Santa Fe
(Santa Fe Cnty.)
Aztec
(San Juan Cnty.)
Hobbs
(Lea Cnty.)
Albuquerque
(Bernalillo Cnty.)
Las Cruces
(Doña Ana Cnty.)

NORTH CAROLINA
Raleigh
(Wake Cnty.)
Winston-Salem

M: 30
No

15 – 30

Peter Clary

(Forsyth Cnty.)
Brevard

No

4

Paul Welch

Yes

2–3

Lawrence Campbell

No

F: 10

Mark Touler

M: 40

Tony Purcelle

No

14 – 30

Robert Kemp, III

No

28 – 48

Angus Thompson, II

(Transylvania Cnty.)
Durham
(Durham Cnty.)
Charlotte
(Mecklenburg Cnty.)
Greenville
(Pitt Cnty.)
Lumberton
(Robeson Cnty.)
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Jim Thorpe
(Carbon Cnty.)

No

7

Greg Mousseau

Lancaster

No

30

James Karl

No

11 – 21

Glen Welsh

No

20

Bob Jones

Yes

3

Ellen Greenlee

(Lancaster Cnty.)
Reading
(Berks Cnty.)
Johnstown
(Cambria Cnty.)
Philadelphia
(Philadelphia Cnty.)

Charles Anthony
Cunningham, III

Doylestown
(Bucks Cnty.)

No

2–3

Stephen Shantz

(Belleforte Borough)

Yes

3 – 10

David Crowley

No

5 – 10

F. R. Gutshall

(Lackawanna Cnty.)

No

6

Joseph Kalinowski

(Cumberland Cnty.)

No

5 – 10

Taylor P. Andrews

(Union Cnty.)

No

7 – 10

Brian Ulmer

Media

No

10

Douglas Roger

No

10

William R. Carroll

No

7

Pat Carlson

(Minnehaha Cnty.)

Yes

1

Traci Smith

Deadwood

No

F: 21

Matt Pike

Huntingdon
(Huntingdon Cnty.)
Scranton

St. Lewisburg

(Delaware Cnty.)
(Somerset County)

SOUTH DAKOTA
Pierre
(Hughes Cnty.)
Sioux Falls

(Lawrence Cnty.)
Rapid City

M: 14
No

F: 15

Paula Peterson
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M: 2 – 5

(Pennington Cnty.)

WEST VIRGINIA
Charleston

Yes

Randy Markum

(Kanawha Cnty.)
Berkeley

No

45

T. Delaney

No

F: 10

Teresa McCune

(Jefferson Cnty.)
Williamson
(Mingo Cnty.)
Fayetteville

M: up to 120 days
No

F: 10

Nancy Fraley

No

F: 10

Deborah A. Lawson

(Fayette Cnty.)
Martinsburg
(Berkeley Cnty.)
Kingwood

M: 45
No

Randy Goodrich

M: 30 – 45

(Preston Cnty.)
Clarksburg

F: 10

No

8 – 10

Nancy Ulrich

(Harrison Cnty.)

WYOMING
Cheyenne

Scott Mitchel Guthrie

(Laramie Cnty.)

Yes

Casper

No

3
M: 10 – 14

Kerri Johnson

(Natrona Cnty.)
F: 10

Gillette

Mike Shoumaker

No
M: 60

(Campbell Cnty.)
Douglas
(Converse Cnty.)

Bill Disney
No

7

Cody

Brigita Krisjansons

(Park Cnty.)

No

5

Worland

No

5 – 10

(Washakie Cnty.)

Richard Hopkinson

